Democratic assistance to post-conflict Ethiopia: impact and limitations by Dessalegn Rahmato & Meheret Ayenew
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribuiion-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs 3.0 Licence, 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.0rg/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
I 
INSTITUTE 
OS 
DEVELOPMENT 
SIUD12S 
USSAfiV 
FSS MONOGRAPH SERIES 3 
DEMOCRATIC ASSISTANCE TO 
POST-CONFLICT ETHIOPIA 
Impact and Limitations 
Dessalegn Rahmato 
Forum for Social Studies 
and 
Meheret Ayenew 
Faculty of Business and Economics 
Addis Ababa University 
Forum for Social Studies 
Addis Ababa 
IDS 
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of FSS or its Board of 
Advisors. 
Financial support for the printing of this publication was 
provided by the R O Y A L N O R W E G I A N EMBASSY for which 
we are grateful. 
ISBN: 1-904855-65-2 
ISBN-13: 978-1-904855-65-1 
Copyright: © The Authors and Forum for Social Studies 2004 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements- i 
Acronyms ii 
Abstract v 
Preface v 
I Country Introduction 1 
1 Background 1 
2 Conflict History 4 
3 The Elusive Peace 7 
4 Post Conflict Assistance 10 
a Development Assistance 12 
b Humanitarian/Relief Assistance 16 
c Assistance to Democratization and Governance 18 
5 Methodology 20 
6 Outline of Study 22 
II International Electoral Assistance 24 
1 Introduction 24 
2 Electoral Context 25 
3 Post-Conflict Elections- 27 
a The 1992 Interim Elections 27 
b The 1995 Constituent Assembly Elections 29 
c The 1995 First National Assembly Elections 30 
d The 2000 National Elections 31 
4 International Electoral Assistance 36 
a Technical and Financial Assistance for Constitutional 
and Legal Reforms 36 
b Assistance to the National Electoral Board 38 
c Political Party Assistance 42 
d International Election Monitoring 44 
e Civic and Voter Education 44 
5 Impact of Electoral Assistance 45 
6 Conclusions 47 
III International Human Rights Assistance 49 
1 Background: History of Human Rights Violations 49 
2 Post-Conflict Human Rights Context 51 
3 International Assistance to Human Rights 55 
a Human Rights Observation 55 
b Red Terror Tribunals 57 
4 Legal and Institutional Reforms 57 
a Structure of the Court System 57 
b Recruitment and Independence of the Judicial System.. 58 
c Training 60 
d Court Administration Reform 61 
e Law Reform and Revision 62 
f Parliament Capacity Building 63 
5 Impact of International Assistance on the Justice Sector 
and Parliament 63 
6 Impact of Electoral Assistance on Civil Society 65 
Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO) 66 
7 Human Rights Institutions 68 
a Overview 68 
b Human Rights Commission/Ombudsman 68 
c Human Rights Organizations 69 
8 Conclusions 74 
IV The Media and International Assistance 78 
1 Introduction 78 
2 Context 79 
a Regulatory Framework 79 
b Problems of the Media 81 
c Relations between the Media and Government 85 
3 International Assistance 88 
a International Assistance to Media for Elections 88 
b International Assistance for Training of Journalists.... 89 
c Other Support to the Private Press 90 
d Assistance to Regulatory Reforms 91 
e Support to Media Organizations 92 
4 Impact of International Assistance 94 
V Conclusions 99 
Limitations of Democratic Assistance 99 
REFERENCES 104 
PERSONS INTERVIEWED 111 
Tables 
Table 1.1 Comparative Political Profile of the Three Regimes 
Table 1.2a Total ODA to Ethiopia 1991 to 1996 
Table 1,2b ODA to Ethiopia 1997 to 2003 (in million USD) 
Table 1.3 ODA Trends by Source 1997 to 2003 (in million USD) 
Table 2.1 Constituent Assembly Election Results 1995 
Table 2.2 House of Representative National Election Results 1995 
Table 2.3 National Election Results for House of Representatives 
2000 
Table 2.4 Number of Candidates in 2000 Elections 
Table 2.5 Number of Parliamentary Seats in 2000 Elections 
Table 2.6 Estimated Use of Free Air Time by Parties and 
Government Officials in the 2000 Elections (in minutes) 
Table 2.7 Outcomes of Elections under the Three Regimes 
Table 2.8 Cost of Elections in Ethiopia 1993/94-2001/02 (in USD) 
Table 2.9 Comparative Data on Cost of Elections in Selected 
African Countries (in USD) 
Table 2.10 Assistance to Registered Political Parties for the 2000 
Elections 
Table 3.1 Human Rights Violations 1991-2000 
Table 3.2 Number of Participants in Judicial Training Program 
2000-2003 
Table 4.1 Indicators of State of Media 2002 
Table 4.2 Sample of Four Independent Weekly Newspapers 
Table 4.3 Threats to Press Freedom 1994 
Figure 
Figure 1.1 Average Share of ODA by Ten Largest Bilateral Donors, 
1997 to 2003 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank all government officials, staff of human rights 
groups and officials of donor agencies who provided us information and 
who were kind enough to sit for interviews and to answer our questions. 
Without their cooperation this study would not have been completed. We 
would also like to thank all participants of the brainstorming workshop 
held on 28 October 2003 to discuss the preliminary findings of the study; 
their critical comments were very valuable to us. 
Finally, our sincere appreciation to our research assistant, Fassil 
Yenealem, who was diligent and hardworking, who spared no effort in 
tracking down sources of information and documents, and who played a 
very important supporting role in the preparation of the study. 
1 


OLF = Oromo Liberation Front 
ONC = Oromo National Congress 
OPDO = Oromo People's Democratic Organization 
PDRE = People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
PMAC = Provisional Military Administrative Council 
SAHRE = Society for the Advancement of Human Rights 
SAP = Structural Adjustment Program 
SDPRP = Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction 
Program 
SEPDC = South Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Coalition 
TGE = Transitional Government of Ethiopia 
TPLF = Tigrai People's Liberation Front 
UK = United Kingdom 
UNDP = United Nations Development Programme 
UNESCO = United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural 
Organization 
UNICEF = United Nations Children's Fund 
UNMEE = United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
US = United States 
USAID = United States Agency for International Development 
WB = World Bank 
WFP = World Food Programme 
WHO = World Health Organization 
WPE = Worker's Party of Ethiopia 
iv 
DEMOCRATIC ASSISTANCE TO 
POST-CONFLICT ETHIOPIA 
Impact and Limitations 
Dessalegn Rahmato and Meheret Ayenew 
Abstract 
There is a long history of donor relationship with Ethiopia going hack at 
least to the early 1940s. Since then, the number of bi- and multi-lateral 
donors providing assistance to the country has grown substantially. At 
present, the U.S., Japan and the Scandinavian countries are the major 
bilateral donors, while the World Bank, the EU and agencies in the UN 
system provide the bulk of the multilateral assistance. The international 
assistance that was offered to the country with the change of regime may 
be grouped into three categories: a) development assistance; b) 
humanitarian assistance; and c) assistance for democratization and good 
governance. 
Ethiopia has conducted a number of elections in the post-conflict 
period, the last one being in 2000. At present, the country is bracing itself 
for a third round of national elections in 2005. A comparison of election 
costs for selected African countries with Ethiopia shows that the cost of 
elections in Ethiopia has been quite low given the country's enormous size 
and its lack of experience in running democratic elections. Ethiopia has 
received considerable international electoral assistance since 1991 and 
such assistance has strengthened the capacity of the National Electoral 
Board and civil society and human rights organizations in monitoring and 
supervising elections. Donor assistance has also been provided to 
political parties to make the electoral process more competitive. However, 
the impact of such assistance in democratizing the election process has 
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been limited because the ruling party has failed to broaden its political 
power base and provide a level playing field for all contestants. 
Human rights and advocacy organizations began to be established 
for the first time in the country following the fall of the Derg and the 
change of government. This has meant that the human rights record of the 
present government has been more systematically monitored and rights 
violations more extensively compiled than at any time in the past. Donor 
assistance to human rights has primarily been financial assistance to 
advocacy organizations on the one hand, and financial support as well as 
training and technical support to government institutions on the other. 
Assistance lias been provided for: a) preparatory work for setting up a 
government human right commission and ombudsman institution; b) 
reform of legal institutions, and training of law enforcement agencies; c) 
support to legislative bodies and training of legislators; d) financial 
support to civil society organizations active in monitoring human rights, 
human rights protection and advocacy. 
One of the first acts of the Transitional Government was to enact a 
press law, which turned out to have a dramatic impact on the country's 
media. At present, there are a large number of private papers published 
regularly. However, the free press is faced by a host of problems: 
structural, economic, and professional. International assistance to the 
media (both public as well as private) has been limited in scope, and 
relatively insignificant in terms of its impact. International donors have 
failed to make a strategic intervention in the media sector and have been 
limited to low level support with only limited results. 
Donor assistance to the democratization process in Ethiopia has 
been comparatively limited. In contrast, donors have invested heavily in 
the humanitarian and relief effort on the one hand, and in the socio-
economic development sectors on the other. Assistance to both sectors has 
been growing in the last ten years, and in particular assistance to the 
humanitarian sector has been increasing markedly in this period. 
On the other hand, financial support to civil society, especially local 
human rights and advocacy organizations, has been instrumental in 
enabling the growth of the voluntary sector in the country. Without such 
vi 
support, civil society would have faced serious difficulties, and its 
achievements, especially in the areas of human rights monitoring, training 
and advocacy, would have been more limited. On the other hand, the 
impact of international assistance on the democratization process in this 
country has been quite limited. The achievements registered to date in the 
areas of elections, human rights and press freedom have primarily been a 
product of local initiative, local organizations, and struggles by 
stakeholders. 
vii 
Preface 
There are a few points that we wish to raise here to put this work in proper 
context and to give the reader a better understanding of the circumstances 
under which the work was prepared. 
This work is part of a research project covering eight countries and 
intended to look into the role and effectiveness of international assistance 
in supporting the process of democratization in post-conflict situations'. 
The project was sponsored by the Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations based in The Hague. The countries in question, all of which 
have emerged from a period of destructive conflict within the last two or 
so decades, include Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Mozambique and Sierra 
Leone in Africa, Guatemala and El Salvador in Central America, and 
Cambodia in Asia. The study was launched in May 2003 and was 
planned to be completed in November of the same year. The timeframe 
for our study is 1991 to mid-2003. 
The research framework as well as the specific content of the study 
was defined by the Institute, which also selected the countries in which 
the investigation was to be undertaken. The project was designed to focus 
on three areas that were thought to constitute critical components of 
democracy, namely, elections, human rights, and the media. An important 
issue that was to be investigated was whether or not donor assistance has 
contributed to the development of sustainable and effective electoral, 
media and human rights institutions in post-conflict societies. 
Obviously, the study would have been structured differently if the 
framework and content were defined at the outset by the present authors 
themselves. This is not meant to imply a criticism of the Netherlands 
Institute. The Institute had to formulate a common framework for 
comparative purposes and to satisfy its own specific objectives, one of 
which was gaining a better understanding of the impact of international 
1 For the preliminary definition of the research project see the Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations, "Research Framework (Workshop Version, 1 May 2003)", The 
Hague. 
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assistance and how it can be improved to make a sustainable contribution 
to the process of democratization in post-conflict societies. Secondly, the 
authors were faced with several limitations, of which the lack of adequate 
information, in particular from donor agencies, and the time available to 
investigate the broad subjects identified in the research framework were 
the most serious. Democratization is a complex process, and the past has 
an important impact on the present. However, the research did not provide 
sufficient opportunity to investigate in depth Ethiopia's recent political 
past. The project defined the post-conflict period as "the phase beginning 
with the signing of the peace agreement or the end of the violent conflict". 
As far as we know, this is the first study to examine the role and 
effectiveness of international assistance on the democratization process in 
Ethiopia. The practice in this country up to now has been for donors to 
examine the performance of government and non-government institutions; 
we have reversed the spot light, focusing instead on donors and the impact 
of their assistance. We hope this will stimulate serious debate and will 
encourage more in-depth studies of a similar nature in the future. The 
work is a slightly revised version of the draft we submitted to the 
Netherlands Institute for publication. That draft contains a more detailed 
list of specific recommendations to donors (which we have taken out from 
the present work). 
Dessalegn Rahmato 
Meheret Aye new 
April 2004 
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I. C O U N T R Y I N T R O D U C T I O N 
1. Background 
With a population estimated in 2000 to be more than 64 million and a 
land area of 1.13 million km2, Ethiopia is one of the largest countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. It has a relatively high population density, 
ranging from 150 persons/km2 in Wollo in the northeast of the country 
to over 300 persons/km2 in parts of south-central Ethiopia. The 
population is estimated to be growing at 3 percent per year, and the 
demographic profde reflects the preponderance of the young, with 
those below twenty-five years of age making up nearly two-thirds of 
the total population (CSA 1999a). Urbanization is very low, and only 
15 percent of the population lives in urban centers, which makes the 
country one of the least urbanized in the world. 
The country is one of the poorest in the world, ranked 169 out 
of 175 in UNDP's latest Human Development Report (2003b). Per 
capita income is the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa, and average food 
consumption per capita per day is estimated to be less than 70 percent 
of internationally accepted standards (World Bank 2000). According 
to FAO reports, Ethiopia is one of the ten hungriest nations in the 
world (2001), and frequent food crises, including virulent famines, 
have brought suffering and devastation to the rural population all 
through the last half century. There is sufficient evidence that over the 
last fifty years, poverty, and in particular rural poverty, has been 
growing in severity and magnitude, and that the country's agriculture, 
which is the dominant sector of the economy serving as the main 
means of livelihood for the overwhelming majority of the population, 
has been in structural decline. This is evidenced by recurrent incidents 
of mass starvation and high levels of livelihood as well as ecological 
vulnerability (Dessalegn 2003a). 
The economy is dominantly rural, and, according to recent CSA 
(1999b) figures, the agricultural sector accounts for 81 percent of total 
employment and 84 percent of total exports. Agriculture's contribution 
to GDP is high but has been falling since the 1960s when it 
contributed 65 percent, while at the end of the 1990s this had 
decreased to a little over 45 percent (Befekadu and Berhanu 2000). 
Agriculture consists overwhelmingly of smallholder peasant 
cultivation producing a range of food crops primarily for own 
consumption using traditional farming practices. Due to stagnant land 
and labour productivity, food production has failed to keep pace with 
population growth. Similarly, due to population growth and the 
scarcity of arable land reserves, per capita farm plots are small and 
getting smaller, and the fertility of the land is diminishing 
continuously. There are those who have argued that unless a 
determined shift in economic policy towards greater industrialization 
is forthcoming, the prospects for the viability of Ethiopian agriculture 
and the sustainability of the environmental resources will be in doubt 
in the decades ahead (Dessalegn 2003a). 
The modern sector of the economy consists of a large service 
sector and a small industrial base. Manufacturing enterprises, both 
public and private, produce a small range of consumer goods 
predominantly for the local market; however, since the economic 
liberalization of the early 1990s they have had to compete, often 
unsuccessfully, with products flooding into the country from the 
booming economies of east and south Asia. Manufacturing industry in 
Ethiopia is in very poor state because it employs obsolete technology, 
and because many of the enterprises were established in the 1960s and 
are today in a decrepit condition. Industry accounts for 11 percent of 
total exports and two percent of total employment. There has been 
only limited investment in the past in basic infrastructure and thus 
surface transport, communications, electric power, and water supply 
are little developed. However, there has been some progress in this 
regard since the 1980s, although there is a long way to go before the 
country can have an efficient modern transport and communications 
infrastructure. Persistent poverty and livelihood insecurity over the 
last half century, brought on by underdevelopment, civil conflict, 
natural resource degradation, high population growth and frequent 
environment crises, have given rise to increasing poverty and 
permanent food insecurity, which from time to time has led to 
devastating famines. 
Ethiopia's political history in the last four decades has been one 
of upheaval and radical change. In this period, the country has had 
three radically different political regimes involving in each case 
economic, legal and administrative reorganization, leading to a great 
deal of institutional instability1. 
Until the mid-1970s, the country was ruled by an absolute 
monarchy, with political power concentrated in the hands of Emperor 
Haile Selassie, and economic power in the hands of a class of landed 
nobility and local gentry which between them owned a preponderant 
1 The discussion in this Chapter is based on the personal experience of the authors as 
well as the following works: for the period up to end of the 1980s: Andargachew 
1993, Clapham 1988, Gilkes 1975, Markakis 1974; for the 1990s and after: Merera 
2003;Pausewang et al. 2002, and Tronvoll 2000. 
share of the country's productive resources. The nobility and gentry 
controlled a major portion of the country's arable land, which was 
parceled out and worked by a class of poor tenant farmers. Haile 
Selassie's regime, which lasted from 1930 to 1974, with a brief period 
of Italian colonial rule (1935-41), was relatively stable and the period 
fairly peaceful for a majority of the population. The violent conflicts 
that were to bring large-scale destruction and loss of lives, and serious 
instability and disorder in the country are, by and large, a legacy of the 
post- Imperial period. The one regional uprising which erupted in the 
first half of the 1960s and which the Imperial regime was unable to 
put down was that in Eritrea, which was then a province of the 
country. While by the end of the Imperial regime this regional conflict 
had become an established liberation movement, it was successfully 
contained all through the 1960s and early '70s, with limited effect on 
the daily lives of a majority of the Eritrean population. 
The modernization of the state under the Imperial regime was not 
accompanied by the democratization of the polity, nevertheless, the 
Emperor did establish a parliament, provide a written constitution (in 
1931, revised in 1955), and introduce universal suffrage and a national 
electoral system. Elections to the lower House of Parliament were 
held every five years from 1957 onwards, however, since political 
parties were not allowed electoral seats were contested on individual 
basis. Parliament had little effective power but it debated legislation 
and acted as a sounding board. Absolute monarchy did not tolerate 
dissent or criticism, and the constitution affirmed that the Emperor 
ruled by divine right. Neither civil society organizations (other than 
customary self-help and burial societies) nor an independent media 
were allowed. 
The Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), or 
Derg, which seized power by overthrowing the monarchy in 1974, 
switched the country's diplomatic alliance towards the Soviet bloc, 
and embarked on the disastrous road of "socialization" of the country's 
polity and economy. The earliest reform which subsequently was to be 
the cornerstone of agricultural collectivization was the radical land 
reform of 1975. This effectively ended landlordism in the country, 
emancipating millions of peasants from the control of the propertied 
classes. However, land was to be state property and the peasant had 
only usufruct rights over it. Subsequent reforms eroded the benefits of 
the land reform, preparing the way for the socialization of agriculture. 
In the 1980s, partly as a response to the devastating famine and 
environmental shocks, the Derg embarked upon a massive program of 
resettlement and villagization involving millions of peasants. The 
popularity and good will it had gained from the peasantry as a result 
of its effective measures against the propertied classes and the 
distribution of land evaporated as the government turned more and 
more towards hard line Stalinist reform policies. 
The Derg's democratic pretensions only became apparent some 
twelve years after it had seized power. In 1987, it introduced a 
constitution which vested power in the National Assembly. However, 
in line with the accepted formula of Soviet bloc countries, the Derg 
established a party in the Leninist tradition, called the Serategnoch 
Party of Ethiopia (ESP) as the ruling party of the country. Effective 
power remained in the hands of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the 
military dictator, and a small coterie of his advisors who were 
appointed as the leading officials of the Party. Elections to the 
Assembly were held subsequently, but the seats were contested only 
by ESP cadres, and the outcome was decided long before the formal 
ballots were cast. The Derg was perhaps the most despotic and the 
most brutal regime in the country's history. Thousands of people were 
executed without trial, hundreds of thousands were thrown in jail on 
trumped up charges, and innumerable men and women were forced to 
flee the country for fear of arrest, persecution or execution. 
2. Conflict History 
Though their roots go much further back in the country's troubled 
history, the violent conflicts which engulfed the country all through 
the 1980s started in the post-Imperial period and escalated as a 
response to the unpopular policies of the Derg. These conflicts 
consisted of a feeble attempt at armed resistance by what the Derg 
called "the counter-revolution" (remnants of the propertied classes and 
their allies on the one hand, and radical opponents of the Derg on the 
other), war with neighboring Somalia, the Eritrean independence 
movement, and ethnic-based insurgency, first in the northwest of the 
country but later in western Ethiopia. The war with Somalia, which 
claimed a large swathe of Ethiopian territory, was humiliating for the 
Derg, and it was able to finally drive back the Somalia invasion 
forces, which had over-run a considerable part of eastern Ethiopia, 
with the active involvement of Cuban troops and large-scale Soviet 
arms airlift. The Eritrean independence struggle, which was now able 
to field a large fighting force and engage the Derg in conventional 
warfare, threatened to over-ran Eritrea at any moment, hence the Derg 
was forced to commit a considerable portion of its military force and 
resources to defend the province. From the latter part of the 1970s, the 
Tigrai People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which was fighting the Derg 
in the northwest of the country, grew to be a strong force to contend 
with. Other ethnic-based insurgencies included the Afar Liberation 
Front(ALF) in the northeast and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in 
the southwest, and an Islamic movement in the southeast. 
While on all the fronts the fighting was conducted between one 
armed force and another, there were spillover effects in which civilian 
populations were caught in the middle. But unlike civil conflicts in 
some countries in Africa (eg. Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Congo) or 
central America, there were few deliberate attempts on the part of one 
side or another to extend the war to non-combatants. Thus genocide, 
large-scale massacres, or acts of mass terror against civilian 
populations during the war were fairly limited. Engaged on many 
fronts, and exhausted by continuous warfare that had been going on 
since the second half of the 1970s, the Derg's army began to crumble 
in the latter part of the 1980s. Due to high rates of attrition, a large 
part of the army was made up of young peasants forcibly recruited, 
and these had neither the training nor the stomach to fight what 
appeared to be an endless war. Moreover, the restructuring of the 
military apparatus by the Derg had been accompanied by the 
politicization, Soviet style, of the military personnel. Alongside the 
regular hierarchy of non-commissioned and commissioned officers 
were appointed political cadres recruited very frequently from the 
lower ranks who, as activists of the ruling party, ESP, were given far 
more importance than the officer corps. This was to be one of the most 
important causes of low morale within the Derg army. 
The anti-Derg forces, subsequently united into a coalition of 
ethnic-based parties called the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF), with the TPLF as the dominant partner, 
intensified their offensive against government forces towards the end 
of the 1980s, winning ground and advancing on Addis Ababa rapidly. 
As the Derg army continued to disintegrate, and the government 
increasingly lost all support from the public, in particular the 
peasantry, the insurgents' offensive met with little resistance. In mid-
May 1991, with the rebels almost at the gates of the capital, Mengistu 
Haile Mariam fled the country for exile in Zimbabwe. There was an 
attempt to bring together all the rebel groups and the Derg at the short-
lived London Peace Conference in early May 1991, with the U.S. 
playing an active role to broker a peace deal, but this flopped because 
the Derg was collapsing at that very moment and the rebels were at 
the gates of the capital. The main beneficiary of the aborted 
Conference was the EPRDF, which gained the support of Washington 
and which was to provide it a measure of legitimacy among Western 
powers. The EPRDF forces finally entered Addis Ababa on 28 May, 
with the Eritrean liberation forces capturing Asmara soon after. This 
brought to an end over a decade and half of brutal military 
dictatorship. While there was confusion and uncertainty among large 
sections of the public with regard to the future, it was everyone's hope 
that the overthrow of the Derg would usher in a time of peace and 
stability. 
The EPRDF's immediate objective after seizing power was to 
bring about peace and public order. This was a welcome initiative, for 
after nearly two decades of insurgency and civil conflict, there was an 
overwhelming desire on the part of the public for an end to hostilities 
and civil discord. But the most important reform agenda of the new 
rulers was to destroy the apparatus of state built up under the Derg, to 
restructure the country and its civil administration along ethnic lines, 
and to establish ethnicity as the defining principle of political, social 
and economic discourse. As part of this endeavor, EPRDF convened a 
"Peace and Democracy Conference" a month after assuming power in 
which twenty-nine ethnic-based political groups, most of which 
hastily organized for the occasion a week or two earlier, participated. 
The conference, which was dominated by EPRDF, and through it the 
TPLF, endorsed a Charter for the transitional period, and approved the 
establishment of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia with an 
interim legislative body in which the EPRDF, and the Oromo 
Liberation Front were heavily represented. It also approved the 
holding of a UN-supervised referendum in Eritrea to formalize its 
separation from Ethiopia. With the subsequent independence of 
Eritrea, Ethiopia lost its outlet to the sea. The Charter affirmed respect 
for the law, protection of human rights, and equality of all ethnic 
nationalities which had the right to self-determination but which were 
to be part of a federal Ethiopia (TGE 1991). 
Following the setting-up of the Transitional Government, there 
were a number of important political developments. The country's 
administrative map was redrawn along ethnic lines and "Regional 
States" for each of the major nationalities were created. These 
Regional States were given wide administrative and legislative power. 
The goal was to be the devolution of power within a federal 
framework. In 1992, local and regional elections were held throughout 
the country. The elections were monitored both by local and foreign 
observers. Ethnic federalism was further formalized by the drafting of 
a Constitution in 1994 following elections that were held to the 
Constituent Assembly whose job was to ratify the Constitution. The 
Constitution establishes a federal state, the component elements of 
which were "nations, nationalities and peoples". It endorses respect for 
human rights, the rule of law, and a multi-party electoral regime. 
There were federal parliamentary and Regional elections in 1995 and 
five years later in 2000 on the one hand, and local council elections in 
2001 on the other. In all instances, foreign observers were allowed to 
monitor the balloting process. 
3. The Elusive Peace 
The establishment of peace and public order in the country following 
the fall of the Derg proved to be a difficult undertaking. Due to many 
years of civil war, both internally and also among ethnic and political 
divisions in the neighboring countries of the Horn, there was a large 
inflow of arms into Ethiopia as well as the region as a whole. 
Moreover, the defeated and subsequently disbanded Derg army, 
numbering over 200,000 soldiers, many of whom still in possession of 
their arms, posed a serious threat to public order. The initial euphoria 
and partnership among the many small and unstable ethnic political 
groups that initially made up the EPRDF coalition did not last long, 
and soon the political process became polarized. 
There were sporadic armed hostilities in several parts of the 
country as well as widespread armed robbery perpetrated by some of 
the disbanded soldiers and armed political groups. On the other hand, 
the government began to forcibly suppress first the OLF and later 
other smaller groups (such as the All-Amhara People's Organization 
and the Afar Liberation Front), which had decided to pull out of the 
coalition. Moreover, due in part what to many seemed to be the 
government's encouragement for "ethnic separation" and in part to 
zealous activism of party militants in the Regions, there were several 
incidents of communal violence in which many people on the wrong 
side of the ethnic divide lost their lives; a considerable number of 
people were displaced and a lot of property was destroyed in these 
conflicts. 
Finally, there was the war with Eritrea, which came to a head 
following border incursions by the latter in 1998 (see Tekeste and 
Tronvoll 2000). Arguably the most senseless conflict in recent Africa 
history, the war placed an enormous burden on both countries which, 
in aggregate, lost tens of thousand of lives and caused immense 
suffering. Defense spending in Ethiopia went up sharply, resources 
that were earmarked for development and infrastructure were shifted 
to support the war, and the country's foreign exchange reserves were 
depleted. The human toll on the Ethiopian side includes 300,000 
internally displaced persons, 100,000 nationals deported from Eritrea, 
and 36,000 militia killed in the fighting (World Bank 2002). 
Comparable figures on the Eritrean side are not available though 
UNMEE notes that 350,000 Eritreans were displaced by the war 
(UNMEE website). The peace accords which were crafted in Algiers 
and which called for the cessation of armed hostilities were signed by 
both countries in 2000, and subsequently both agreed to seek 
arbitration on the border issue by an independent body. This led to the 
establishment of an independent Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission 
which began to hear evidence in The Hague in 2001. The peace 
accords also led to the establishment of UNMEE which was mandated 
to monitor the ceasefire and to liaise with the two parties. The war has 
had a damaging impact on the local economy as a whole, reducing 
private as well as public sector investment, slowing down business 
activity, and contributing to growing unemployment in the urban areas 
and elsewhere (EEA 2002). 
The political changes briefly sketched above were accompanied 
by equally dramatic changes in the economic sphere. The Imperial 
regime promoted what may be termed a "mixed economy" made up of 
public, private and joint enterprises. The public sector was the 
dominant sector in the economy, but that was largely because of the 
relative weakness of the private sector rather than a conscious policy 
in favor of public enterprises. The private sector was made up of 
foreign and local capital, but the latter was overshadowed by the 
former. The country suffered from limited development of basic 
infrastructure and lacked a sufficiently large skilled labor force, and as 
a result the flow of foreign investment into the country was limited. 
On the other hand, the regime pursued a pragmatic economic policy, 
had a fairly well-crafted legal infrastructure ensuring protection for 
private investment, and generous incentives to attract foreign capital. 
The Derg, which for some fifteen years was bent on building up 
a Soviet-style "command" economy, nationalized all productive 
resources and enterprises, including land, rental houses, foreign as 
well as local investments, and decimated the private sector. The 
pursuit of the full "socialization" of the economy was undertaken 
aggressively in the 1980s through the expansion of state enterprises in 
the manufacturing, commercial and retail sectors on the one hand and 
the collectivization of agriculture and villagization of the rural 
population on the other. By the beginning of 1990s, the combination 
of ill-advised and ideologically driven economic policy and a decade 
and half of war and violent conflict had resulted in the extreme 
running down of the country's physical and human capital, and 
infrastructure. 
The present government inherited a devastated economy and 
massive levels of poverty and unemployment. Its first task, soon after 
assuming power, was to launch a program of reconstruction on the one 
hand, and introduce reform measures to liberalize the command 
economy on the other. Encouraged by the World Bank and IMF, the 
government adopted a structural adjustment program (SAP) in 1992 
which involved the devaluation of the currency, liberalization of trade, 
deregulation of labor and wages, and privatization of public 
enterprises. These reform measures had mixed results: on the negative 
side were sharp price rises of consumer goods and severe pressure on 
poor and low-income families on the one hand, and increasing 
unemployment on the other; on the positive side were stabilization of 
the macro-economic environment. There was a respectable rate of 
economic growth in the first five years with overall growth reaching 6 
to 7 percent according to government figures, but opinion is divided 
on whether the main contributing factors were the SAP reforms, 
fortuitous circumstances, or a combination of both. 
The government has made a commitment to pursue a policy of 
free market economy, but there are contradictory elements in the 
development measures it has pursued and in the reforms it has failed 
to undertake; some of these decisions are ideologically driven. Until 
recently, the government did not show a strong desire to create a 
favorable environment for the private sector, which was placed under 
pressure by high taxes, hostile attitudes from government 
functionaries, and a stifling bureaucracy. To this day, "para-statal" 
enterprises, owned and operated by the ruling Regional Parties, enjoy 
favorable status from government, and a competitive advantage vis-a-
vis the private sector. The development strategy adopted since the 
mid-1990s, known as ADLI (Agricultural Development-Led 
Industrialization), which envisages peasant-based agriculture as the 
engine of growth, is based not on a sound assessment of the potential 
of the sector (which is limited) but reflects the bias of decision-
makers. This strategy, pursued since the mid-1990s, has had poor 
results and has led to the neglect of the urban economy and the 
manufacturing sector (Befekadu, Berhanu and Getahun 2001). 
Table 1.1 below provides a comparative picture of the 
similarities and differences of the three regimes under discussion on 
the basis of five "measures of democratization". 
Table 1.1 Comparative Political Profile of the Three Regimes 
Criteria 
Imperial Regime 
1941-74 
Derg Regime 
1974-91 
EPRDF Regime 
1991-2002 
State Form Absolute 
Monarchy; 
Unitary state 
Marxist-Leninist; 
Unitary state 
Ethnic Federalist 
state 
Parties No parties 
allowed; elections 
individual 
Single Leninist 
party system 
Multi-party 
elections allowed 
Media/Press Government 
media mainly; 1 
private radio 
station 
Government 
media only; 
highly restricted 
Government 
media and 
independent press 
Civil Society 
Organizations 
CSOs highly 
restricted; some 
professional 
associations 
allowed 
CSOs not allowed 
except inter'al 
NGOs; customary 
ones under 
pressure 
CSOs allowed; 
growing number 
inc. advocacy and 
human rights 
ones. 
Economy Mixed economy; 
pragmatic policy 
State or command 
economy; policy 
ideologically 
driven 
Restricted market 
economy; policy 
ideologically 
driven 
Source: Compiled by the authors 
4. Post-Conflict Assistance 
There is a long history of donor relationship with Ethiopia going back 
at least to the early 1940s. Initially, the main bilateral assistance came 
from a few countries, notably the U.S., Britain and Sweden, and 
multilateral assistance from the World Bank, FAO, WHO and 
UNESCO. Since then, the number of bi- and multi-lateral donors 
providing assistance to the country has grown substantially. At 
present, the U.S., Japan and the Scandinavian countries are the major 
bilateral donors, while the World Bank, the EU and agencies in the 
UN system provide the bulk of the multilateral assistance. In the 980s, 
at the time of the military regime, Soviet bloc countries provided 
substantial assistance, both military and economic. Interestingly 
enough, the Imperial regime did also benefit from economic assistance 
from the Soviet Union despite the obvious differences in political 
orientation between them. The relationship between the donors and 
the country has gone through cycles: many years of amicable 
relationship followed by years of friction and tension. During the 
Imperial regime, there was a slight falling off between the government 
and the donors towards the end of the 1960s when the latter were 
disappointed with the lack of progress in economic and political 
reforms. During the military government, the major donor countries 
such the U.S. withdrew their development support, though they 
continued to be significant actors in the area of humanitarian 
assistance. The Derg's Stalinist policies and its atrocious human rights 
record were cited as reasons for disengaging from the country. 
However, many European countries, the EC, as well as all of the 
multi-lateral donors continued to play active roles in the country. 
The new government has enjoyed considerable goodwill from the 
international donor community from the moment it assumed power. 
The military dictatorship it had replaced was unpopular among many 
Western powers, in particular the U.S. and its European allies, and 
there was great relief that it had finally been successfully overthrown. 
As the collapse of the Derg became imminent, the leaders of the rebel 
movement had quietly abandoned their hard-line Marxist-Leninist 
ideology and were keen to adopt electoral politics and a free market 
economy. This and their eagerness to listen to the advice of U.S. 
officials gained the new leaders a lot of friends within the donor 
community. 
The initial economic program that was adopted by the 
transitional government (TGE 1992b) was seen as sufficient proof that 
this was a government that the Western powers could do "business 
with". The World Bank and IMF were eager to have the TGE 
implement wide ranging structural reforms, in return for which they 
were to provide loans, grants and aid for reconstruction, while the 
bilateral donor agencies were ready to offer development assistance as 
well as aid for democratization and good governance. As noted above, 
it was not long before coming to power that the new rulers 
implemented a structural adjustment program which won them 
considerable support not just from the international financial 
institutions but also from the U.S., the EC and other significant 
donors. 
But the problems facing the country and the new government are 
immense and the assistance required quite complex. To begin with, 
there had been considerable destruction of infrastructure, social 
services, and the running down of management capacity in the course 
of the long civil war, and it was thus necessary to invest in 
reconstruction if the country was to embark on development activity. 
Secondly, the new regime was confronted with a colossal human 
disaster: in the period up to the mid-1990s, there were over two 
million "displaced" persons who were without means, without 
employment, and some of whom posed a serious threat to public 
security as well as to the political stability of the government itself. 
More recently, donors were at odds with the Federal government 
over issues relating to the conflict with Eritrea, and currently relating 
to the border demarcations. There are also other outstanding issues, 
such as the country's debt burden, economic liberalization, and the 
problems associated with recurrent food crises and famines that cause 
disagreement between one and the other. On the other hand, the 
government's recently completed poverty reduction strategy program, 
which was submitted to the international financial institutions as part 
of the debt relief (or HIPC) initiative, has promoted a notable degree 
of harmony between it and the donor community. 
But the cycle of boom and bust in Ethio-donor relations, and the 
response of donors over the years have also been influenced by 
international events, geopolitical considerations and other contingent 
factors. First, Ethiopia is a big country within the Horn (or Greater 
Horn) of Africa, and the international community does not want the 
country to collapse or plunge into civil war because this would have a 
spillover effect on the Horn countries leading to their political 
destabilization. Moreover, the growth of "Islamic fundamentalism", 
particularly in the Sudan, Ethiopia's neighbor, has led the U.S. and 
others to value Ethiopia's friendship. Thirdly, the U.S.-led war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the current campaign against "international 
terrorism" have been a godsend, as it were, to the country: Ethiopia 
supported the American effort in each instance and has been rewarded 
in return by generous humanitarian and other support by Washington, 
which now considers the country as a "frontline state" in the war 
against terrorism. 
The international assistance that was offered to the country with 
the change of regime may be grouped into three categories: a) 
development assistance; b) humanitarian assistance; and c) assistance 
for democratization and good governance. Unfortunately figures for 
the last category are difficult to get access to, though the evidence that 
is available suggests that it is on a much smaller scale compared to the 
other two. 
a. Development Assistance 
A comprehensive picture of the official development assistance 
(ODA) to the country from 1997 to 2003 is provided by a recent 
report prepared by UNDP (2003a), and in what follows we shall 
present a summary of the findings. ODA here includes humanitarian 
and relief assistance, though not assistance to democratization and 
governance. But a few words on ODA data sources and the level of 
external assistance to the country is in order here. 
First let us look at the data sources. There are three major sources 
of ODA flows to developing countries and we have looked at all three. 
These are the UNDP, OECD's International Development Statistics 
2003 which provides data on aid flows to developing countries 
annually from 1960, and the current (2003) annual publication from 
the African Development Bank entitled Selected Statistics on African 
Countries which gives ODA data for each country starting from 1980. 
Each source provides different ODA figures for each year, and in 
some cases the differences are significant. For example, external 
assistance to Ethiopia in 1997 was 605 million USD according to 
UNDP, 116 million according to OECD, and 578 million according to 
the ADB. In general, the figures from UNDP are lower than those 
from the other two. We have chosen the UNDP data for all the years 
shown below not because we think UNDP is more accurate than the 
others but because it is the data used by donors in the country and the 
Ethiopian government as well. 
Secondly, we should note that the level of assistance to the 
country is very low compared to many other African countries. On 
average, the country receives 16 USD per capita (and the trend is 
downwards), but the comparable average for Sub-Saharan African 
countries is 32 USD. On the other hand, aid finances between 35 to 37 
percent of the country's total public expenditure (UNDP 2001). 
The ODA data provided below are grouped into two periods, 
1991 to 1996 (Table 1.2a), and 1997 to 2003 (Table 1.2b). The figures 
in the first Table are simple aggregates while those in the second are 
further broken down into aid sources and types of assistance. We were 
unable to find figures showing breakdowns for the first period. The 
two Tables and Table 1.3 below present the flow of assistance to the 
country since the present government came to power. 
Table 1.2a Total ODA to Ethiopia 1991 to 1996 
(in Million USD) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
1001.1 1089.5 1070.3 881.1 816.1 727.2 
Source: wwvv.undp.org; UNDP 2001 gives 756.8 million for 1996 
Table 1.2b ODA to Ethiopia 1997 to 2003 
(in million USD) 
Year Total 
ODA 
ODA in 
form of 
Loan 
ODA in form of Grants 
Total 
Grants 
Grants to 
Humanitarian 
/Relief 
Grants to Normal 
Socio-Economic 
Sectors 
1997 605 114 491 181 310 
1998 675 149 526 152 374 
1999 730 202 528 232 296 
2000 925 142 783 448 335 
2001 1083 532 551 293 258 
Average 
1997 to 
2001 
804 228 576 261 315 
2002* 1448 656 792 383 409 
2003** 1584 713 871 201 670 
Source: UNDP 2003a. Note: *2002 figures are estimates; ** 2003 figures are 
projections. 
As the first Table shows, international assistance peaked in the early 
years of the present government but declined gradually from the mid-
19908. The large volume of assistance for the period until 1995 was in 
part to cover the cost of reconstruction after the war, to help the 
government demobilize the large number of Derg soldiers, to support 
returning refugees, and to avert serious food crises. The government's 
attempt to bring about a restoration of peace and stability was assisted 
considerably by safety net programs to the poor and to the large 
number of displaced and unemployed people in the country in this 
period. In the second period, as shown in Table 1.2b, assistance 
increased in magnitude from 0.6 billion USD in 1997 to 1.0 billion in 
2001, and is expected to grow to a projected 1.6 billion in 2003. 
Actual ODA disbursement for the period 1997-2001 averaged 804 
million USD. In terms of make-up, there is a clear trend that 
humanitarian and relief assistance is absorbing an increasing share of 
ODA. In the first five years, on average this category of ODA 
consumed 32.4 percent of total assistance. In 2000, 
humanitarian/relief assistance amounted to almost half of all aid. The 
figures for 2002 and 2003 show a declining trend, however, these 
estimates were made before the current massive food crisis was 
anticipated. Another point to note is that the grants portion of ODA is 
quite high and is expected to remain about 55 percent of the total aid 
in 2003. It can also be noted that the loan portion of ODA has jumped 
from 19 percent in 1997 to 45 percent in 2003. 
Table 1.3 and Figure 1.1 below show ODA trends over the same 
period by source. Except in the year 2000, multilateral assistance was 
much higher than bilateral assistance, and the two international 
financial institutions, in particular the World Bank, provided an 
increasing share of the total ODA. Bilateral assistance peaked in 2000 
to reach 575 million USD and has declined since then. At the outbreak 
of the Ethio-Eritrean war, many donors suspended assistance, and the 
notable decline in bilateral assistance shown in 1999 is a result of this 
measure, though it appears that this decline was made up by increased 
assistance by multilateral donors. Aid was resumed in 2000 with the 
signing of the peace accords, and both bilateral and multilateral 
assistance helped the government in its recovery, demobilization and 
reintegration programs. The U.S. remains the largest bilateral donor, 
disbursing on average 39 percent of total bilateral assistance for the 
period. It is followed by Japan, a distant second with 11 percent of the 
total and Germany third with 6 percent. Of the total multilateral 
assistance, the World Bank contributed (on average) 40 percent, 
donors in the UN system (FAO, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, etc.) 31 
percent, the EU 14 percent and the African Development Bank 10 
percent. 
Table 1.3: ODA Trends by Source 1997 to 2003 
(in million USD) 
Donor 1997 1998 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Average 
1997 to 
2001 
ODA 605 675 730 925 1083 1448 1584 804 
Bilateral 263 303 247 575 402 345 390 358 
Multilateral 342 372 483 350 681 1103 1194 446 
UN System 
(FAO, UNDP, 
UNHCR, etc) 
149 130 213 203 148 274 305 169 
WB and IMF 58 72 149 105 322 583 662 141 
Non-UN system 134 148 121 42 211 246 227 131 
Source: UNDP 2003a 
Figure 1.1 Average Share of ODA By Ten Largest Bilateral 
Donors, 1997 to 2003 
Source: UNDP 2003a 
The development sectors that have benefited from international 
assistance were transport, agriculture and the social service sector 
(health and education). At the macro level, ODA amounted to, on the 
average, 13 percent of GDP over the period 1997-2001, and ODA 
flows are growing at a faster rate than GDP growth, which averaged 
about 5.6 percent in the same period. Such a high level of assistance 
relative to GDP reflects the high level of humanitarian aid which has a 
limited impact on economic growth. 
b. Humanitarian/Relief Assistance 
The bulk of the humanitarian/relief assistance has been channeled to 
the country in the form of food aid. Food crisis, including famine, has 
been a recurrent tragedy in Ethiopia during much of the twentieth 
century, bringing suffering and death to innumerable peasant families 
and helping to prepare the ground for the collapse of both the Imperial 
and Derg regimes. The virulent famines of the 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s brought devastation to a wide section of the rural population in 
many parts of the country. More recently, the food shortages of 1994, 
and the famine of 1999/2000 caused large-scale deprivation and loss 
of human lives and livestock, putting enormous pressure on the 
present government. Behind these publicized tragedies are a large 
number of localized disasters which do not often attract media or 
donor attention, but whose impact on the population concerned is just 
as devastating. There is sufficient evidence that dearth and starvation 
have deep-rooted structural causes and are not a product of temporary 
social or environmental shocks. We also know that food shortages and 
famines have occurred with greater frequency since the 1960s than at 
any time before2. This must be seen against a background of growing 
poverty on the one hand and declining agricultural performance on the 
other over last five decades. 
The vulnerable population, that is people who are supported by 
food aid, has been growing rapidly in the last five decades, though we 
have reliable statistical evidence for the 1980s and 1990s only. In the 
decade between 1980 and 1989, the vulnerable population averaged 
4.2 million per year; in the period 1992-2001, the comparable figure 
was 5.3 million. In 1993, the third year of the new government, 7.6. 
million peasants (or 17 percent of the rural population) were facing 
acute food shortages; in 1994, the figure was 6.7 million (or 15 
percent). In both decades, 11 percent of the rural population was 
vulnerable annually. At present, the government has formally declared 
that 14 million people are vulnerable across the whole of the country. 
The flow of food aid into the country in the last three decades is 
also a good indication of the growing inability of the agricultural 
economy to feed the peasant population. According to government 
figures, the amount of food aid distributed in the country in the last 
three decades has increased dramatically. In the decade of the 1970s, a 
total of 688,500 metric tons (mt) of food aid was distributed; on the 
average, this was 76,500 nit per year. In the 1980s, the food aid flow 
had jumped to 5.1 million mt, and the annual average was 512,400 mt. 
In the period 1991 to 2000, the total and annual average figures were 
8.0 million and 798,800 mt respectively. The evidence shows that 
between 20 to 25 percent of the food consumed in the rural areas in 
the 1990s was made up of food aid. The European Union and USAID, 
followed a distant third by Canada, are the largest donors of food aid 
to the country (not counting WFP as a donor). These three donors 
provide about 50 percent of the food delivered to the country in any 
one year (WFP website). 
2 For the evidence for the discussion on the frequency of famine and dearth see 
Dessalegn 1994. The figures regarding vulnerability and the flow of food aid come 
from CSA and DPPC for which see Dessalegn 2003a. 
•. Assistance to Democratization and Governance 
A brief discussion of assistance to governance and democratization is 
now in order. It has been difficult to get aggregate figures on the 
subject; we have searched all data sources on ODA and external 
assistance but none include figures on this subject. Assistance 
provided in this sector by donors is not shown in either UNDP's, 
OECD's or ADB's documents cited above. The problem is further 
complicated by the fact that assistance to programs in this sector is 
frequently channeled through NGOs or civil society organizations in 
general, and it is not often easy to distinguish what has gone to 
governance programs and what to non-governance programs. 
It should be pointed out, however, that many of the major 
bilateral and multilateral donors have provided support to governance 
and democratization programs of one sort or another. Among the 
bilateral donors one may cite the U.S., Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, 
Canada, Germany, Italy and U.K.3 The programs commonly funded 
may be grouped into five broad categories: support to the electoral 
process; improvements in the justice and court systems; capacity 
building for Parliament; support to civil society and to the media. In a 
number of cases, support to elections has meant capacity building for 
the National Election Board (NEB), campaign finance channeled 
through UNDP and NEB, and funds to civil society groups to ran 
civic or voter educations programs. 
The available evidence suggests that overall such assistance 
makes up a small percentage of donors' total assistance to the country. 
There is also reason to suspect that some of the major donors have cut 
down on governance assistance for a variety of reasons4. There is a 
shift of emphasis from democratization and governance to socio-
economic and humanitarian assistance, and the shift, spearheaded by 
the U.S., has been justified on the grounds that economic growth must 
be a priority and that support to the democratic process will be made if 
it contributes to development, and in particular to the poverty 
reduction. Canadian assistance, for example, puts heavy emphasis on 
supporting the government's poverty reduction program, entitled 
SDPRP and initiated in 2002. One suspects also that donors welcome 
the shift because support to democratization is bound to be 
3 The AIDA website's list of donors for civil society and governance programs to 
Ethiopia does not include multilateral donors The list gives prominence mainly to 
Norway, Sweden, Netherlands: the U.S. and U.K are cited a few times, but Germany 
and Canada are hardly mentioned. 
4 See for example USAID briefing handouts, Canadian Embassy 2003, 2004. 
contentious since invariably there are bound to be failings in human 
rights and the electoral process which may lead to conflict or 
diplomatic standoff between donors and the government. While 
figures are not available, we have been informed that USAID's 
.governance fund has been decreasing in the last few years not just for 
Ethiopia but worldwide. The Governance Department of USAID-
Ethiopia was merged with another Department and its main officer's 
contract was not renewed because of budget cuts5. The Agency's 
recent briefings indicate that USAID has been running down its 
democratic and governance program and shifting the emphasis of its 
country assistance to other sectors, in particular to what it calls human 
resource development, i.e. education and health (USAID Ethiopia 
website) 
However, some donors continue to provide strong support to 
human rights and governance programs, the bulk of which is 
channeled through civil society institutions. A few examples may be 
cited here. Norway's assistance to good governance and 
democratization programs has been robust and has steadily increased 
over the years. More than one-third of Norway's bilateral assistance to 
Ethiopia in 2002, for example, went to support the work being done 
by civil society in the country, in particular in the areas of human 
rights, good governance and democracy. According to the Norwegian 
Ambassador in Addis Ababa, if the funds provided by Norway from 
its other budget posts are added up together, civil society receives 
"more bilateral and humanitarian aid from the Norwegian Government 
than the total amount channeled to the Government of Ethiopia and 
the multilateral system" (Norwegian Embassy 2003). 
Similarly, Canada has maintained a strong support program to 
democratization and governance; indeed, since the end of the 1990s it 
has pledged more money for this sector than before although the 
emphasis now is on assistance to democratic programs that directly 
support development. Canada's aid agency, CIDA, has identified 
Ethiopia, along with six other developing countries, as the focal point 
of its development assistance. Its support to improved governance has 
been running since 1994, and between that year and 2000 it spent over 
2.4 million USD on various projects focusing on legal and justice 
reform and capacity building (Canadian Embassy 2003). On the other 
hand, the European Commission, which had not had any serious 
programs on governance and democratization until the Cotonu 
Agreement of 2000 (see below), has now earmarked a budget of 25 
5 Oral information by Polhemus. See also USAID briefing handouts. 
million Euros for such programs for this country for the years 2002-
2007 (interview with Vetter). At the time of our interview, there were 
no programs that were being funded but there were several in the 
pipeline with implementation planned to start in 2004. 
In conclusion, three important points may be drawn from the 
discussion on international assistance presented above. First, the 
Ethiopian government is heavily dependent on international donors 
without which it cannot undertake development programs, feed its 
population, or even run its own administrative machinery. According 
to the World Bank (2003), for example, aid finances about 37 percent 
of the government's public expenditure. Secondly, this dependence is 
exacerbated due to the fact that a high and growing proportion of 
international assistance goes to humanitarian/relief programs, meaning 
essentially to feed the country's increasingly hungry population; this 
assistance does not contribute to economic development. Finally, the 
donors which should have considerable leverage over the government 
due to their significant contributions to both development and 
humanitarian assistance are the U.S., the World Bank, the European 
Commission, and the African Development Bank group. While Japan 
with 11 percent, and Germany with 6 percent of total ODA may 
command some attention from the government, Canada and three 
European countries (including the Netherlands) with 5 percent each, 
and a number of UN agencies (UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR) with 
similar contributions compete for influence on the government. 
Putting it in realistic terms, it may be argued that out of a total of some 
45 donor countries, only a handful, perhaps not more than five, 
provide assistance significant enough to exercise leverage over the 
government if they wish to do so. 
5. Methodology 
This study is based on information, observations and insights, and 
statistical material gathered from a wide range of sources. The 
following is a brief discussion of these. 
Interviews 
We conducted a large number of interviews with a) government 
officials; b) officials from a select number of donor agencies; c) 
persons in responsible positions in a number of civil society 
organizations on the one hand and newspaper editors, publishers, as 
well as government and independent media specialists on the other. 
The term 'civil society organizations' in this country refers to 
non-government groups that are involved in huma.i rights, advocacy, 
civic education, and in general, non-service delivery activities. Those 
whose activities are primarily service delivery and emergency relief 
are referred to as NGOs (see Hyden 1997 for the debate). 
The government officials we interviewed included the head of 
the country's National Election Board, officials at the Ministry of 
Information, officials of the Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission 
and an official from the Mass Media Training Institute. 
The donor agencies we selected were USAID, EC, the 
Netherlands Embassy, Canadian CIDA, and the British DFID. Later, 
we obtained information from the Norwegian Embassy. There are 
some fifty or so bilateral and multilateral donor agencies in the 
country each one of which has provided assistance of one kind or 
another to the government in the last ten years. The five we decided to 
select for the study have invested, relatively speaking, significant 
resources in the country's democratization effort in the last ten years. 
Arranging interviews or gathering information from donors is an 
immensely difficult task. First, there is high staff turnover among 
embassies and aid agencies. Officials' term of duty is usually three 
years, at the end of which they are either transferred elsewhere or in 
some cases leave the diplomatic service. The new officials that replace 
them lack the experience, and/or do not have ready access to the 
information that we were seeking. On a number of occasions, 
information is not found in readily accessible form, or does not exist 
altogether. It is interesting to note that we found government 
institutions had a better system of information management and were 
better able to provide information than many of the donor agencies we 
approached. The institutional memory of the agencies in question 
leaves a lot to be desired. Moreover, since what we were looking for 
was not only hard information but also observations, comments and 
insights, which can only come with experience in the job, the new 
officials were unable to be of much help. Finally, since many of the 
officials we spoke to were diplomatic staff and some of the answers 
we got were either not candid or were carefully couched in diplomatic 
language in which the substance was lost. 
Documents 
We gathered a large body of documentary evidence from government 
agencies, the donor community, civil society organizations, and the 
media. Many of these records are unpublished internal documents, 
occasionally merely computer print-outs. We have deposited many of 
the published and unpublished material at the FSS library. 
Newspapers 
We selected five independent and two government newspapers for 
closer examination. We read these papers on a regular basis to 
examine their content, concerns and management. Both authors are 
also familiar with many of the other papers published in the country, 
including the English language ones, as well as the broadcast media 
discussed in the report. 
Published Material 
We have made use of relevant published material for the discussion in 
each of the chapters. The sources in question consist of both primary 
material (ie., government and donor publications), as well as 
secondary materials- ie., books, monographs, articles, and 
occasionally, source material downloaded from the internet. The 
works also include papers, articles and monographs published by the 
present authors. 
Authors' Personal Experience 
The personal experience of the authors themselves has been a valuable 
input. The two authors were active observers and participants of the 
developments that are discussed in this study, and have done 
considerable research on subjects relevant to the discussion at hand. 
6. Outline of the Study 
The discussion that follows has four parts. Chapter II will focus on the 
electoral context and international assistance to the country's major 
elections. There have been three major national and regional elections 
since the new government came to power. Each of the elections will 
be discussed from the point of view of management and participation 
on the one hand and the contributions of international assistance to the 
success or failure of the electoral process. Chapter III is on human 
rights and human rights organizations, and the impact of international 
assistance in this sector. Chapter IV is on international assistance and 
the media. Many donors have provided support of one sort or another 
to the country's fledgling private press. There has not been much 
support to the government media and hence this subject has not been 
discussed at length though there are passing comments and references 
to it. The country boasts over seventy newspaper and news magazines 
and the fact that such large numbers are being published, while a 
welcome change from the past, has nevertheless created problems for 
the press itself. We shall discuss the nature of the assistance provided 
and the impact it has had on the media. We present in Chapter V our 
overall conclusions based on our findings and the insights we have 
gained in the course of the study. 
II. INTERNATIONAL E L E C T O R A L ASSISTANCE 
1. Introduction 
Elections in post-insurrection states have often been used to bring 
about peace and stability to once strife-torn societies. The agreement 
of conflicting parties to cease hostilities and conduct dialogue is an 
essential precondition for elections to be successful in ending years 
of political turmoil. Once peace reigns, the verdict of the people as 
expressed in free and fair elections will serve as a basis for sharing 
power and constituting a transitional administration that will be a 
precursor to a popularly elected permanent government. Often, it is 
such a government that is expected to bring about lasting peace and 
reconciliation. However, the experiences of many post-conflict 
states suggest that interim elections are not a smooth ride and have 
not always led to successful outcomes because of continuing violence 
and rebuttal by any one of the parties to abide by the choice of the 
electorate. 
Time and again, the international community has intervened and 
supported elections to bring about peace and order in states shattered 
by many years of civil war. According to Kumar and Ottaway 
(1998), the international community has often provided financial, 
technical and political assistance to organize elections in post-conflict 
states. These forms of assistance have proved valuable in conducting 
elections that lead conflict-ridden nations towards democracy and 
political stability. Public opinion in donor countries supports such 
initiatives because the alternative to inaction is continuous political 
and economic turmoil in such states and untold suffering for their 
peoples. For obvious reasons, the Western public can ill-afford to sit 
back and watch indifferently an unfolding crisis of immense 
proportions. Simply put, the advantages of electoral assistance in 
ending incessant instability and war cannot be overemphasized, and 
over the past few years there have been tremendous efforts to make 
such assistance more effective in steering crisis-ridden states along 
the path towards permanent peace and stability. 
Ethiopia has conducted a number of elections since 1991, the 
last one being in 2000, and has received substantial international 
electoral assistance for conducting these elections. The driving force 
behind much of the bilateral and multi-lateral electoral assistance has 
been the desire to pull the country out of many years of war-torn 
politics and create a stable and peaceful nation-state that would be 
inclusive of all opposition groups that fought against the Derg's 
dictatorial military regime (Harbeson 1998; Kassahun 2003). 
2. Electoral Context 
Ethiopia has had an election record dating back to the time of the 
Imperial era. The first electoral law in the country's history was 
promulgated in the 1950s and consisted of many articles on 
prohibited acts and unfair practices during public elections. Later, 
this law was amended in 1969 and the Central Election Board was 
created under the Ministry of Interior to conduct elections throughout 
the empire. It contained provisions on voter rights and obligations, 
registration and qualifications of candidates, number of 
constituencies, proper conduct of elections, counting of ballots and 
announcement of results. The Derg regime, which succeeded the 
Imperial Government, also adopted a similar system of electoral 
structure, including a national electoral board and a set of penal code 
provisions against offences during public elections. 
At present, Ethiopia has a bi-cameral Parliament consisting of a 
House of Peoples Representatives (HPR) and a House of Federation 
(HoF). According to the 1995 Federal Constitution, both Houses are 
elected for a 5-year term. The HPR has 550 seats, acts as the lower 
House of Parliament and is the main organ that makes laws and 
approves major policies of the government. The HoF is a de facto 
Upper House composed of representatives of nations, nationalities 
and peoples of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia. According to the 
Constitution, this house consists of at least one member from each 
nation and nationality and one additional representative for each one 
million population of the nationality or nation. Although 
constitutionally important as a representative body, the HoF does not 
have formal law making powers but decides on issues relating to the 
rights of nations and nationalities to self-determination, including 
secession. Its other main responsibility is to provide interpretations 
on constitutional issues. 
Members to the House of Representatives are elected on the 
basis of a plurality of votes cast in single member constituencies. 
Under this system, the candidate who receives the highest number of 
votes is declared the winner and others are dropped regardless of the 
number of votes cast in their favor. This electoral practice precludes 
the representation of candidates having alternative programs and 
views other than the winning candidate with the highest number of 
votes. In electoral systems that do not provide for a level playing 
field, such as Ethiopia's current system, this practice can give undue 
advantage to the party in power especially when the government has 
complete control over the mass media and other state resources and 
uses the same to influence the outcome of the elections in its favor. 
In several discussions with the authors, most opposition parties 
in Ethiopia have severely criticized the current single member 
constituency system as being undemocratic and favoring the ruling 
party. They have repeatedly called for changes to the constitution to 
allow for 'proportional representation'6. Proportional representation 
makes it possible for different political forces to share parliamentary 
seats in proportion to their electoral strength. In principle, no 
political force or part of public opinion retains a monopoly; at the 
same time, none is excluded from representation. Hence, the 
system's main virtue is said to be justice. Another advantage of this 
system is that voting takes place in a single round and the 
'politicking and bickering', which often takes place in systems 
practicing a second round, is avoided (IPU 1993). 
Ethiopia has a parliamentary form of government in which the 
House of Peoples Representatives (HPR) elects the Prime Minister. 
There is a State President who serves for a six-year term but his/her 
role and functions are largely ceremonial. As the leader of the party 
with the largest number of seats in parliament, the Prime Minister is 
the chief executive officer and wields tremendous power in the 
running of the country as well as in his relation with the legislature 
and the judiciary. He/she has the authority to dissolve the HPR but 
is required to call elections within six months of the latter's 
dissolution. One-party executive dominance is a typical feature of 
the Ethiopian government and this has meant a weak system of 
checks and balances among the three organs of government. 
As indicated elsewhere in this report, Ethiopia's electoral 
experience dates back to the Imperial era. Through Proclamation No. 
158 of 1957, the Imperial Government defined a series of 'offenses 
against public elections and voting' and corresponding punishments. 
Later, Proclamation No. 28 of 1969 was issued dealing with 
'Parliament and Elections'. The law established the country's first 
6 Interview with Ledetu Ayalew, Secretary-General, Ethiopian Democratic Party 
(EDP) 
electoral board, defined its powers and duties and set out registration 
and voting principles and procedures. In spite of its leftist ideological 
rhetoric, the Derg conducted elections by following similar practices 
and principles enshrined in the Imperial legislation. There was little 
competition in elections under the monarchy because the 
overwhelming majority of parliamentary candidates were supporters 
of the Imperial regime. Under the Derg, only candidates of the sole 
ruling party run for parliamentary seats. As a result, elections were 
neither free nor competitive under the two regimes. Further, both the 
Imperial regime and its successor, the Derg military dictatorship, did 
not allow international monitoring and supervision of national 
elections. EPRDF's inclination to allow election monitoring and 
supervision clearly sets it apart from its predecessors. 
3. Post-Conflict Elections 
Upon coming to power in 1991, EPRDF made a public commitment 
to democracy, national reconciliation and a broad-based government 
that will be inclusive of all vying groups that fought against the 
Derg regime. Subsequently, it has already carried out 4 major 
elections: the 1992 interim elections; 1995 national parliamentary 
elections; the 1995 constituent assembly elections and the 2000 
national assembly elections. All are intended to consolidate peace 
and order throughout the country, and create a proper climate for 
economic reconstruction and development. At present, the country is 
bracing itself for another round of nation-wide parliamentary 
elections in 2005. It is necessary to review the purposes and 
outcomes of these elections to provide a proper scene for assessing 
their contribution to peaceful transition and the prospects for 
democracy in post-Derg Ethiopia. 
a. The 1992 Interim Elections 
Following the ousting of the Derg regime by the Ethiopian Peoples 
Revolutionary Democratic Forces (EPRDF) in 1991, the country 
conducted its first interim national elections that led to the 
establishment of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in 
1992. The TGE was set up in the wake of the London and Addis 
Ababa peace conferences and was entrusted with the task of 
administering the country on a provisional basis under a transitional 
charter. Under the charter, the TGE was committed to conduct 
regional and local elections within three months of its establishment, 
drafting a new constitution, which required elections for a 
constituent assembly and holding national elections under the new 
constitution within two-and-half years. 
The EPRDF conducted the 1992 elections at national, regional 
and woreda levels to establish a Transitional Government that could 
fill the gap created by Derg's departure. The elections took place in 
about 450 of the 600 woredas. These were hastily prepared and quite 
a number of ethnic-based liberation groups that fought the Derg 
regime participated. As Ethiopia's first post-Derg elections, the 
elections were characterized by chaos and poor organization of the 
electoral process. Election irregularities were widely reported 
raising serious concerns about the legitimacy of the outcome as being 
the true wish of the people. More than any thing else, the EPRDF 
affiliated parties manipulated the elections in most of the 
constituencies to insure complete victory (Vestal, 2000; NDI, 
1992). 
The attempt to establish a broad-based government following 
the 1992 elections was unsuccessful because major political and 
ethnic groups boycotted the elections on grounds of 'unfair and 
unequal conditions' for participation set out by the dominant EPRDF 
coalition (Pausewang and Tronvoll 2000).7 Although controversial, 
however, these elections were important in setting the stage for the 
division of the country into ethnic regions controlled by parties 
closely affiliated to the EPRDF. The Amhara National Democratic 
Movement (ANDM), the Tigrean Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF), 
the Oromo Peoples Democratic Movement (OPDM) and the South 
Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Coalition (SEPDC) constitute the core 
parties of the EPRDF. About 45 other smaller predominantly ethnic 
parties are supported by and work with the EPRDF coalition but are 
not member organizations of the Front. Over the years, ethhnic 
parties closely allied with the EPRDF emerged as single ruling 
parties in their respective regions with little or no challenge from 
opposition parties. This eventually helped the EPRDF to solidify its 
control over the different regions because the parties affiliated with 
the coalition continued to provide the bedrock for its power. 
7 One of the major groups which boycotted these elections was the Oromo Liberation 
Front (OLF). 
b. The 1995 Constituent Assembly Elections 
The EPRDF conducted the 1995 Constituent Assembly Elections 
following the appointment of a constitution drafting commission by 
the Council of Representatives of the Transitional Government. This 
commission was entrusted with the task of preparing a draft 
constitution that was to be adopted by an elected assembly. The 
credibility of the commission was seriously questioned by opposition 
groups and political observers as the positions of chairmanship, vice-
chairmanship and secretary were held by members of the EPRDF 
(Kassahun, 2003). The opposition and critics of the government saw 
it as a move by the EPRDF to pre-empt any alternative vision for the 
future of the Ethiopian state and entrench the ruling party in power. 
The 1995 constituent assembly elections resulted in the adoption 
of a Constitution that established a federal state structure composed 
of quasi-sovereign ethnic-based Regional states. The Constitution 
devolved considerable powers and authority to the regions and 
transformed Ethiopia from one of a highly centralized unitary 
government to a decentralized federal state. While much of this 
exercise was important to the extent that it aided the country's 
peaceful transition, the inclusion of the controversial Article 39 of 
the Constitution, which sanctions secession for any nationality or 
ethnic group, has to this day continued to be a source of acrimony 
among groups with different visions for the future of the Ethiopian 
state. 
Table 2.1 Constituent Assembly Election Results - 1995 
No. Region Estimated eligible voters 
Registered 
voters 
Actual 
Votes cast 
Number of Wining 
candidates 
1. Tigray 1,549,192 1,226,208 1,146,510 37 
2. Afar 355,196 358,170 291,764 8 
3. Amhara 6,392,052 3,916,118 3,517,781 137 
4. Oromiya 8,072,722 5,197,913 4,444,640 177 
5. Somale 2,399,984 1,607,532 1,396,933 23 
6. SNNPR 4,810,319 3,590,440 3,277,368 123 
7. Gambella 53,784 49,316 26,085 3 
8. Harari 80,750 35,304 31,212 3 
9. Dire Dawa 184,221 66,702 40,794 2 
10. Addis Ababa 1,128,781 593,946 398,044 23 
TOTAL 25,359,550 16,778,620 14,697,992 536 
Source: National Election Board, Report to the House of Representatives, Addis 
Ababa, 1997 
Voter turnout for the 1995 elections was low compared to earlier 
elections. According to data obtained from NEB, out of more than 
25 million eligible voters, only about 15 million or only 60 per cent 
of the eligible electorate actually voted. As in the 1995 national 
elections to the House of Representatives, however, EPRDF had 
again a landslide victory winning 460 (90 %) of the total 510 
organized constituencies. This assured EPRDF an unquestionable 
hegemony in shaping the form and content of Ethiopia's post-Derg 
Constitution; and set the stage for legitimizing two singularly 
important and core agendas of the dominant EPRDF for the future 
Ethiopian state —the division of the country along ethno-linguistic 
lines and constitutionally enshrined right of any nation or nationality 
to secede from the federation. 
c. The 1995 First National Assembly Elections 
After nearly 4 years in power as a transitional authority, the EPRDF 
ruling group conducted the 1995 parliamentary elections to provide 
for a permanent government. These were largely peaceful and took 
place in a climate of relative political calm and order throughout 
much of the country. Nevertheless, many opposition groups and 
independent candidates boycotted the elections; and allegations of 
intimidation, imprisonment and voting irregularities were widely 
reported (Tronvoll and Aadland 1995; Polhemus 2002). In addition, 
the elections had other shortcomings, including insufficient civic 
education, apathy among the voting public especially among the rural 
peasantry and the absence of a strong and united opposition that 
could provide an alternative (Pausewang and Tronvoll 2000). 
Despite the inadequacies, however, the EPRDF had a landslide 
victory and managed to assert complete control of the executive and 
the legislature. 
Table 2.2 House of Representatives National Election 
Results—1995 
No. Region 
Regis tered 
voters 
Actual votes 
cast 
N u m b e r of 
winning 
cand ida tes 
M F 
I. Tigray 1,364,087 1,341,850 36 2 
I. Afar 574,616 503,483 8 -
J . 
4. 
Amhara 5,447,236 5,268,501 137 1 
Oromyia 6,191,826 5,855,598 174 3 
5. Somale 2,294,497 2,086,869 23 — -
6. Benishangul-
Gumuz 
213,665 195,487 9 
7. SNNPR 4,473,679 4,204,693 123 — 
8. Gambella 52,487 32,228 3 
9. Harari 60,357 52,412 2 
10. Dire Dawa 1,005,51 82,378 2 
I I . Addis Ababa 564,378 445,058 19 4 
Total 21,337,379 19,986,179 536 10 
Source: National Election Board, Report to the House of Representatives, 
Addis Ababa, 1997. 
When the results of the 1995 national elections were announced by 
the National Election Board, EPRDF scored an overwhelming 
victory winning 89 per cent (491 out of the 546 seats) of the 
parliamentary seats. Political groups not directly allied with the 
EPRDF and independent candidates won 19 per cent, out of which 
more than 55 per cent was filled by region-based ethnic parties 
which were not members of the ruling coalition but were under the 
direct tutelage of the EPRDF, such as the Somali Democratic League 
and the Benishangul People's Unity Party. 
d. The 2000 National Elections 
After its first 5-year term expired as a permanent government, 
EPRDF conducted the 2000 national, regional and woreda elections 
to provide a second term for itself. The elections took place at a 
time when relative peace and stability have reigned over much of the 
country. It was also a period when law and order was much 
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1995 elections when the EPRDF had not yet firmly established state 
authority throughout the nation. Nevertheless, it was also a time 
when the general public has not yet come to grips with the disastrous 
consequences of the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean border war and the ensuing 
fragile ceasefire. In 2000, the Government signed the Algiers Peace 
Agreement immediately before the elections. Although the 
Government scored a landslide victory in the polls, it is difficult to 
determine the extent to which the signing of the Peace Agreement 
might have helped its cause in influencing the outcome. 
Table 2.3 National Election Results for the House of 
Representatives—2000s 
No. Region Number of registered voters 
Number of 
actual votes cast 
Voter turnout 
(%age) 
1. Tigray 1,391,575 1,338,197 96.1 
2. Afar 495,181 328,908 94.9 
3. Amhara 5,333,079 5,293,553 99.2 
4. Oromiya 7,006,783 6,396,025 89 
5 
Benishangul-
Gumuz 205,489 172,865 84 
6. SNNPR 4,630.308 4,043,351 86.4 
7. Gambella 94,565 93,563 98.9 
8. Harari 56,295 56,066 99.5 
9. Dire Dawa 112,307 74,484 66.3 
10. Addis Ababa 849,510 664,759 78.2 
Total 20,354,156 18,659,481 91.6 
Source-. NEB, Addis Ababa, 2001 
The 2000 elections provided legitimacy to the EPRDF for a second 
term and were handsomely won by the ruling party. As Table 2.4 
below indicates, a total of 1156 candidates competed at the national 
level. There were 412 independent candidates and 744 candidates 
were put up by about 50 political parties that participated in the 
competition. 
8 Election results in the Somale Region are not included in the
Table 2.4 Number of Candidates in the 2000 Elections 
No. Description 
Number of 
Candidates 
% 
1. 
Number of EPRDF and other 
party candidates 
744 64 
2. 
Number of independent 
candidates 
412 36 
3. Total number of candidates 1156 100 
Source: Compiled by the Authors and Berhanu and Meleskachevv 2001. 
There were a total 547 parliamentary seats in the 2000 elections. 
Out of these, 263 or about 48.1 % were uncontested, i.e. only one 
candidate ran unopposed often from the ruling party, and thus went 
automatically to the ruling EPRDF. As shown in the Table 2.5, by 
winning 481 (88 percent) out of the 547 parliamentary seats, The 
EPRDF assured an overwhelming victory for itself. 
Table 2.5 Number of Parliamentary Seats in the 2000 Elections 
No. Description 
N u m b e r of 
Seats 
% 
1. 
Number of parl iamentary seats won 
by EPRDF affi l iate parties and 
uncontested seats 
481 87 .9 
2. 
Number of par l iamentary seats won 
by the opposit ion 
53 9 .6 
3. Number of Independent seats 13 2 . 3 
4. Total number of parl iamentary seats 547 100 
Source: Compiled by the Authors and Berhanu and Meleskachew 2001. 
Of all the national elections that the EPRDF conducted in its nearly 
ten years of rule, the 2000 national elections were by far significant, 
better organized and showed a relative degree of competitiveness 
especially in the Southern Region and some urban areas like Addis 
Ababa and Dire Dawa. There was much more spirited public 
discussion of issues among candidates representing different parties, 
and the people followed many of these elections with a great deal of 
interest. More important, the government allowed limited access to 
the state controlled media and airtime for campaigning by opposition 
and independent candidates. Still, however, the electronic media was 
largely dominated by politicians from the ruling party as can be 
evidenced by the fact provided in Table 2.6 below. 
Table 2.6 Estimated Use of Free Air Time by Parties and 
Government Officials in the 2000 Elections (in minutes) 
No. Organization/Politician Radio Television 
1. AAPO - Opposition 15 15 
2. EDP - Opposition 15 15 
3. EPRDF - Ruling Party 57 57 
4. Meles Zenawi - Prime Minister 60 60 
5. Ali Abdo Ruling Party 30 30 
6. Addisu Legesse - 45 45 
7. Abate Kisho - 42 42 
8. Kuma Demeksa 40 40 
9 Total 304 304 
Source: Berhanu and Meleskachew 2001 
The airtime offered to pro-government and opposition candidates 
was highly skewed in favor of the former. As can be observed in the 
Table above, a total of 304 minutes of airtime was used by different 
politicians out of which the opposition used only 30 minutes for 
radio and TV each, and this represented about 10 per cent of the 
total airtime. In contrast, politicians and officials of the ruling party 
used nearly 90 per cent of the airtime indicating a preponderant use 
of the electronic media by the party that controlled the state. This 
definitely gave undue advantage to the ruling party in introducing its 
programs and plans to the electorate. The role of the electronic 
media, particularly radio broadcasting, is critical in a country like 
Ethiopia where print media reach only a small proportion of the 
people. Hence, it is absolutely necessary to provide fair access to all 
the parties to guarantee a level playing field for competition during 
elections. 
Elections during the Imperial and Derg eras were neither 
democratic nor free. In both regimes, they were tightly controlled 
from above and largely ceremonial activities, which the people had 
to carry out as an expression of their obedience to the authority of 
the state. The public line up and cast their ballots because failure to 
do so can bring the wrath of the government (Pausewang, Tronvoll 
& Aalen, 2002). Under the monarchy, there were no political parties 
and candidates had to possess immovable property; these conditions 
could hardly qualify the electoral process as democratic. Under the 
Derg, people could vote only for candidates of the regime's Marxist-
Leninist Party masquerading as the Workers Party of Ethiopia 
(WPE). Since the elections were neither competitive nor open under 
the two defunct regimes, only official candidates won and often with 
a landslide victory. This reality is reflected in Table 2.1. It can be 
observed that the outcome of elections under the EPRDF reflect an 
extremely interesting resemblance to the two preceding regimes 
despite formal claims by the present government of having allowed 
multi-party politics. 
Table 2.7 Outcomes of Elections under the Three Regimes 
No. Regime Regime Characteristics Election outcomes 
1. Imperial Regime No parties Allowed 99% all regime candidates 
won 
2. Derg Regime Single ruling party 99% victory - all regime 
candidates 
3. EPRDF Regime Multi-party 95% victory for ruling party 
Source'. Compiled by the authors 
The table shows that despite differences in regime characteristics, all 
the three regimes invariably won elections with a landslide victory 
and the ruling group held or continues to hold power unchallenged. 
However, it is important to note that there are also important 
differences among the three regimes. For example, the Imperial and 
Derg governments never allowed the existence of a free press and 
freedom of association. Neither did they allow international 
supervision and monitoring of elections. In contrast, there is a 
struggling free print media under the EPRDF and the current 
government has, albeit reluctantly, allowed international and 
domestic elections monitors to observe elections in the country. In 
addition, unheard of under its predecessors, the present regime has 
to its credit allowed the growth and functioning of independent civil 
society organizations, such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Council 
(EHRCO), which have been very active in the election process and 
monitoring the state of human rights in the country. 
In Ethiopia, most political parties are ethnic-based and multi-
ethnic/national parties are far too small in number. As was indicated 
elsewhere in this report, about 50 parties contested the last 2000 
national elections and a substantial majority supported the ruling 
EPRDF. At present, there are a few opposition political parties but 
these are largely weak and ineffective in challenging the dominant 
EPRDF and offering alternatives to the electorate. In addition, most 
are urban based and thus unable to reach the larger rural 
constituency. They have been made less effective in part due to the 
heavy-handed tactics of the ruling EPRDF that includes harassment, 
intimidation and imprisonment of opposition party functionaries and 
supporters. 
4. International Electoral Assistance 
a. Technical and Financial Assistance for Constitutional and 
Legal Reforms 
There was a major infusion of international electoral assistance that 
was given to the Ethiopian government in the early 1990s before the 
present NEB was formally established. This was given through the 
UNDP under the project title 'Assistance to the National Electoral 
Board of Transitional Government of Ethiopia' in May 1994 and 
amounted to more than 14.9 million US dollars. The UNDP grant 
brings the total bilateral and multi-lateral electoral assistance that 
Ethiopia has received between 1992-2004 to 15.5 million USD. As 
earlier noted, the Ethiopian government budgetary allocations to the 
9 different elections conducted between 1992-2000 have run to the 
tune of 17.5 million USD. 
The UNDP 14.9 million US dollars grant was intended to assist 
the NBE of the Transitional Government in preparing and carrying 
out the Constituent Assembly election held in 1994. In particular, 
the project was to assist in the planning of the elections and 
mobilization and coordination of external resources, and in the 
procurement of inputs to be financed by donor contributions through 
a cost sharing mechanism. It is also possible that some of the 
assistance could have been used in drafting the constitution and the 
legal provisions for elections; but, given the chaotic situation and the 
level of disorganization at the time, there is no evidence to assess the 
magnitude of the aid and its impact. More specifically, the aid was 
intended to be used for the provision of computer systems; wide 
range of civic education and polling station officer training materials, 
equipment and support; supplies and materials in iupport of voter 
registration, i.e. voter registration books, voter cards, pens, pencils, 
etc. and provision of supplies and materials in support of election-
day activities. 
As already discussed, the period the UNDP grant was given to 
conduct the constituent assembly elections in 1994 was characterized 
by disorganization and poor preparation of the election process. The 
current NEB has very little information on how the money was spent 
and was unable to provide any evidence that will serve as a basis to 
assess the impact of the assistance. In addition, no proper accounting 
on the use of the money could be provided by any other government 
agency or the UNDP. Hence, although the donation was significant 
and could have immensely contributed towards democratizing the 
electoral process, the absence of accountability in the use of resources 
has made it difficult to assess the fiill impact of the assistance. 
Another factor which contributed to the relative success of the 
2000 elections was the keen interest shown by the donor community 
and the country's major aid providers to see a democratic and 
competitive electoral process. The donor community in Addis 
Ababa set up a Donor Election Unit (DEU) to coordinate aid to the 
elections and political parties as well as closely follow whether the 
elections would be fair and free. Such a common platform helped 
the group to exchange information and express a common position to 
the Ethiopian Government if irregularities are reported in the 
electoral process and the outcome. 
The close attention of the donor community might have helped 
in the creation of a better playing level field for competitive and free 
elections than in the past. Many embassies and bilateral and multi-
lateral aid agencies based in Addis Ababa organized election 
monitoring missions or sent representatives to observe the election 
process in the different parts of the country. For example, the 
Embassy of the United States of America fielded 17 observers and 
election monitors throughout the different regions of the country and 
Addis Ababa. The assessments that followed were largely positive 
and reflected a gradual sense of optimism. According to the report of 
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the U.S 
Department of State, "most opposition political parties competed in 
the May election; however, due to lack of funds and often weak 
organization, opposition parties contested only 20 per cent of the 
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b. Assistance to the National Electoral Board 
Chapter 6 of the Ethiopian Federal Constitution provides for an 
independent National Electoral Board (NEB) to manage elections at 
federal, regional and local levels. The Board has seven members who 
are accountable to and appointed by the House of Representatives 
upon presentation by the Executive branch of government. It will 
have a Chairperson and a secretary who assumes the role of chief 
executive of the secretariat and is non-voting. The Constitution does 
not specify the term of office of the Board and the assumption is that 
members will continue to 'serve for good behavior'9. It only states 
that it will be composed of members designated in consideration of 
'national representation, technical competence, integrity and 
experience'. Although set up by the Federal Government, the 
Constitution allows the Board to have branch offices at Regional and 
sub-Regional levels for organizing elections throughout the country. 
The NEB has been given full and independent authority to 
confirm and officially announce election results as well as rectify 
electoral irregularities and decide on complaints submitted to it. 
This subsumes that it will be impartial, independent and free of any 
interference in carrying out its mission. However, this principle was 
put to a severe test in 2003 when the General Manager of the NEB 
was jailed for three days on charges leveled against him by the 
Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption and Commission. The 
Commission accused him of misuse of authority and violating the 
constitutional right of a public employee who was arbitrarily 
dismissed for exposing acts of corruption in the Board. He was 
released after agreeing to respect the law and reinstate the suspended 
public servant (Addis Zemen, April 24, 2003; Addis Zena, April 22, 
2003). 
The order to arrest the General Manager came from a 
department under the executive branch of government, and this could 
be considered a serious threat to the independence and integrity of 
the National Electoral Board. Coming from the Executive branch of 
government, it could as well be considered as unwarranted meddling 
or manipulation of the Board's activities and a serious challenge to 
its status as an impartial body in conducting free and fair elections. 
Despite the serious implications that the incident signaled for the 
neutral status of the Board and its ability to conduct elections as an 
impartial body, however, there is no evidence to indicate that any 
donor group or country providing assistance to the Government of 
Ethiopia took up the issue or expressed concern about the 
unprecedented arrest of the General Manager. 
The General Manager of the NEB was sharply critical of the 
role of international/foreign election monitors and observers. He 
criticized many of them for being pre-judgmental, having ulterior 
agendas and bent upon fault-finding rather than providing 
constructive advice and suggestions to improve the electoral process. 
In his opinion, it is absolutely necessary to have international 
monitors seconded to the country well in advance of the actual 
elections so that they could observe the entire process from the start, 
including campaigning, registration, voting and counting and 
announcement of results. Simply put, free and fair elections do not 
begin and end in a polling day and as such monitors and observers 
should be assigned well ahead of the elections so that they will be in 
a position to judge the full conduct of the election process. 
Furthermore, the Head of Ethiopia's NEB has reservations on 
direct international funding of national elections. He insisted that a 
government must be able to cover the full cost of elections because 
external funding can bring with it undue influence that can 
compromise the country's sovereignty and independence. In 
whatever form international assistance may come to advance 
democratic elections, it should be envisaged as solidarity or 
partnership in a common endeavor to conduct free and fair elections 
rather than being viewed as donor-recipient relationship. He also 
resented the fact that in many instances inexperienced recruits with 
little knowledge and appreciation about the history and culture of the 
country are often designated for monitoring elections, and this had 
resulted in superficial and highly impressionistic assessment of 
election processes and outcomes. Neutral observers with reasonable 
knowledge about the history and politics of the country could make 
significant contributions to improve the electoral system for future 
elections.10 
Proponents of electoral politics argue that the cost of elections 
must not be expensive for parties and individual candidates because 
of their dampening effect on competitive politics. The experience of 
many African countries over the past two decades shows that the 
costs of elections have been escalating and there is a grave danger 
that this might impede democracy and effective participation in 
election campaigns by several parties. In addition, there is also the 
argument that if elections become expensive, fund raising becomes 
the pre-occupation of politicians thereby distracting them from public 
policy making and their role as trustees of the public interest 
(Shugarman 2000; Oyugi 2003). 
It is generally believed that post-conflict elections can be costly 
affairs for a poor nation such as Ethiopia. Often, the donor 
community provides assistance to offset the heavy cost of elections 
for poor states struggling to come out of crisis. In its post-conflict 
history, Ethiopia has conducted 9 national, regional and local 
elections under the EPRDF at a cost of nearly 17.5 million USD—a 
substantial amount of money for a very poor nation. This amount 
constituted the total budget allocated by the Government to the 
National Electoral Board between 1992-2000. During the same 
period, the country has received bilateral and multi-lateral electoral 
assistance to the tune of 15.5 million USD that was used to 
administer elections and support political parties. Table 2.8 below 
contains only regular budget allocations made by the Ethiopian 
Government to the National Electoral Board. 
Table 2.8 Cost of Elections in Ethiopia 1993/94-2001/02 
(in USD11) 
No. Year Area and Type of Election Amount 
1. 1995 Constituent assembly elections 5,026,394 
2. 1995 First national assembly elections 469,484 
3. 1996 Nationwide Woreda and Kebele elections 1,900,193 
4. 1997 Afar elections 296,663 
5. 1998 Debub Woredas elections 1,398,202 
6. 1999 Gambella, Benishangul and nation-wide by-
lections 698,338 
7. 2000 Second national elections 3,370,310 
8. 2000 Woreda and kebele elections in Tigray, Amhara, 
Oromia, Afar and Addis Ababa 3,3600,26 
9. 2001 Zone, Woreda and Kebele Elections in Debub 949,426 
Total 17,469,036 
Source: National Electoral Board, Addis Ahaba, 2003. 
11 The original budget in Ethiopian Birr has been converted at the equivalent rate of 1 
USD= Eth. Birr 8.52 
As indicated earlier, the total budget figure in the table does not 
include any bilateral or multi-lateral assistance that might have come 
to the NEB or other civil society organizations engaged in various 
activities related to elections, such as voter education and monitoring 
elections. Available evidence suggests that international electoral 
assistance has been significant but, as will be argued later, its impact 
on democratizing the electoral process has been limited. 
Cost per voter is often used as a yardstick to assess the cost of 
elections and make comparisons among countries. Available 
evidence suggests that elections can be costly affairs in some African 
countries. Lack of experience in administering elections, and 
undeveloped physical and communication infrastructure often 
dilapidated through many years of neglect and civil war, add to the 
cost of elections in many post-conflict states. Table 2.9 below 
presents data on election costs for some African countries. It can be 
observed that a comparison of election costs for selected African 
countries with Ethiopia shows that the cost of elections in Ethiopia 
has been surprisingly low given the country's enormous size and its 
lack of experience in running democratic elections. 
Table 2.9 Comparative Data on Cost of Elections in Selected 
African Countries (in U.S. Dollars) 
No. Country Date of Election Total Cost 
Number of 
voters 
Total cost/ 
no. of voters 
1. Angola 1992 100 mills. 4.5 mills. 22 
2. Botswana 1994 1 mill. 0.37 mill. 2.7 
3. Ethiopia12 1995 Constituent 
Assembly elections 
8.2 mills. 14.7 mills. 0.55 
2000 National 
Elections 
3.5 mills. 18.7 mills 0.19 
4. Kenya 2002 45.5 mills. 5.9 mills. 7.8 
4. Lesotho 1995 6 mills. 0.83 mill. 6.9 
5. Malawi 1994 8 mills. 3.8 mills. 2.1 
6. South Africa 1994 250 mills. 22.7 mills. 11.0 
7. Tanzania 1995 Shillings 
28,567,396,767 - 7.88 
Source:. Fambon, 2003; NEB, 1997 
Note: The figures for Ethiopia for the 1995 Constituent Assembly and 2000 
National Elections are government outlay only. 
12 TIip calculation for Fthinnia was made usine budeetarv allocations bv the 
From the preceding table, it can be observed that Ethiopia, with 0.55 
and 0.19 U.S. cents per voter for the 1995 constituent assembly and 
2000 national elections respectively, has conducted the least 
expensive elections from among the countries sampled. By all 
standards, Ethiopia has registered a spectacular achievement when 
compared with Angola's 22 and South Africa's 11 US dollars per 
voter. One important explanation for the low cost is the fact that the 
National Electoral Board in Ethiopia conducts elections by using 
existing government administrative structures and resources at 
federal, Regional, Zonal, woreda and kebele levels. In addition, the 
Board also deploys a huge army of government civil servants at very 
low rates of pay, and this keeps the cost of elections down. This 
practice might have enabled the country to run low-cost elections; 
however, serious questions can be raised as to whether the elections 
are going to be free and fair given the fact that they are conducted 
through the instrumentality of a state apparatus and public personnel 
both of which are under the tutelage of the ruling party and 
government in power. 
c. Political Party Assistance 
Another international electoral assistance worthy of mention is the 
318,625.39 USD that was given to the NEB to be distributed to 
political parties during the 2000 elections. The money was 
distributed to 33 registered political parties through a committee 
chaired by the Head of the National Electoral Board. The 
disbursements ranged from a high of 35,798 USD, which went to the 
Oromo National Congress (ONC), to the smallest 586 USD, which 
went to the Yem Nationality Democratic Movement (NEB, 2001). A 
number of European countries and the UNDP contributed to the 
fund. Detailed information on donor contributions is provided in 
Table 2.10. 
Table 2.10 Assistance to Registered Political Parties for the 
2000 Elections 
No. Donor Amount in USD 
1. U N D P 58,685.44 
2. Government of Norway 56,383.22 
3. Government of Netherlands 56,989.97 
4. Government of Sweden 58,538.58 
5. Government of Ireland 29,342.72 
6. Government of U.K. 58,685.44 
Total 318,625.39 
Source: National Electoral Board, 2001. 
The donation went into a provisional fund established under 
Proclamation No. 46/1993 at the initiative of the National Electoral 
Board. The objective of the fund was to provide financial assistance 
to legally registered political parties through the Board to enable 
parties to contest the general elections in a competitive manner. The 
support was used for communication, office space, for access to the 
public media and for any other measures to ensure broad 
participation and free and fair elections. 
In general, the establishment of the provisional fund through a 
program of international electoral assistance was helpful in providing 
support to legitimate political parties and in facilitating participation 
in the 2000 elections. This definitely contributed to broad 
participation in the elections and might have aided the 
democratization process. Despite the positive contribution, however, 
there were as well some weaknesses in the distribution and utilization 
of the money. For example, the majority of the parties that benefited 
from the support have not provided complete financial reports and 
this has made it difficult to account for the funds in an accountable 
and transparent manner. Equally important, according to reports 
received from many political parties, the money was late in coming, 
and this might have reduced their effectiveness in the political 
competition. While there is general consensus that the support might 
have contributed to broad participation in the 2000 elections, none of 
the donor governments have insisted on reports that would show how 
the contributions were spent by political parties. The lack of 
effective follow-up and monitoring has made it difficult to assess the 
full impact of the international assistance on electoral politics in 
Ethiopia. 
d. International Election Monitoring 
Another factor that is significant in Ethiopia's low-cost elections is 
international electoral assistance that mostly comes in the form of 
financial, material and technical assistance. This assistance goes both 
to the NEB and independent civil society organizations, such as 
EHRCO, CRDA and others actively engaged in monitoring elections 
and voter education programs prior to the elections. The assistance 
given to the NEB is largely in the form of material and technical 
assistance, such as computers, vehicles and other election related 
assistance. In this regard, mention can be made of the roughly 
300,000 US dollars that the NEB received from the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) to purchase 
communication and radio equipment, computers, vehicles and other 
accessories for the 2000 elections (NEB 2003). The executing 
agency for the assistance was the Washington-based International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems. It can be argued that this was a 
small portion of the cost of elections that Ethiopia incurred and its 
impact on democratization in this country was bound to be limited. 
e. Civic and Voter Education 
With international and bilateral electoral support, a number of civil 
society organizations have been active in voter and civic education 
programs before the 2000 elections in Ethiopia. The main ones 
included the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce (AACC), 
Ethiopian Women's Lawyers' Association (EWLA), the 
Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU), Eneweyay Civic 
and Social Education Center (ECSEC) and the Society for the 
Advancement of Human Rights (SAHRE). These represented a 
small segment of the civil organization community and were limited 
in outreach because they could cover only Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa 
and some cities in the Southern Region. In addition, many of them 
started their work close to the elections and as a result their impact 
has been limited (CLCBS 2003). 
To carry out a better coordinated program of voter and civic 
education, a group of six NGOs had established the Ethiopian Non-
Governmental Organizations Consortium for Elections (ENCONEL)-
-2000 in early 1999. The objectives of the Consortium 'were to 
develop standard and coherent teaching materials for voters' 
education; to determine target areas for voters' education among the 
constituent NGOs in order to avoid a geographical duplication of 
efforts as well as to maximize the use of scarce resources; and, 
finally, to apply a coordinated and structured approach towards the 
donors in the process of equitably using the limited available 
resources' (CLCBS, 2003). 
Voter and civic education programs prior to the 200 elections 
focused on human rights and the law, good governance, the 
Ethiopian electoral law and election processes and procedures. 
Some of the programs initiated by civil society organizations in 
Ethiopia had either targeted audiences or were intended to advance 
the cause of a particular constituency. For example, with assistance 
from FES (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), the British Council in Addis 
Ababa and CIDA, EWLA's activities focused on increasing the 
participation of women in the elections. With assistance from the 
USAID, CETU arranged public forms for political parties and 
individuals to introduce their programs to workers. It also 
encouraged workers to participate actively in the national elections. 
Through a project known as 'Vote Addis', the Addis Ababa 
Chamber of Commerce (AACC) launched a campaign encouraging 
candidates to properly articulate the agenda of the business 
community to the voters. It also focused on supporting the media to 
cover the election in a fair and acceptable manner and serve as a 
bridge between candidates and voters. 
5. Impact of Electoral Assistance 
Bent upon improving its image as a democratic government 
domestically and abroad, the EPRDF regime organized a number of 
elections in a bid to open the country's politics to multi-party 
competition. However, none of the elections it conducted were 
judged to be neither free nor competitive because voting 
irregularities were widely reported and the main opposition parties 
boycotted the elections (AAI/NDI 1992; Aalen 2002; Pausewang, 
Tronvoll and Aalen 2002; Polhemus 2002). More important, the 
ruling party using state and bureaucratic resources under its control 
repeatedly gained an overwhelming victory and the people were not 
given real options to choose from (Abbink 2000). Hence, serious 
questions are being raised about prospects for democratic politics and 
multi-partyism in Ethiopia at least in the not-too-distant future given 
recent setbacks in providing a level playing field for competitive and 
open elections. 
Compared to the Derg era, Ethiopia has enjoyed relative peace 
following the series of elections discussed earlier, and the 
international community has provided considerable reconstruction 
and humanitarian assistance to aid the country's peaceful transition. 
As in many other similar states, however, elections in Ethiopia have 
not achieved full reconciliation among the protagonists because some 
important contending groups were not included in the post-
insurrection power structure (Asnake 2001). As a result, substantial 
anxiety still exists about the long-term stability of the political order 
and its inability to be inclusive of all groups. 
In assessing the value and contribution of election monitoring 
and observation to the democratization process, diplomatic staff of 
different embassies and donors based in Addis Ababa expressed 
differing views. In informal discussions that the writers had with 
representatives of selected foreign embassies, it was revealed that the 
intention of such missions was not to influence or pressurize the 
Government but to see to it that elections in Ethiopia followed 
international standards and practices. Equally important, it can be 
argued that election monitoring in Ethiopia should be undertaken by 
external actors to see to it that the Government adheres to the 
principles and standards of democratic practice that it had vowed to 
uphold upon coming to power. 
When it comes to external involvement and monitoring of 
elections particular mention must be made of the role of the 
Delegation of the European Commission in Addis Ababa, which 
organized an observer mission that carefully assessed Ethiopia's 
election in accordance with the official policy to support free and 
competitive elections in emerging democracies (CEC 2002). 
As a typical post-conflict state, Ethiopia has received substantial 
international electoral assistance for the series of elections conducted 
between 1992-2000. Such assistance has built the institutional and 
logistical capacity of the National Electoral Board to administer 
elections. In addition, donor assistance has also been provided to 
strengthen civil society and human rights organizations, develop and 
institutionalize political parties, conduct public debates and 
discussions during and before elections and run voter education and 
training programs. However, the impact of such assistance on 
democratizing the electoral process has been limited. 
The electoral process in Ethiopia has been consistently 
dominated by a single ruling party, which has faMed to provide a 
level playing field for competitive, fair and free elections for all 
contestants that could provide alternative choices to the electorate. 
Hence, contrary to the expectations of bilateral and multi-lateral 
donors, Ethiopia's transition to peace and democracy has been 
fraught with problems because the political regime has failed to be 
all inclusive; and has not broadened the political space for long-term 
stability and democracy. 
On a comparative basis, Ethiopia has been very successful in 
conducting low-cost elections. The considerable international 
electoral assistance the country has received over the years is a 
significant variable in keeping the cost of elections low. But, 
perhaps, the most critical explanation for this state of affairs is the 
fact that the National Electoral Board makes use of the huge state 
bureaucracy and the civil services at central, regional and lower 
levels of government to administer elections. While this might have 
kept the costs down, it has serious implications for the legitimacy of 
election outcomes and the extent to which such support from the 
state and government will favor ruling party candidates. 
6. Conclusions 
In view of the preceding discussion, the following conclusions are 
provided. 
Despite political party assistance and the original installation of 
a broad-based coalition, Ethiopia has remained a one-party 
dominated state. As noted earlier, the regime has not been able to 
broaden its political space to include opposition parties that can offer 
alternatives to the electorate. 
Although some positive changes have taken place in state-
society relations in Ethiopia, such as the burgeoning private print 
media and growth of civil society organizations, the political regime 
that emerged over the past 12 years has failed to broaden its political 
space and create a level playing field for free and competitive 
elections for all contestants. Albeit the international gesture to 
institutionalize democratic politics, therefore, state and society in 
post-Mengistu Ethiopia are under the tight grip of one-party rule. 
In Ethiopia, national, regional and local/woreda elections have 
been conducted with the assistance of a government-managed 
electoral authority. This can insure the election of ruling party 
candidates and has serious implications for the legitimacy of 
outcomes as the true expression of the wish of the people. 
Ethiopia uses an electoral practice that operates on the basis a 
plurality of votes cast in single member constituencies. This practice 
precludes the representation of candidates having alternative 
programs and minority and disadvantaged parties other than the 
winning candidate with the highest number of votes. In electoral 
systems that do not provide for a level playing field, such as 
Ethiopia's current system, this practice can give undue advantage to 
the party in power especially when the government has complete 
control over the mass media and other state resources and uses the 
same to influence the outcome of the elections in its favor. 
In several discussions with the authors, most opposition parties 
in Ethiopia have severely criticized the current single member 
constituency system as being undemocratic and favoring the ruling 
party. They have repeatedly called for changes to the constitution to 
allow for 'proportional representation, which makes it possible to 
share parliamentary seats among different political forces in 
proportion to their electoral strength. In principle, no political force 
or part of public opinion retains a monopoly; at the same time, none 
is excluded from representation. Hence, the system's main virtue is 
said to be justice. Another advantage of this system is that voting 
takes place in a single round and the 'politicking and bickering', 
which often takes place in systems practicing a second round, is 
avoided (IPU 1993). 
Ethiopia's National Electoral Board has been given formal 
statutory independence. However, this was no guarantee for its 
effective functioning as a neutral body free from outside influence, 
especially the executive. 
Insufficient voter education, voter apathy and the absence of a 
united and strong opposition are constraining factors in 
democratizing the election process in Ethiopia. 
Despite the consistently high voter turnout in many of the 
elections in Ethiopia, civic education remains weak and insufficient, 
especially in the rural areas. 
Ethiopia's National Electoral Board has been given formal 
statutory independence. However, this was no guarantee for its 
effective functioning as a neutral body free from outside influence, 
especially the executive. 
HI. I N T E R N A T I O N A L H U M A N RIGHTS A S S I S T A N C E 
1. Background: History of Human Rights Violations 
As noted above, neither the Imperial nor the Derg regime allowed 
opposition parties, an independent press, nor civil society 
organizations except some professional associations and NGOs; these 
latter were restricted to emergency relief and the provision of health 
and other social services to communities in need. While, in both 
regimes, the formal constitutions provided a wide variety of civil 
liberties (including the rights to freedom of expression and of 
assembly), in practice none of these liberties were enjoyed by citizens. 
Both were highly authoritarian regimes and dissent or the public 
expression of independent opinion was not tolerated. Students were 
the only group who from the mid-1960s onwards gave voice to public 
discontent as well as to the need for reforms and social justice. 
Student demonstrations, which became frequent occurrences towards 
the end of the decade and in the first year of the Derg, were violently 
suppressed and many student leaders were placed in detention without 
the decision of the courts. 
There were extensive human rights violations during the Imperial 
regime but their nature was somewhat different from that of the two 
subsequent regimes. While there were cases of illegal detentions, 
disappearances and torture, the most widespread form of injustice had 
to do with the illegal expropriation of the property (especially landed 
property) of groups, communities and individuals13. There were large-
scale dispossession of peasants and their eviction from the land, in 
particular in areas settled by minority nationalities. This was 
frequently the work of powerful landed interests as well as members 
of the royal family. The Imperial state expropriated large tracts of 
rangeland, forests and other resources from pastoralists and other 
communities on the dubious ground that these resources had no 
recognized owner(s) with legal title to them. In this country as well as 
elsewhere in Africa, communities and individuals have had claims to 
land and other natural resources based on long established and 
legitimate customary rights but such rights were frequently 
disregarded in Ethiopia when it suited the government or powerful 
elements of the ruling class. There were also many cases of unjust 
treatment of persons suspected of plotting against the government, and 
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the expropriation of the property of dissidents or opposition groups 
was quite common. 
The evidence regarding human rights violations during the Derg 
is relatively better. While the military dictatorship did not welcome 
international human rights organizations to investigate the human 
rights situation in the country, a few of them, including Amnesty 
International, managed to get access to information on the basis of 
which they issued very critical reports detailing extensive human 
rights violations. Large-scale extra-judicial killings, mass arrests, and 
disappearances were reported, together with the suppression of rights 
of free expression and assembly. The plight of prominent members of 
the royal family, and of Ethiopian academics and dissidents who were 
imprisoned without due process and the right to appear before a court, 
were frequently highlighted. The so-called Red Terror, which the 
Derg unleashed in the latter part of the 1970s in an attempt to crush its 
opponents, was universally condemned by the international human 
rights movement as well as by many Western governments. The 
Derg's massive resettlement program which was under way from the 
early 1980s, drew strong criticism from a number of human rights 
groups, some of whom compared it to the forced labor camp system of 
the Stalin era (see Dessalegn 2003b). 
There is broad consensus among Ethiopian social scientists and 
historians that the Derg was one of the most oppressive and despotic 
regimes in the country's history. The regime came to power through 
peaceful means but was to stay in power by the indiscriminate and 
unrestrained use of violence and tenor. The victims of repression were 
not, by and large, a particular group, community or class, but a cross-
section of society, both rural and urban, civilian as well as military 
and security forces. In the end, it was its unrestrained violence and 
terror that was to alienate the majority of the population, undermine its 
authority and finally lead to its ignominious collapse. A catalogue of 
its brutality against the citizenry of this country during the seventeen 
years of its rule would be too long to list here but we provide below 
some of the most shocking cases of human rights violations 
perpetrated under the regime14. 
• Summary executions of over one hundred high ranking 
government and military officials immediately after the Derg's 
seizure of power; subsequent executions of several dozen 
14 The list is based on personal experience of the authors; press reports during the 
Derg; and references cited in Chapter 1 above. 
members of the ruling class alleged to have fomented 
rebellions. 
• Violent suppression of trade union, student, and other 
peaceful demonstrations in the mid-1970s in which many 
people were injured or killed, and large numbers arrested. In 
the demonstrations organized by one of the opposition groups 
in 1976, several hundred young people are reported to have 
been massacred by security forces. 
• Intimidation, detention and torture of hundreds of civil 
servants and public enteiprise management officials 
"suspected" of bureaucratic red-tape, economic sabotage, or 
alleged to have carried out counter-revolutionary activities. 
• Arbitrary arrest and imprisonment without trial of men, 
women and children from all walks of life numbering in the 
hundreds of thousands before and during the Red Terror in the 
second half of the 1970s. 
• Executions of people suspected of belonging to the opposition 
during the so-called Red Terror numbering in the thousands. 
• Intimidation and harassment of followers of several 
Protestants denominations and the closure of many of their 
churches and religious institutions. 
• Over 30,000 deaths of peasants involved in the government's 
forced resettlement scheme in the years between 1984 and 
1986; deaths due to hunger, disease and exhaustion during the 
relocation process and immediately after (Dessalegn 2003b). 
• Forced recruitment of hundreds of thousands of young men, in 
particular peasants, to fight in the various fronts opened up by 
ethnic-based rebel insurgency in the 1970s. The ill-fated 
Peasant Militia offensive launched by the Derg in 1975 
against the Eritrean rebels resulted in disaster, and casualties 
among the militia, many of whom were forcibly recruited, 
were enormous. 
It is worth noting here that the atrocities committed by the Derg are in 
some ways comparable to those committed by Pol Pot in Cambodia. 
2. Post Conflict Human Rights Context 
When the Derg was finally overthrown, there was public expectations 
that the country would make a fresh start and the atrocities and mass 
terror of the past would not be repeated. While there was considerable 
aDDrehension reeardine the ethnic nolicies of the new regime, there 
was hope that human rights violations on the order of the past would 
not be repeated. The Constitution of the new regime, which came into 
force in 1995, guaranteed a wide range of human rights and freedoms, 
including the right to freedom of expression, of assembly and respect 
for the rule of law. However, what was guaranteed in the constitution 
and the measures the government has taken since to deal with its 
opponents, real or imagined, and the political decisions undertaken 
were highly contradictory. As we shall see below, there were 
numerous cases of unlawful killings and arbitrary detentions, the rule 
of law was frequently ignored, political organizations not based on 
ethnic identity (such as pan-Ethiopian parties) were not allowed, and 
the registration and activities of civil society organizations were 
restricted. Some of these constitutional restrictions have been eased 
during the second half of the new government, partly as a result of the 
Ethio-Eritrean war, and partly due to the conflict within the ruling 
party, and the purge of party and state officials that followed. 
The human rights record of the present government, measured by 
most accepted standards, has been very poor, though, as we noted 
above, comparison between it and the two other regimes that preceded 
it is difficult to make. It can be said, however, that mass atrocities on 
the scale perpetrated by the Derg have not been committed so far. 
Another important difference is that at present an independent press 
has been allowed, and civil society institutions, including rights-based 
advocacy organizations, which would have been unthinkable at the 
time of the Imperial or Derg regimes, are becoming part of the socio-
political landscape. A third difference to be noted is that while not 
exactly invited to the country by the authorities, international human 
rights organizations have been able to send monitors to gather 
information and to report on the human rights situation in the country. 
International human rights organizations such as Amnesty 
International (AI), Human Rights Watch, Africa Watch (AW), and 
others have issued numerous reports on the government's record and 
the state of human rights in the country. Amnesty in particular has 
issued frequent reports since the mid-1990s highlighting numerous 
cases of illegal detentions, torture, threats to press freedom and the 
arrest of journalists, mass deportations of citizens of Eritrean origin 
(54,000 according to one of its reports), and disappearances (AI 
website). Similarly, Human Rights Watch, Africa Watch and the U.S. 
Department of State have produced reports on the country at least 
once a year. In the latest report available, the first two organizations 
argue that human right conditions have not markedly improved in 
2002, and go on to document a wide diversity of cases of violations; 
on the other hand, the report prepared by the State Department points 
out that the rights record remains poor but there have been 
improvements in a few areas. 
One should note here that despite the fact that international 
organizations are able to gather information more or less freely at 
present, their reports are deficient in some respects and contain many 
inaccuracies. Such organizations are understandably constrained by a 
number of factors chief of which is the lack of a deeper understanding 
of the political process in the country, the inability to follow events 
closely and to ensure the accuracy of information received and the 
credibility of informants. None of these organizations have local 
representation here although EHRCO is affiliated with a number of 
them; on many occasions the former depend on the reports published 
by the latter. 
EHRCO has been monitoring the human rights situation in the 
country and issuing reports on rights violations since it was first 
established in 1991. The main violations frequently reported on 
include cases of extra-judicial killings, illegal detentions, 
disappearances, torture, unlawful expropriation of property, threats to 
freedom of the press and harassment and detention of journalists. The 
following table is based on a tally of reported violations that occurred 
from 1991 to 2000 that appear in EHRCO's two published volumes 
(1999; 2003). 
Table 3.1 Human Rights Violations 1991-2000 
Type of Violations No. in Period 1991-97 No. in Period 1997-2000 
Extra-judicial Killings 185 141 
Torture 70 31 
Disappearances 120 30 
Illegal Detentions 5525 1052 
Source: EHRCO 1999, 2003 
The Table does not include what EHRCO describes as massacres that 
occurred on a number of occasions in different parts of the country, of 
which the main ones have been in the towns of Areka, Gonder, Tepi, 
Awassa, and in Addis Ababa following the peaceful demonstration of 
students. In all these cases, no measures were taken on the security 
forces responsible for the human rights violations. 
Let us look briefly at some of the most serious cases of violations 
discussed at length by EHRCO (1999, 2003). It is of course 
impossible to include all the violations reported by the organization 
given the limitations of space. The massacre in Areka (a small town in 
south central Ethiopia) occurred on 14 July 1992 when security forces 
opened fire on a peaceful demonstration by demobilized soldiers 
demanding stipends which they had been promised but which they had 
not received. EHRCO quotes a report by a Parliamentary fact finding 
mission as saying that 31 persons were killed and 29 wounded but it 
suspects the casualty figures are higher. The 1993 massacre in 
Gonder, a large town in northwest Ethiopia, also led to a large number 
of innocent civilians being hurt. The incident occurred when security 
forces shot into a peaceful assembly of worshippers at a church in the 
process of trying to arrest a priest of the church. EHRCO puts the 
casualty figures at 18 civilians killed and 17 wounded. The conflict in 
Tepi in southwestern Ethiopia occurred in March 2002 when two 
ethnic groups clashed due to political rivalry. In the ensuing clash, 
security forces, including soldiers and a special police force brought 
into the area by the authorities, opened fire indiscriminately, leading 
to many deaths and thousands of people displaced from their homes. 
EHRCO lists the names of 24 people, including 4 security officers, as 
having been killed in the clash; some 4738 people are believed to have 
been displaced. The violence in Awassa, a town in south central 
Ethiopia, in which security forces opened fire on a peaceful crowd 
demonstrating against the decision of the local authority to relocate 
the seat of the Regional government elsewhere, led to the death and 
injury of scores of civilians and the arrest of over thirty-five 
demonstrators. 
Addis Ababa has witnessed a considerable number of clashes 
between the authorities and different sections of the population, but 
for our purposes it is enough to cite two examples. The first incident 
was the violent suppression of the protest of businessmen in the city. 
The capital's business community was quite upset when in 1996 the 
government decided to raise rents of offices, shops, stalls and other 
business premises by a substantial margin. The government owns a 
majority of the city's buildings, offices and rental houses and most 
people are tenants of the state. The business community decided to 
hold a peaceful demonstration to express its grievances on 17 May 
1997. This was followed by a strike, which closed down most shops, 
trading centers and business offices a few days later. The government 
reacted angrily and used strong-arm methods to quash the protests. 
According to EHRCO, 84 alleged leaders were placed in detention 
and the licenses of 52 of them were revoked as a retaliatory measure 
(EHRCO 1999: 276ff). Many of the detained were not released until 
many weeks later. 
The second example concerns the violent suppression of students 
in Addis Ababa, in particular Addis Ababa University sUidents in 
1993, again in 1997 and in 2001. In all cases, the government used 
violent methods to stop students and other young people to stage 
peaceful demonstrations. In these incidents dozens of students were 
hurt and several hundred arrested. EHRCO reports, for example, that 
in the last incident, 10 people including students were killed, and over 
200 students arrested. 
The government's response to EHRCO's report has changed over 
the years. Initially, it was one of hostility accompanied by attempts to 
silence the organizations (see below). The government accused 
EHRCO of prejudice against the new political order and being a 
political organization rather than an impartial human rights group. 
Later, it sought to belittle the reports by ignoring them and refusing to 
respond to the allegations. This soft approach was in part to due the 
change of leadership at EHRCO in the last quarter of the 1990s and 
the war with Eritrea. Table 3.1 above shows that the number of human 
rights violations has decreased in the second period shown. We 
hesitate to conclude from this that this is evidence of improvements in 
the human rights record of the government, although it may be 
suggested that while the overall record is still very poor the second 
period is not as bad as the first. 
3. International Assistance to Human Rights 
a. Human Rights Observation 
Among many donors in this country, human rights falls within their 
democracy or good governance assistance program and thus it is not 
always easy to disentangle how much support has been provided for 
human rights causes per se. Human rights does not have defined 
boundaries in many cases and is seen as a cross-cutting issue. For 
instance, there is a donor Human Rights Subgroup in the country, 
consisting of members from a large number of countries. The 
Subgroup meets regularly to discuss 'human rights' issues in the 
country. The Subgroup is further divided into four sub-committees 
concerned with elections, the press, freedom of association and labor, 
and freedom of belief and conscience. Thus, the remit of the Subgroup 
is quite broad. 
There is another donor body that also monitors human rights in 
the country. This is made up of EU member states and the European 
Commission Delegation in the country. This group also meets 
regularly at ambassadorial level or lower, depending on the gravity of 
the matter to be discussed. The Embassy of the country which holds 
the EU presidency acts as the 'leader' of the group and convenes 
meetings, sets the agenda, and often influences the debate. A 
presidency country with a strong concern for human rights may 
influence the EU to be more engaged with human rights. On the other 
hand, a presidency with different concerns may have a different effect 
on the members. The EU group has more clout than the Human 
Rights Subgroup noted above, however, it takes a long time to arrive 
at a decision acceptable to all as each member state has to agree to the 
terms of the decision. 
It should be noted that the EC's engagement with issues of 
human rights and democratization was given the green light only after 
the Cotonou Agreement with the ACP countries in 2000. Previous to 
that, the EC was restricted in its mandate since its relationship was 
only with the government and the areas of its engagement excluded 
human rights and 'political' issues. Thus the EC was not able to make 
a strategic intervention in the democratization process taking place in 
the country and was limited to providing low level support to a few 
minor initiatives. Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement now specifies 
that the EC and the governments concerned should engage in political 
dialogue which encompasses regular assessments concerning respect 
for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good 
governance. Moreover, the EC has also been mandated to work with 
non-state actors under Article 4 of the Agreement (EC 2000). Such 
actors include civil society organizations, the private sector, and 
others. This will obviously have an impact on resource allocation. 
The donor community employs several methods of monitoring 
the human rights situation in the country. When serious violations 
occur, as it did in 2002 in Awassa in the south of the country, and in 
Tepi in the southwest (see above), the donor's Human Rights 
Subgroup as well as the EC send a fact finding mission to gather 
information and to discuss the matter with all the parties to the 
incidents involved. The Subgroup does not make a decision or take 
any measures, it only provides information to the members; it is the 
responsibility of each donor or country to make its own decisions'5. 
The EC on the other hand can take measures under certain 
circumstances. Another way donors monitor the human rights 
situation is through the work of the international human rights 
15 Interview with L. Williams of the British Embassy, and O. Blake of DF1D, Addis 
Ababa. Ms. Williams argued that the fact that the Subgroup does not make decisions 
should not be seen as a weakness. 
movement, in particular Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, and others. 
Finally, the donor community also relies on the wo'k of local human 
rights groups, in particular the reports prepared by EHRCO. 
b. Red Terror Tribunals 
The EPRDF government arrested and brought charges against nearly 
8,000 officials of the Derg regime for genocide, war crimes, and 
atrocities soon after it came to power. The officials included high 
government and security personnel as well as lowly state 
functionaries; a few, including Mengistu Haile Mariam, were tried in 
absentia. The court cases related to 'genocide' during the Red Terror 
of the mid-1970s, and war crimes allegedly committed in Tigrai in 
1987 during the Derg's military offensive against the TPLF. These 
cases are still in progress in the federal and Regional courts, though 
some of the accused have been freed or sentenced. Assistance to the 
InterAfrica Group, a Regional NGO with its head office in Addis 
Ababa, was provided by Amnesty and other international human 
rights organizations to record the proceedings and provide transcripts 
and other pertinent information about the cases to the wider public 
(interview with Jalal A Latif). 
The trials have not been received favorably by the public for a 
number of reasons: a) because they were seen to be politically 
motivated; it was seen as a trial imposed by the victor on a defeated 
opponent; b) because the prosecution was carried out by the 
government's Special Prosecutor's Office, and the judges were 
government appointed judges and not independent ones; neither 
during the Derg regime nor at present has the judiciary been an 
independent institution; and c) because there were strong suspicions, 
which the government did very little to allay, that the outcome was 
already determined and most of the accused would be convicted 
anyway (local press reports). 
4. Legal and Institutional Reforms 
a. Structure of the Court System 
An independent and effective judiciary is an essential element in 
promoting democracy, good governance and the rule of law in 
Ethiopia. It is necessary to review the Ethiopian justice system for 
effective donor intervention to build the capacity of the justice sector 
as part of the broad assistance program to democracy and human 
rights. 
The judiciary in Ethiopia has a three-tier system of courts. These 
are the Federal Supreme Court, Federal High Court and Federal First 
Instant Court. The organization of courts at Regional levels is the 
same as that of the federal court system. In 2002, there were a total of 
111 judges serving at the three tiers of the federal court system. There 
were 14, 32 and 65 judges serving at Federal Supreme, Federal High 
and Federal First Instant courts respectively. Out of this total, 35 or 
about 32 percent were women. 
b. Recruitment and Independence of the Judicial System 
The mode of recruitment and appointment of judges is a critical factor 
in determining the effectiveness of the judiciary in upholding the rule 
of law and human rights. In addition, it can also determine the 
integrity and independence of the system in dispensing justice. One 
means of guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary is through 
the appointment and promotion of judges. In Ethiopia, the 
Constitution formally provides for an independent judiciary that is 
free from external influence in the administration of justice. As a 
guarantee to provide for the independence and integrity of the 
judiciary, the responsibility for the recruitment and promotion of 
judges in Ethiopia is shared between the parliament and the executive. 
At the federal level, judges are appointed by the House of 
Peoples' Representatives upon submission of a list of nominees by the 
Prime Minister initially screened by the Federal Judicial 
Administration Commission. The same procedure is followed at the 
Regional level whereby the screening and selection is performed by 
the Regional Judicial Administration Commissions and the final 
appointment granted by the Regional Assemblies. The criteria for 
being appointed as a federal judge are rigorous and a candidate must 
satisfy the following: attain the age of 25; have legal training; be loyal 
to the constitution; consent to be a judge; have good reputation for 
diligence; have a sense of justice; and have good conduct. 
As noted earlier, the State Council of the Region appoints the 
president and vice-presidents of the State Supreme Court upon the 
recommendation by the Chief Executive of the Regional State (Art. 
81(3) Federal Constitution). It is also provided that the State Council 
shall appoint the other judges upon the recommendation by the 
Regional State Judicial Administration Council. However, it is 
incumbent upon the State Judicial Administration Council to solicit 
and obtain the views of the Federal Judicial Administration Council 
on the nominees and forward these views along with its 
recommendations before submitting nominations to the State Council. 
As a measure to guarantee the independence and integrity of the 
judiciary, the Ethiopian Constitution has provided for lifetime 
appointment of judges. For Example, article 79 of the Federal 
Constitution provides that no judge shall be removed from his/her 
duties before s/he reaches the retirement age determined by law except 
under some specified circumstances. Accordingly, the tenure of any 
judge can be terminated only: a) upon resignation subject to a two-
month prior notice; b) upon reaching the retirement age of 60 years; c) 
where it is decided that he/she is incapable of properly discharging 
his/her duties due to illness; d) he/she has committed a breach of 
discipline; e) it is decided that he/she has a manifest incompetence and 
inefficiency; and, f) he/she has transgressed the Disciplinary and Code 
of Conduct Rules of judges. 
In 2000, the Ethiopian government launched a justice system 
reform program to improve the system and process of judicial 
administration. The reform is guided by the conviction that a 
predictable legal environment with an objective, reliable and 
independent judiciary is an essential factor for democratization, good 
governance and human rights. A related objective of the reform 
program is the establishment of a secure basis for the rule of law so 
that basic democratic and human rights are respected (Ministry of 
Justice, 2002). 
The reform program plans to remove impediments of access to 
justice at all levels. This will be achieved by making legal services 
less expensive, justice institutions more accessible, ensuring that legal 
services are not time consuming, formalistic and full of procedural 
pitfalls, and that execution is not delayed. It is also important that the 
justice system has to be responsive to the needs of the people 
(Ministry of Justice, 2002). 
The government's judicial reform program is an important 
measure to promote democracy and the rule of law and has received 
considerable bilateral and multilateral assistance. The project has 
three components: training, court administration reform and law 
reform and revision. The objectives and achievements of the 
program so far and the amount of external assistance provided for 
the project are discussed as follows. 
c. Training 
There is at present an acute shortage of adequately trained and 
qualified judges in Ethiopia and this has severely affected the justice 
sector. Providing assistance to the legal sector should be an area of 
high priority in so far as this falls within the framework of assistance 
to human rights, good governance and democracy. A well-
functioning legal system that can protect human rights and uphold the 
rule of law is also a goal expressed by the Constitution of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). 
The problems of the justice sector were exacerbated and its 
capacity crippled following the mass dismissal of judges by the 
Prime Minister in the early 1990s on corruption allegations. Over 
the years, the shortage of trained and well-qualified judges has 
resulted in court delays and massive backlog cases which cannot be 
redressed in the not-to-distant future. More important, the delays 
and inefficiencies in the court system have had serious implications 
for the rule of law in the country and the right of the citizenry to be 
given quick justice. 
To remedy the situation, the Government of Ethiopia in 
cooperation with foreign donors had initiated a judicial training 
program in early 2000. For example, there is the program launched 
by the Federal Supreme Court in collaboration with Regional 
Supreme Courts and US AID aimed at: providing training programs 
to judges to improve their capacity in all fields; strengthening the 
institutional capacity by providing materials that are needed by 
judges in their day-to-day activities; and making all the preparations 
for the establishment of a permanent Judicial Training Unit (JTU). 
Major funding for the program came from the USAID to the tune of 
500,000 US Dollars and was conducted by Ethiopian and expatriate 
legal professionals. The full cost of the program and the number of 
participants are provided in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 No. of Participants in Judicial Training Program 
2000-2003 
No. Name of Court 
No. of 
Trainees 
Amount in 
US D 
1. Federal Supreme & High Courts, 
Addis Ababa Municipal Courts 150 7,944.44 
2. Afar Region Supreme Court & High 
Courts 64 68,921.52 
3. Amhara Region Supreme & High 
Courts 132 91,535.89 
4. Benishangul-Gumuz Supreme Court & 
High Courts 50 35,990.64 
5. Oromiya Region Supreme & High 
Courts 107 70,827.64 
6. Tigray Region Supreme & High Courts 50 39,981.88 
7. Gambella Region Supreme & High 
Courts 33 22,793.63 
8. SNNPR Supreme & High Courts 150 98,656.42 
9. Harari Region Supreme & High Courts 15 11,521.48 
10. Somali Region Supreme & High courts 50 34,298.00 
Total 801 482,470.66 
Source: Federal Supreme Court 2003 
A total of 801 judges from the Federal and Regional Supreme and 
High Courts benefited from the training. USAID was the major 
provider of the assistance and actively cooperated with the Federal 
Supreme Court's Judicial Training Unit in successfully conducting 
the training project. It was indeed a major piece of achievement in 
enhancing the capacity of the judiciary in upholding human rights 
and the rule of law. Equally important, the program could be 
assessed as highly successful and effectively coordinated and 
institutionalized between the Ministry of Justice and the USAID. 
d. Court Administration Reform 
Side by side with the training of judges, the government also 
undertook a Court Administration Reform project with the assistance 
of CIDA Canada. The total cost of the nroier.t wac saiH tn 
157,000 US dollars. The goal of the project is to "contribute to the 
stability, security and sustained development of Ethiopia by 
promoting practices that will help achieve and sustain the rule of 
law". More specifically, the project aims to reduce administrative 
inefficiencies and develop Ethiopian courts, promote better 
management practices, and promote greater equity and judicial 
independence. In sum, the project was aimed at exploring ways and 
means of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the operation 
and management of the courts. Pilot projects for the improvement of 
the court system at the federal level have been implemented. The 
benefits of the pilot projects at the Supreme Court will be gradually 
replicated at the lower federal and Regional courts, and this will go a 
long way in reforming the justice system. 
e. Law Reform and Revision 
The Government has established the Justice and Legal System 
Research Institute under the Ministry of Justice to undertake a 
comprehensive law reform and revision program to harmonize 
existing laws with the constitution and thereby enhance democracy 
and socio-economic development (Mandefrot, 2002). A major 
component of this program i is developing improved court 
management and administration systems throughout the Federal 
Supreme Court, other federal courts, and selected regional and local 
courts. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
has been a major funder of this project to the tune of 3,850,000 US 
dollars. CIDA has commissioned the Canadian Office of the 
Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs as the implementing 
agency, whose support will help to reduce administrative 
inefficiencies and delays. Upon the successful completion of this 
project, it is expected that new and improved court administration 
systems will contribute to more efficient disposition of cases and 
improved court professional and operational standards. This will 
further support better-performing courts, and a strengthened rule of 
law in Ethiopia. 
In addition to the above, a number of foreign governments have 
provided assistance to enhance the capacity of the Ethiopian justice 
sector. For example, the French Government has provided experts 
to assist the Ethiopian Ministry of Capacity Building in training 
prosecutors and facilitating legislative reform. The total cost of the 
program was estimated at 500,000 US dollars and would run until 
2004. The Norwegian Government was acti1 ely involved in 
enhancing the capacity of the Federal Prosecutor's Office. They 
were also supporting a program of training in human rights, good 
governance and the rule of law.16 
/ . Parliament's Capacity Building 
As part of the democracy and governance project, the Canadian 
Government has provided considerable assistance to the tune of 
3,850,000 US dollars to enhance the governance and accountability 
of the Federal Parliament of Ethiopia. Funded under the Donor 
Group Cooperation Framework, the Canadian Parliamentary Centre 
was selected as the implementing agency covering the period 1999-
2004. The project targets four key areas: strengthening of the 
Parliamentary Committee Processes, particularly the finance, legal 
and women's affairs committees; master planning, public 
consultation, and establishment of the Human Rights Commission 
and Office of Ombudsman; assistance in the creation of a 
parliamentary centre for research and public consultation; and 
democratic outreach, to support an enhanced process for dialogue 
and engagement of Parliament and civil society in the 
democratization in Ethiopia. An assessment of the project made in 
September, 2001, indicated positive outcomes: parliamentary leaders 
have become more committed to institutional development; members 
are more aware of what MPs should be doing; committees are 
emerging as significant work units; the physical infrastructure has 
been upgraded; and there is increasing awareness among groups in 
civil society and donors about the importance of parliament as an 
important venue for the discussion of national issues (Nakamura, 
2001). 
5. Impact of International Assistance on the Justice Sector 
and Parliament 
There has been significant bilateral assistance to the justice sector in 
Ethiopia in the areas of training of judges and improving the overall 
efficiency of the system for the administration of justice. For a 
number of reasons, however, the assistance has had little impact in 
terms of promoting the rule of law or enhancing the independence of 
the judiciary in dispensing justice. Despite formal constitutional 
guarantees for its independence and integrity, the judiciary in 
Ethiopia is in practice subservient to a domineering executive. 
Hence, capacity building in the form of training judges and 
improving the administrative infrastructure must be accompanied by 
fundamental institutional reform that provides for an effective 
checks and balances system between the executive and the judiciary 
to yield the intended result of judicial independence. 
At present, judges in Ethiopia are nominated by the executive 
branch of government and their appointment is made by a legislature 
made up of members of the ruling party. This practice has affected 
the integrity and independence of the court system from the influence 
of the executive and the legislature. Hence, major reform initiatives 
to streamline the appointment and recruitment of judges and make 
the process free from the influence of the dominant executive is a 
desirable alternative. Second, assistance for judicial reform must be 
delivered as one essential component of a total assistance package 
that includes: projects to improve the overall human rights situation 
in the country, such as human rights education to law officers/police; 
programs to expand legal education at the national level; and the 
establishment and strengthening of Ombudsman/woman offices and 
independent human rights monitoring organizations in the country. 
International assistance to capacity building of the National 
Parliament has enhanced the administrative and institutional structure 
of the legislature but has not transformed it into an effective 
institution to hold the executive accountable nor to make this organ 
of government an active partner in public policy making. Formally, 
the Ethiopian parliament is independent of external influence in its 
legislative responsibility. It has the power of legislation on all 
matters assigned by the Federal Constitution (Art. 55(1). In 
practice, however, parliament is a dormant institution and its role as 
the forum for debating issues of national importance independent of 
the influence of the executive is very limited. It has largely 
functioned as an appendage of the Executive thanks to the fact that 
the overwhelming majority of the members of parliament are 
members of the EPRDF ruling party, which controls both the 
legislative and executive branches of government. 
6. Impact of Electoral Assistance on Civil Society 
Organizations 
As explained elsewhere in this report, civil society organizations that 
uphold the rule of law and play an advocacy role are new to the 
Ethiopian political landscape. Traditionally, the country has limited 
experience in involving non-state actors in the policy process but over 
the past 10-12 years the country has seen a burgeoning of independent 
civil society organizations. Successive governments in the past have 
pursued a state-centered political agenda and non-state actors were 
viewed with suspicion at best and down right hostility at worst. 
Hence, their role in promoting democracy and respect for human 
rights has indeed been limited. It is still incumbent upon the political 
system to open up and demonstrate a clear commitment to entertain 
alternative voices in public policy that come from independent civil 
society. 
Ethiopia has comparatively fewer civil society institutions than 
many African countries. Further, many of these institutions have not 
developed their own programs to act independently, and experience 
capacity and resource constraints to play a constructive role to 
advance democracy. Despite the hurdles, however, there are some 
civil society organizations, such as the Ethiopian Human Rights 
Council (EHRCO), the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association 
(EWLA), the Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute (EEPRI), 
the Forum for Social Studies (FSS), Christian Relief and Development 
Association (CRDA), to name only a few, which have emerged as 
non-partisan civil society institutions and act as independent voices of 
the public and have thus exerted some indirect impact in advancing 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the country ( 
Dessalegn, 2002; Inter-Africa Group, 2000). 
In Ethiopia, civil society institutions can operate only if they are 
duly registered with the Ministry of Justice. There are detailed legal 
provisions and procedures for the registration of civil society 
organizations as provided in Article 479 of the Civil Code of 1960. 
The law stipulates that: 
no association shall carry on any activities other than those 
necessary to effect the establishment there of unless and until 
the memorandum of association or staUites therefore of have 
been registered in accordance with the law and these 
regulations and a Certificate of Registration has been issued to 
the founders thereof pursuant to Article 9 hereof. Any person 
acting on behalf of or in the name of an association not so 
registered shall be jointly and severally liable with the 
association for any such acts. 
Despite the hurdles and lack of a conducive political environment, 
there are some civil society organizations which have been quite 
active in advocating for human rights, the rule of law, and 
monitoring elections. Two of these are the Ethiopian Human Rights 
Council (EHRCO) and the Christian Relief and Development 
Association (CRDA) -an umbrella organization for NGOs mainly 
engaged in relief and development. Both of these organizations have 
received substantial external assistance and have been quite active in 
election monitoring and voter education programs during the 2000 
national elections. 
The Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO) 
The Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO) is an independent, 
non-governmental, non-profit making, non-partisan and non-political 
organization established in 1991. The founding members are 
Ethiopians from all walks of life ~ academics, professionals and 
businessmen-who are committed to the cause of human rights, rule 
of law and democracy. EHRCO's membership spreads to other 
parts of Africa, Europe, the United States of America and Canada, 
and these are several EHRCO support committees in major cities of 
Europe, the U.S.A. and Canada. In addition, EHRCO exchanges 
reports and information with international and continental human 
rights organizations, such as Amnesty International (AI), Africa 
Watch (AW), World Organization Against Torture (WOAT) and the 
International Federation of Human Rights (IFHR) (for more details 
of the organization's history, see below). 
EHRCO has three fundamental and inseparable objectives: 
• To strive for the establishment of the democratic process; 
• To promote the rule of law and due process; 
• To encourage the respect for and to monitor violations of 
human rights in Ethiopia. 
EHRCO also has other objectives, including the following: 
• encouraging Ethiopia's acceptance of all international 
conventions, covenants, charters and declarations that are 
concerned with human rights; 
• organizing seminars, workshops, panel discussions and 
lectures in order to promote the respect for human rights, the 
rule of law and the democratic process; and, 
• publishing and disseminating periodicals, newsletters and 
books in order to elucidate and advance the cause of human 
rights and the democratic process. 
The basic mission of EHRCO is to monitor human rights violations 
in the country. It receives considerable international financial support 
from the Governments of the Norway, Sweden, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and United Kingdom. EHRCO was one of 
the few civil society organizations that was active in monitoring the 
2000 elections. International assistance for its work came from the 
Embassies of Finland, Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden based 
in Addis Ababa. It organized public lectures and panel discussions 
on different topics throughout the country prior to the elections. It 
also launched civic and voter education programs that focused on 
democracy and elections, measures and standards for fair and free 
elections, campaign issues, role of the media in democratic elections. 
The reports issued by the organization indicated that a sizable 
segment of the public attended these panel discussions and seminars. 
The main area of involvement of EHRCO in the 2000 elections 
was in monitoring and observing the election process. In the end, it 
was sharply critical of the May 2000 elections and has characterized 
the same as 'neither free nor fair' . The organization registered 182 
election violations during the registration period; and most of these 
incidents involved arbitrary killings, illegal detentions, illegal 
dismissals/transfer from jobs of opposition and independent 
candidates and harassment of candidates. In its damning assessment, 
the organization reported that 'the large majority of election officials, 
support staff, security personnel, and even the so called people's 
observers were not neutral and objective because often they favored 
ruling party/government candidates' (EHRCO, 2002). 
There were other civic society organizations that were active in 
voter education programs in the 2000 national elections with support 
received from the international community. Two examples included 
the Christian Relief Development Association (CRDA) and the Addis 
Ababa and Ethiopian Chambers of Commerce. It is not necessary to 
provide a detailed account of the activities of these and other civil 
society organizations because they are not human rights 
organizations and most of their work focused on civic education 
rather than election monitoring and supervision. In addition, donor 
assistance for voter and civic education programs prior to the 2000 
national elections has been discussed in the section dealing with 
international electoral assistance. 
7. Human Rights Institutions 
a. Overview 
One can identify several sectors or institutions which have a human 
rights mandate and which have benefited from donor assistance. 
Donor assistance to human rights has primarily been financial 
assistance to advocacy organizations on the one hand, and financial 
support as well as training and technical support to government 
institutions on the other. Assistance has been provided for: a) 
preparatory work for the setting up a government human right 
commission and ombudsman institution; b) reform of legal 
institutions, and training of law enforcement agencies; c) support to 
legislative bodies and training of legislators; d) financial support to 
civil society organizations active in monitoring human rights, human 
rights protection and advocacy. 
b. Human Rights Commission/Ombudsman 
It was towards the end of the 1990s that the government made some 
positive gestures regarding the setting up of a human rights 
commission and the office of an ombudsman. Both institutions are 
eagerly awaited by civil society organizations as well as by donors, 
who are keen to finance them in the belief that they would go some 
way to improve the human rights situation in the country. However, 
the government has shown a marked reluctance to move the process 
along and to facilitate the setting up of the offices concerned. The 
legislation creating the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and also 
the Institution of the Ombudsman went through Parliament in the first 
half of 2000, but the physical establishment of the institutions has 
been delayed since then, and at present there is no indication when 
they will start to carry out their duties. 
The legislations are sound as they stand: both the Commission 
and the Office of the Ombudsman have been created as autonomous 
organizations accountable to Parliament. In both, the chief officers are 
nominated by nominating committees and appointed by the Lower 
House with a term of office of five years (FDRE 2000). This is meant 
to give the officials concerned some degree of freedom of action and 
some protection from pressure from the Executive branch. The 
government's lack of enthusiasm to see these institutions come into 
being has to do with the fact that it does not have any leverage over 
them and that it is not quite confident of its human rights record. 
On the other hand, the government was quick to set up the 
Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. Newspaper 
columnists and others have alleged that the speedy establishment of 
the Commission had an ulterior motive: it was meant to be used as an 
instrument against the opposition within the ruling party following the 
internal power conflict in which many party stalwarts were 
subsequently purged from the organization. Some of the purged 
officials were later arrested under charges of corruption brought by the 
newly established Commission; some are still in detention today and 
their court case is making painfully slow progress. The legislation, 
which was adopted in 2001, gives wide powers to the Commission to 
investigate alleged cases of corruption, to detain suspects without a 
court order, to summon persons in public office, public and private 
enterprises and receive testimony from them. The Commission is 
accountable to the Prime Minister and the chief officials are appointed 
by Parliament upon his nomination (FDRE 2001). Since its 
establishment, the Commission has been actively engaged in 
investigating numerous public agencies, and has brought charges of 
malpractice and corruption against over 150 persons some of whom 
have been detained and all whom are awaiting trial as of the end of 
2002 (FEAC 2003). So far, donors have not been keen to support the 
Commission and budget allocation from the government has been the 
organization's sole source of funds for its activities. 
c. Human Rights Organizations 
We may first begin by a brief note on the broader context within 
which to view human rights organizations that have emerged in this 
country. The voluntary sector in Ethiopia has been growing at a rapid 
pace in the last six to seven years. There is today a wide diversity of 
non-government institutions, many of which would not have been 
allowed to function either under the Imperial or Derg regimes. The 
voluntary sector now consists of professional societies, women's 
groups, human rights and advocacy organizations, community 
organizations, indigenous and Northern NGOs, employers' 
associations, educational foundations, think tanks, and cultural 
societies. 
Human rights organizations in Ethiopia are those whose activities 
focus primarily on what may be described broadly as "rights" issues: 
promoting respect for the rule of law, and protecting the rights of 
citizens specially women; enhancing civic awareness through civic 
education and human rights training. For the purposes of this study 
we may divide the human rights organizations in the country into four 
broad categories based on their main sphere of activity and mandate. 
These consist of: 
• those that monitor human rights violations and prepare public 
reports on them (for example EHRCO); 
• those that defend the rights of women (eg. EWLA); 
• those that generally enhance public awareness about civil 
liberties and promote respect for the rule of law by providing 
human rights training to officials in law enforcement agencies, 
etc.; (eg. APAP) 
• those that undertake civic education, in particular voter 
education to enable citizens to make the right decisions during 
elections (eg. CLCBS). 
We shall look closely at both EHRCO and EWLA since they are the 
most prominent human rights organizations in the country. But a word 
about APAP because it is an important rights-based organization and 
because it shares one important factor in common with the others. All 
three organizations were at one time or another harassed by the 
authorities, and closed down or threatened with closure because of the 
kind of work they were doing. In all cases, few donors raised their 
voice to remonstrate or show concern except perhaps a small number 
of officials from the Scandinavian countries. 
APAP was established in 1993 by a group of young people, some 
of whom had legal training, as an organization dedicated to the 
promotion of public awareness about civil liberties and respect for the 
rule of law17. It is the second oldest human rights organization in the 
country after EHRCO. Among its many activities are informing the 
public about existing laws and legal institutions protecting the right of 
citizens. This is done through the distribution of booklets, posters, and 
articles in the newspapers. The basic assumption is that to disseminate 
legal knowledge among the public will help citizens be aware of their 
rights. Another activity centers on providing human rights training to 
17 The discussion is based on unpublished APAP documents 
members of the judiciary as well as officers in the police force. This is 
meant to make law enforcement officers aware of the "ights of citizens 
and detainees and to make the treatment of people under arrest or in 
detention better through respect for their rights. APAP has been 
conducting such training in various parts of the country for the last 
five years. A third important activity has been providing legal service 
in collaboration with the Ethiopian Bar Association. APAP has set up 
a legal service center to provide legal service to poor people who 
cannot afford to pay for lawyers. It also provides legal and other 
assistance to children and women who have been sexually abused. 
This is part of its defense of children and in particular children who 
have been forced into prostitution. 
APAP was closed down in 1994 by the government on the 
grounds that it was carrying out work beyond the mandate for which it 
was established. It took nearly two years of persistent struggle by the 
organization before it was allowed to resume its activities. 
The two human rights organizations that we shall examine 
closely are the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), and the 
Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA). Both are 
membership organizations and both were established in the 1990s 
following the collapse of the Derg. 
EHRCO, the first human rights organization in the country, was 
established in 1991. It is the only human rights organization which 
monitors human rights violations in the country and issues periodic 
reports on them18. These reports have had wide readership but they 
have angered the government which has disputed the reports' 
accusations claiming that they are based on false evidence and 
politically motivated. 
The government tried to silence EHRCO from the early days of 
the organization but without much success. Initially it refused to 
approve the Council's application for registration alleging that 
EHRCO is a political organization and should be registered as such. A 
media campaign to brand the organization as an anti-government 
political movement and to discredit it in the eyes of the public in the 
mid-1990s backfired and may in fact have enhanced the stature of the 
organization. Later, the government decided to establish its human 
rights commission and ombudsman office to compete with EHRCO 
but the initiative has yet to bear fruit. In 1996, the state-owned 
Commercial Bank blocked EHRCO's account and the organization 
had to rely on public donations to cover its basic expenses and 
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maintain its activities. The Council sued the Bank but the court was 
reluctant to handle the case. International donors, no doubt pressured 
by the government, were unwilling to provide financial support or 
speak-up on its behalf. In mid-1999, EHRCO's application for 
registration was finally approved and its bank account was unblocked 
soon after. The move came as part of the government's effort to woo 
the voluntary sector following the war with Eritrea. Since its legal 
registration, the organization has become more active outside Addis 
Ababa and has been able to establish a number of branch offices in 
other parts of the country. 
Many of the major diplomatic missions, including the U.S., were 
expressly unhappy with EHRCO. It is quite telling that Western donor 
agencies which placed so much emphasis on civil society as the best 
hope for fostering democratization in Africa felt it prudent to kowtow 
to the government when it decided to take punitive measures against 
the one and only human rights organization in the country. 
While it is too early to judge at this point there is no evidence 
that EHRCO's efforts have had any impact on the process of law 
enforcement and the conduct of government authorities. EHRCO does 
not provide legal assistance to the public: it does not represent 
aggrieved persons in court nor offer legal advice or support to those 
who may seek it. It is on the strength of its reports and documentation 
that it hopes to achieve its main objectives. Due in part to government 
hostility and harassment, EHRCO's activity has been confined to 
Addis Ababa and its range of functions fairly limited. 
EWLA was established in the mid-1990s by a group of women 
lawyers to defend women's rights through the legal system, to raise 
public awareness about the plight of women, and to agitate for reforms 
promoting gender equality19. Its main activities consist of legal aid to 
women, public education and advocacy for legal reforms, and research 
and documentation. The organization has three main branch offices 
outside Addis Ababa (in Assossa, Bahr Dar, and Nazret), and operates 
through eleven committees at the regional level, and twelve voluntary 
committees at the zonal and woreda levels distributed throughout the 
country. Committee members are given a short para-legal training and 
encouraged to take an active role in protecting women's rights in their 
localities. 
The legal aid program, which is probably one of the most central 
of EWLA's activities, provides a wide variety of legal advice and 
counseling to women, including court representations by EWLA 
1Q The discussion that follows is based 011 EWLA documents 
lawyers. The service is offered free of charge to all that come seeking 
help. While the overwhelming majority of EWLA cl'ents are women, 
a few men have also sought legal aid, not for themselves but on behalf 
of their female relatives. About 85 percent of the cases brought to 
EWLA involve marital conflict, and the rest consist of rape, 
abduction, robbery and theft, and assault and battery. Over 4000 
women have received legal aid since EWLA began the program in 
1996; most of the women were from poor and disadvantaged social 
backgrounds. Many of the women who came seeking EWLA support 
heard about the organization either through EWLA's public education 
program transmitted over the broadcast media, through word-of-
mouth, or through the organization's advertising campaign. EWLA has 
had some notable successes in court and this has enhanced its stature 
among women. Many women are now aware that they can turn to 
EWLA if they feel they have been victims of gender-based injustice. 
In this respect, it is fdling an important gap and providing an 
invaluable service 
The main aim of the public education program, another important 
component of EWLA's activities, is to help bring about change in 
public attitudes towards women. The program consists of several 
activities carried out in the capital and the regions, including 
workshops and seminars involving law enforcement officials, judges, 
women and concerned individuals; educational material broadcast on 
radio which is particularly aimed at encouraging women's rights 
activists; and leaflets and posters. The program has been instrumental 
in gaining EWLA wide publicity and raising EWLA's profile 
especially among women who have been victims of marital injustice 
and gender discrimination. EWLA has also invested considerable 
effort in legislative reform. While the goal is to bring about the 
amendment of laws discriminating against women, the main focus so 
far has been on the reform of the Family Law which was enacted in 
1960 during the imperial regime but which was still in the statute 
books until the second half of 2000. EWLA submitted a draft 
amendment of the Law to the federal and regional legislative bodies in 
1996, but it was not until July 2000 that a new Family Law was finally 
enacted. While the organization did not succeed in getting all its 
recommendations accepted by Parliament, the new law that was 
passed by the legislature provides significant improvements on the 
earlier one {Berchi 2000). It is to the credit of EWLA that the reform 
of the Family Law became a public issue and that the government felt 
compelled to revisit the legislation. EWLA was also actively engaged 
in promoting women candidates in the parliamentary elections that 
took place in May 2000. 
EWLA was placed under suspension and its activities were 
blocked in September 2001 by order of a senior government official, 
the Minister of Justice. The organization was in effect closed down 
although the Ministry's subsequent statements clarifying its decision 
made a distinction between suspension and closure. The reason given 
by the Ministry for its decision was neither justified nor legally 
defensible, but in view of the fact that the country's judiciary is not an 
independent institution but was subservient to the Ministry of Justice 
the organization was unable to get legal redress. It was the opinion of 
many that EWLA's activities in support of women's rights and the 
challenge it was posing to decision-makers in this regard was being 
looked at with a jaundiced eye by senior officials in government. 
EWLA is the most important human rights organization in the country 
fighting for women's rights, and to close it down was to strike a blow 
against women. EWLA remained closed for nearly two months 
despite the public outcry and the support it was gaining from civil 
society organizations and the media, both public and private. The 
suspension was finally lifted in October following a cabinet reshuffle 
and the appointment of a new Minister of Justice. 
While some donor countries, in particular Norway, showed 
concern and raised the matter with government authorities, there was 
no concerted effort on the part of the larger donor community to 
convey its concern to the government regarding the unjust treatment 
of EWLA. EWLA receives financial support from a large number of 
donors, of which the following may be cited: a consortium or donors 
consisting of Norway, Netherlands, Sweden and Finland, and also 
Oxfarn U.K and Canada, USAID, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung of 
Germany. 
8. Conclusions 
A number of international human rights groups have alleged that the 
response by some of the big donor countries, in particular the U.S., to 
gross human rights violations perpetrated by the government's 
security forces has been muted and disappointing (Human Rights 
Watch; Africa Watch). The significance of Ethiopia to the U.S war on 
terrorism has grown following the al-Qaeda attack on New York and 
the Pentagon in September 2001. Both rights organizations argue that 
Ethiopia has now become a partner and 'frontline state' in the war 
- - " - 1 1 I 1 rlnp<; not w i sh to 
antagonize the Ethiopian government over the issue of human rights. 
They point out that officials at the State Department in Washington 
and the U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa indicated that the U. S. wields 
110 leverage over Ethiopia, which is of course not entirely true. As 
noted above, the US continues to provide extensive humanitarian and 
development assistance, but it has not demanded accountability with 
regard to human rights. Human Rights Watch quotes 'a senior State 
Department official' as saying that the "the country's human rights 
record is 'not a factor' in the bilateral relations" between the two 
countries (Human Rights Watch: 42). Pausewang et al. argue that the 
U.S. has been apologetic about the country's human rights record. The 
U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa has continued to insist that the new 
government "was better than the military dictatorship ... and having 
started from scratch, needed time to develop a more democratic 
society." America's aim of maintaining stability in the Horn of Africa, 
they note, has made it "overlook severe violations of human rights and 
excuse outright manipulation of elections ... ." (2002:43). 
One of the authors of this report along with half a dozen heads of 
civil society organizations recently had an informal meeting with Mr 
Brian Goldbeck, the newly appointed counselor for Political and 
Economic Affairs at the U.S Embassy here in Addis Ababa20 Asked 
about the evident lack of active concern of the U.S regarding human 
rights and democratization issues in Ethiopia, Mr Goldbeck replied 
that his government was not down-playing the importance of these 
issues but had only adopted a different approach and was pursuing 
them with the Ethiopian authorities through informal channels, behind 
the scenes and without attracting publicity. He also stated that his 
government does not have a political problem with Ethiopia. 
Human Rights Watch credits the European Union for 
demonstrating 'an increased willingness to take a stand 011 human 
rights violations in Ethiopia' in recent years (ibid: 43). In an interview 
we had with the political officer of the EC Delegation in Ethiopia, we 
were informed that the EU has formally taken a 'demarche', as he 
called it, on a number of human rights cases, requesting the 
government for an explanation concerning rights violations by 
security forces in the Awassa and Tepi incidents, and demanding an 
independent investigation of the matter. On the other hand, other 
donors have not taken any determined measures to hold the 
government accountable on cases of serious human rights violations. 
A few donors have made some effort to convey their concern to the 
government but none have shown any willingness to take a public 
stand on abuses carried out by the security forces. 
Thanks to the work of the half a dozen or so local human rights 
organizations, there is a relatively greater awareness of human rights 
issues among the public, at least among the urban public, on the one 
hand, and among the diverse set of civil society groups on the other. 
Many issues related to human rights are discussed in the private press, 
and drafts of government legislation are frequently scrutinized from 
the human rights point of view. Some human rights groups have 
prepared short briefs on the constitutional rights of citizens which they 
have distributed to the communities they work with as well as the 
wider public. Public education on human rights and the constitution 
has also been aired on the local FM radio. 
There is some indication that the government is becoming 
somewhat more careful about human rights issues now than before. It 
is however still not willing to take measures against officials who 
have perpetrated serious human rights violations. In the Awassa case, 
a few local government officials were removed from their posts and 
this was taken by the donor community as a sign that the government 
is responding to donor pressure. But this is a minor measure compared 
to the scale of the violations. There are now government plans to 
provide human rights training to the police and other security forces as 
part of their basic training program but so far human rights training to 
these forces are undertaken by human rights groups only. 
The following are more specific observations that the authors feel 
are important 
• Donors only provide financial assistance, with some training 
and technical support on occasions. The initiative and ideas 
have come from local organizations or the government as the 
case may be. 
• Financial assistance to human rights and other civil society 
organizations has important consequences: such organizations 
have been able to sustain their activities, to expand the scope 
and geographical reach of their work, and to reach more 
people and extend their influence. 
• As a general rule donors have acted individually, and on 
occasions their individual interests have overridden their 
stated commitments to human rights. This has meant that they 
have not taken measures when they should have, in particular 
with regard to serious human rights violations by government 
security forces. The exception to this in respect of the Awassa 
and Tepi cases is the EU. 
Donor decisions may be influenced by personalities. Donor 
officials with a strong concern and active engagement have 
influenced decisions. 
OECD donors frequently operate in a consortium- the Human 
Rights Subgroup is responsible for human rights issues in the 
country. However, this body has no corporate identity and 
cannot make decisions or take measures on behalf of its 
members. It can only provide information to the members and 
it is up to o each member agency or country to take the 
appropriate measures. Donors we interviewed said this is a 
strength but we think it is a weakness. 
Donors' decisions and actions are inconsistent; there is no 
policy coherence. On some occasions donors have bowed to 
pressure from the government and have failed to take 
measures in support of human rights organizations: the 
harassment and/or closure of EHRCO, EWLA, and APAP 
was passed in silence or with only a few donor governments 
showing concern. Moreover, many of the big donors have 
declined to hold the government accountable for serious cases 
of human rights violations by the security forces. 
The government has made its own decision in some human 
rights cases against the interest of donors but there has not 
been any serious response from them. The case in point is the 
delay in the establishment of the Human Rights Commission 
and the Office of the Ombudsman about which it had made an 
initial commitment. 
IV. T H E MEDIA AND I N T E R N A T I O N A L ASSISTANCE 
1. Introduction 
Ethiopia's media has undergone dramatic change since the early 1990s 
following the fall of the military government and the establishment of 
the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). At the time of the 
Imperial and Derg regimes, the government was the sole owner of the 
means of public information and used the media to extend its power 
and legitimacy, to control the population, and to stifle public 
awareness. The Derg in particular employed the radio as a weapon of 
intimidation and terror: it was through radio broadcasts that the public 
heard about the execution of public officials, intellectuals, and 
political activists who were accused of sundry acts of sabotage and 
conspiracy against the "socialist revolution". 
At the time of the Imperial regime, the media consisted, at first, 
of about a dozen state owned newspapers, and the national radio; 
television transmission began only in 1964. All print and broadcast 
media was owned by the state, except one independent monthly 
magazine, and a private radio station established in 1963 and operated 
by the World Lutheran Federation. The station's coverage of 
international news was comprehensive and of high standard but it 
exercised caution and self-censorship with regard to local news and 
programs. This was the only private broadcast media to have operated 
in the country to date; it was finally nationalized by the Derg 
following the Revolution. Under the Imperial regime, news, 
commentary and public affairs programs were heavily censored, and 
journalists and broadcasters could not express their views or report 
public opinion which in any way could be interpreted as being critical 
of the government or the Emperor. Censorship affected not just the 
media but all creative work as well. 
One of the first acts of the Derg when it seized power was to 
ensure that the media was firmly under its control, and both it and the 
censor would serve the Revolution faithfully. The difference between 
the Derg and the Imperial regime in this regard was one of form only. 
While the latter believed press freedom did not exist except in the 
minds of the enemies of the country who were intent on destroying its 
'Solomonic dynasty and Christian tradition', the Derg considered it as 
a bourgeois subterfuge and an imperialist tool designed against the 
socialist revolution. It was a little while before the media, especially 
the print media, which during the days before the Revolution had 
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independent monthly magazines were being published during the 
early, 'transitional' period of the Derg, but all four ceased publication 
by 1976 because the political environment was becoming prohibitive, 
and the threat of detention or worse was hanging over the editors and 
their staff. 
The political context at the time of the change of government and 
the environment in which the deregulation of the press took place 
have had a lasting impact on the relation between the media and the 
government, and it may well be worth recapitulating briefly some of 
the major issues here. The political agenda of the new government 
when it seized power was to restructure the country's political, 
economic and social system along ethnic lines. Ethnic identity was to 
be the main criteria defining an individual and his or her relations with 
the state. Public employment, educational, economic and other 
opportunities, and political engagement were all to be based on ethnic 
criteria. The military, police and other security forces were also 
reorganized on the same basis. Pan-Ethiopian or issue-based political 
parties were not allowed to register since only ethnic parties were 
recognized. The end result was that the country's political landscape 
was radically changed and there was immense upheaval within the 
civil service and other public institutions in the first years of the 
transition 
This chapter will discuss the institutional changes in the media 
brought about by the new government, the state of the media at 
present and the nature and impact of international assistance. As we 
shall try to show in the pages that follow, international assistance has 
had limited impact and the free press in particular continues to evolve 
primarily because of factors growing out of the present political 
context. Indeed, it may be said that international donor groups have, 
unwittingly, walked into a minefield the consequences of which have 
been counter-productive. A clear understanding of the context created 
in the post-conflict period is thus important 
2. Context 
a. Regulatoiy Framework 
One of the first acts of the Transitional Government was to enact a 
press law, which deregulated the press, and which immediately had a 
dramatic impact 011 the country's media. While a small number of 
news magazines had started to appear soon after the fall of the Derg 
and before the nress law wac init iate tUo — 
media allowing citizens or businesses to publish and distribute private 
newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals and other news sources 
was accelerated by the new legislation. The legislation abolished 
censorship and allowed any Ethiopian citizen or group to carry on 
press activity provided that the person or group registers and obtains a 
license from the regulatory agency, the Ministry of Information or its 
Regional bureaus. Obtaining a license was made easy and simple, 
requiring only the submission of the names of the chief and deputy 
editors, the name of the press and the address of the publisher. The 
law also provided rights of access to information, in particular the 
right of the press to seek and obtain news and information from any 
branch of government (TGE 1992a). The allocation of radio waves to 
private investors was postponed for later legislation, which was finally 
issued in the form of the broadcast law of 1999. This law privatized 
the airwaves, allowing individuals and groups to own and operate 
private radio and television broadcast services (FDRE 1999). 
However, the implementation of this legislation and the privatization 
of the broadcast media has been delayed partly because the licensing 
agency was not established but more importantly because the 
government is apprehensive of losing one of its most important 
weapons of political control and manipulation. 
There is broad agreement among informed opinion, and 
especially people in the media, that the press law of 1992 has opened 
the door to the growth of the private press in the country (see EFJA 
2003; Mairegu 2003). The 1995 Constitution guarantees freedom of 
the press as well as of expression but there had been similar 
constitutions in the past but their impact on the media had been 
negligible. It was the press law which established the ground rules for 
the growth of the private press21. The immediate effect following the 
legislation was the proliferation of a wide diversity of newspapers, 
newsmagazines and other publications in Amharic and other local 
languages as well as in English. According to WAAG 
Communications (2003) the licensing department of the Ministry of 
Information has issued licenses for 182 magazines and 543 
newspapers in the last ten years. At present, there are over 65 
independent public affairs and general interest newspapers on the 
market, of which some 35 have been continuously published for five 
years or more. The number does not include newspapers specializing 
in sports, sex and religious matters. In addition, a large variety of 
21 For an extended discussion of the growth of the media and the private press since 
commercial, cultural, and educational publications periodically flood 
the market. The end of censorship has also made it possible for civil 
society institutions, and in particular human rights and advocacy 
organizations to publish and freely distribute reports, studies, 
conference proceedings and public education materials. 
The government still controls four national and at least five 
Regional newspapers as well as most of the broadcast media. A new 
development since the establishment of the present government is 
media ownership by the ruling party and its Regional affiliates. Media 
owned by the ruling parties includes one national and one Regional 
radio, and some seven newspapers. A few of the independent parties 
publish their own newspapers but these have very limited circulation. 
Table 4.1 below provides a brief picture of the state of the media in 
the country today. 
Table 4.1 Indicators of State of Media 2002 
Media Govt Owned 
Party 
Owned 
Private Community 
Radio 1 National; 2 
FM local; 1 
Educational; 2 
Regional 
1 National; 
1 Regional 
None None 
TV 1 National; 1 
Educational* 
None None None 
Newspapers 4 National; 5 
Regional 
7 by Govt 
Parties; 3 
Ind. 
65** Unknown No. 
News Service 1 1 None None 
Source: Mol 2002 and Mol Records; WAAG Communication 2003; Mairegu 2003; 
Brook 2000 
Note: * Transmitted through state TV. 
** Not including sports and religious papers. 
b. Problems of the Media 
Before we examine the problems of the media in greater depth, a brief 
discussion of the overall conditions facing the media is in order. By 
far the most important media in terms of its reach and impact is radio 
but due to poverty, and inadequate marketing and transport facilities, 
only a small percentage of the population listens to radio broadcasts, 
especially in the countryside. According to the last census, only 10 
percent of rural households and 50 percent of urban households have 
radio sets. Television ownership is much smaller, and exclusively 
restricted to urban households, of which a mere 7 percent were found 
to own TV sets (CSA 1999a). Radio Ethiopia, the government radio 
station, broadcasts in eight local languages, and in English, French 
and Arabic with a total broadcast time of 285 hours per week (MOI 
2002). Its main news and current affairs program are broadcast in 
three of the country's main languages, namely Amharic, the official 
language of the country, and in Oromifa and Tigrigna. Discriminating 
listeners have access to foreign radio broadcasts but, according to a 
recent audience survey carried out in five major towns, these draw 
only a small percentage of the radio audience. The report found that 
half of the respondents in the survey were dissatisfied with Radio 
Ethiopia, and the main reasons given were bias and one-sidedness in 
news reporting, and the poor quality of other programs (Berhanu 
2000). 
Newspaper readership may be described as miniscule compared 
to the extent of the radio audience in the country, though there are no 
accurate figures available. According to the audience survey noted 
above, only 9 percent of respondents preferred newspapers as opposed 
to other media for news and information; the comparable figure for 
radio was 74 percent. Another recent survey of urban households 
found that 45 percent of respondents had never read a newspaper in 
their lives (Dessalegn and Aklilu 2002). Low newspaper readership is 
first and foremost a result of low literacy and low reading habits on 
the one hand, and poverty and low income on the other. Adult literacy 
rates in 1998 were 42 percent for males and 30 percent for females; 
the rates are lower in the rural areas. Secondly, most households 
cannot afford to buy newspapers on a regular basis especially when 
the papers do not provide any tangible benefit in return. 
There are also other dimensions to the problem of the media in 
general. Unlike many other countries, the media in Ethiopia has no 
real impact on the lives of the great majority of the people. It does not 
provide reliable information, plays a very limited role in public 
education, and offers very little entertainment value (except to young 
people in the urban areas who find amusement in the music and soap 
opera broadcast on national or FM radio). In so far as the print media 
is concerned, almost all the papers published since the press law of 
1992 are based in Addis Ababa, the capital, and reflect the narrow 
interests of the Addis Ababa literati. Moreover, many of the papers are 
not available outside the capital. 
The private press is faced by a host of other problems: structural, 
economic, and professional. The fact that there is such a large number 
of oaoers on the market has meant stiff competition, limited sales and 
limited advertising revenue. According to information from the 
Ministry of Information, less than ten percent of the papers currently 
in publication have a circulation of 8,000 or more. Only a few papers, 
not more than five in number, have a circulation of over 10,000. As 
Table 4.2 below indicates, of the five main weekly papers shown only 
one newspaper derives good income from advertising. Advertising 
revenue is limited for many, and negligible for the majority. As 
Shimelis (2000) has shown, many press ventures are economically 
unviable and are operated under extremely difficult circumstances. 
Some papers are run on a shoestring budget and remain virtually one-
man operations. Several papers have been able to survive only 
because they have been subsidized by 'patrons' of one sort or another 
(frequently exile political groups), or by donors and NGOs (see 
below). Over the last ten years, numerous papers have come and gone. 
According to WAAG Communications, 19 magazines and 74 
newspapers have stopped publication for a variety of reasons over this 
period. 
Table 4.2 Sample of Five Independent Weekly Newspapers 
Name of Paper Circulation Av. No. of Pages 
Av Advert. 
Space (%) 
Addis Admas 29,000 20 18 
Addis Zena 5200 24 16 
Menelik 8000 16 14 
Reporter (Amharic) 18,500 32 45 
Tobya 5200 20 18 
Source: MOl Records; recent issues of the newspapers. Circulation figures are 
actually number of print runs of each paper and are given by Mol as of June 
2003. 
Moreover, the quality and level of professionalism of the private press 
has been a source of concern to the many readers, friends of press 
freedom as well as donors. Many of the papers show the worst 
excesses of yellow journalism. A recent statement by the Ethiopian 
Free Press Journalists Association (EFJA), the main organization for 
employees in the independent press, makes a number of significant 
criticisms of the free press. There is, it says, lack of professional ethics 
in reporting and news management. Often, stories are written without 
any evidence and without sufficient information. There is alarmist 
reporting, and reporting that is completely false. News reports often 
tell only one side of the story and provide no balance at all. Many of 
the papers suffer from a lack of professionally trained staff. There are 
not many trained journalist working for the private press; in fact in 
some cases, papers are managed by people who have very limited 
formal education. Financing is another major problem raised by the 
EFJA: many of the papers are not profitable and the need to 
economize severely hampers news gathering and report writing. There 
is, finally, a lack of cooperation and goodwill among free press 
journalists and between the free press and the government press 
(EFJA 2003). Interestingly enough, unlike some countries, sex and 
violence have limited sales value in this country. On the contrary, 
what the city's literati find exciting is political sensationalism: the rise, 
fall or defection of officials within the ruling elite, conflict among 
them, embezzlement of public funds and the like. 
The Prime Minister on one occasion described the private press 
as the 'gutter press'. To be fair to the press, we should note that the 
picture is a bit more complicated. While it is true that many of the 
papers that appeared with deregulation (and still appear today) were 
awful, some were better and making efforts to maintain a respectable 
standard. There has been a good deal of improvement over the years, 
and a small number of papers have grown to win public confidence. 
Survival in the marketplace has become tougher, readers have become 
more discriminating, and sensationalism no longer sells papers. For 
these reasons, and, paradoxically because of government pressure, the 
quality of newspaper production as well as journalism has improved to 
some extent. The report prepared by EJPA noted earlier states that 
despite the many weaknesses and constraints, the private press has 
established its identity and achieved a lot. The private press has a 
better record than the heavily subsidized government press in terms of 
public education; it has established a track record in investigative 
reporting, exposing policy failures, and inefficiency and corruption in 
public office. It has, the report goes on to note, been better able to 
present the diversity of views within society, and is beginning to serve 
as a 'watch dog' on behalf of the public interest (EFJA 2003). There is 
a good deal of truth in this assessment. 
It is interesting to note that the proliferation of the private press 
and the competition created as a result has brought about some 
improvement in the state owned media as well. The public media now 
reports on inefficiency and malpractice in government agencies, and 
has offered debates in which critics of the government have 
participated. Occasionally, it reports on the activities of opposition 
political parties. This would have been unthinkable some ten years 
ago. Moreover, civil society organizations can now buy airtime on FM 
Radio Addis, a recently established FM radio station owned by the 
government, and transmit their own programs. A njmber of human 
rights groups, policy research institutes, and the Ethiopian Chamber of 
Commerce have taken advantage of this opening to run public 
education programs over the last three years. 
c. Relations between the Media and Government 
From the very beginning relations between the independent press and 
the new government were on a collision course. The new government 
did not preach reconciliation soon after it seized power, on the 
contrary, government propaganda was inflammatory, and the state 
media was used to fan the flames of ethnic conflict. Ethnic politics 
was strongly resented by a large section of public opinion, especially 
in the urban centers. Ethiopian towns are an ethnic 'melting pot' 
containing people with diverse cultural and religious backgrounds 
living together, if not in harmony, at least tolerant of each other. 
Ethnic politics was now seen as a threat undermining the goals of 
what informed opinion would call unity within cultural diversity. 
Moreover, the new government, flushed with its victory over the Derg 
and its huge but feeble military apparatus was in no mood to enter into 
dialogue with any group or party over any issue. In short, 
reconciliation and dialogue were not part of the government's lexicon. 
The independent press on its part was equally aggressive. A great 
majority of the papers that were launched following the deregulation 
was strongly critical of the new government. Indeed, quite a number 
of them were established for the main purpose of attacking the 
government and exposing the failings of ethnic politics. Of the 65 
independent papers that are published at present less than five percent 
may be described as being sympathetic to the government. To many in 
the emerging press, and to a good section of urban public opinion, the 
new government was a minority government, dominated as it was by 
the Tigrian-based TPLF, and hence illegitimate. Pan-Ethiopianists 
believed the government had brought disrepute to the country and its 
long history and culture. 
The conflict between the state and the press was thus deep 
rooted, and continued to grow as the government's ethnic program 
came to infuse many aspects of public and private discourse and as the 
improvements in the economy, in particular in the poverty situation, 
and in governance and administrative efficiency failed to materialize. 
There have been several costly government blunders, of which the 
Ethio-Eritrean relations leading to the war. the neare nrnrpce tiio 
circumstances surrounding the decision by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border 
Commission are some of the worst, which provided ammunition to the 
press. Under these circumstances, any donor initiative to promote 
dialogue or reconciliation in whatever sphere is bound to fall on deaf 
ears. 
A persistent problem facing the free press is government 
discrimination and harassment. There is open and deliberate 
discrimination of the free press by the government which has taken 
the form of refusing to give information to it and not inviting any of 
the papers for press conferences or news worthy official events. While 
the 1992 legislation acknowledges the right to information and states 
that the press has a right to information from government agencies, 
this is denied in reality. The press conferences given by the Prime 
Minister in the last ten years have always excluded the free press. The 
government media and that of the ruling party are given preferential 
treatment. Even donors were initially reluctant to provide information 
and news releases to the private press. This has contributed to poor 
journalism in the free press, for in the absence of news, journalist have 
turned to the city's active rumor mill and have even occasionally made 
their own, often sensational stories. There has been some change in 
the last few years, and some government agencies are now beginning 
to make an opening and provide information to a select number of 
private newspapers. 
The threat to press freedom posed by government hostility to the 
private press has been a serious one for quite some time and still 
remains a danger. The harassment and victimization of independent 
journalists has taken a toll, and while the number of victims and the 
frequency of harassment have decreased over the years, it cannot be 
assumed to be a thing of the past. Table 4.3 shows the number of 
journalists that were victims of government harassment in 1994 as 
reported by EHRCO; no comparable figures are available for later 
years. 
Table 4.3 Threats to Press Freedom 1994 
Measures Against Journalists 
Detention without charge 
Sentenced 6-24 months in prison 
Fined (varying amounts of money) 
Released on bail 
On appeal or in litigation 
Suspended jail sentence (12-18 months) 
Acquitted by court 
No of Journalists 
2 
7 
13 
2 1 
15 
6 
9 
Source: Based on EHRCO 1999: 124. 
Since the 1994 report, EHRCO has reported on the detention and 
harassment of four journalists working for the weekly paper Tobya 
which occurred in 1996. The journalists were detained without charge 
for various lengths of time and released on bail. The same journalists 
were again arrested in 1998 charged with printing material threatening 
the peace of the country. While they were in detention the paper's 
office was burnt down in mysterious circumstances, and because of 
that and the arrest of the staff the paper ceased publication for four 
months. EHRCO has also reported the cases of several journalists 
subjected to harassment and detention in 2001 (EHRCO 2003: 196 ff). 
According to the report, the editor of Tomar, another weekly paper, 
was arrested for publishing a report on inter-ethnic conflict in one of 
the Regions. He was held without charge for several weeks and later 
released. The report also describes threats and harassment of editors 
and journalists on three other newspapers. According to the head of 
the EFJA, there have been some 200 journalists put in detention, some 
more than once, in the last five years. About 35 to 38 face legal cases 
pending in the courts22. 
The recent decision by the government to draft a new press law 
to replace the law of 1992 has been interpreted by many, including the 
independent media as well as civil society organizations as an attempt 
to muzzle the media, and in particular the country's fledgling private 
press. The draft legislation is highly restrictive in terms of access to 
information, reporting, financing and newspaper distribution. There 
have been numerous articles in the private press criticizing the draft 
law and calling for significant revisions. EFJA has taken a very active 
role in defending the rights of the free press and expressing its 
opposition to the new law. Civil society organizations have also 
expressed their concern: a free press is of central importance to the 
work and growth of civil society and the draft law poses a threat to 
press freedom. Attempts to promote dialogue on the issue between the 
government and the private media, which took the form of a number 
of public conferences, some of which financed by donors such as the 
EU, DFID and the Austrian Embassy, have not been successful. The 
government has refused to make any compromise and the press has 
understandably been sharp in its criticism. The international free press 
movement as well as African press organizations have sent strong 
messages of support to the EFJA and of protest to the government. 
Despite the public outcry, the draft legislation has been submitted to 
the Council of Ministers, the first step on its way to Parliament. 
3. International Assistance 
International assistance to the media (both public as well as private) 
has been limited in scope, and relatively insignificant in terms of its 
impact. International donors have failed to make a strategic 
intervention in the media sector and have been limited to low level 
support with only limited results. The following have been the main 
forms of assistance provided. 
a. International Assistance to Media for Elections. 
Both the electoral law of 1993 and the broadcast legislation of 1999 
stipulate that candidates- both individuals and political organizations-
contesting elections are entitled to equal and free access to the public 
media. However, it is not easy to monitor whether or not these laws 
have been fully implemented. Candidates have to request access to the 
media but not all candidates were aware during the last elections that 
they were entitled to this right. Nevertheless, the findings of one 
study show that the free air time allotted for the 2000 elections was 
used mostly by independent opposition candidates; only three 
opposition political organizations out of a total of 50 took advantage 
of their media access rights (Berhanu and Meleskachew 2001). The 
study goes on to show that government candidates in contrast made 
maximum and more effective use of the free airtime allotted to them. 
Polhemus (2002) states that one of the "improvements in the 2000 
elections was greater and more systematic access to the state owned 
media for the opposition than there had been previously" but many 
opposition groups did "not make optimal use of the access they did 
gain." There has been very little donor support to the government 
media targeted to election coverage. 
The picture is quite different and complicated when it comes to 
the private press. Elections do not make hot news nor do they sell 
newspapers, at least not in this country. During the last elections, none 
of the candidates on either side of the political divide had a media 
personality, and none of them offered ideas, programs or visions that 
excited the public imagination. In fact, Ethiopia's elections have been 
tedious affairs: dull campaigns, limited news-worthy events, and lack 
of media savvy among most of the campaigners. There has also been 
widespread public opinion, shared by many in the press, that the 
outcome of the elections was a foregone conclusion, and that there 
was no level playing field in the contest. Hence many papers were not 
keen to provide wide coverage. Important events during the campaign 
were reported and the press conferences called by the opposition 
groups were given coverage but otherwise the coverage in the private 
media was fairly limited. On the other hand, scandals and malpractices 
related to the elections have been eagerly seized upon by it. 
Donor assistance to the private press in this regard has been 
restricted to training of journalists (including government media 
journalists) on election coverage, and financial support to selected 
newspapers to publish articles related to voter education, and to 
provide expanded coverage of the campaigns of opposition 
candidates. Opposition candidates had limited resources to spend on 
media exposure, and whatever funds were spent on advertising by 
them went to state radio and television because these reach a wider 
public than newspapers, public or private. The private press did not 
benefit commercially during the elections except in the form of donor 
financial support. 
b. International Assistance for Training of Journalists. 
There have been numerous programs initiated and/or supported by a 
large number of donors to provide skills training to journalists in the 
last ten years. Most of these have been short programs, ranging from 
half a day to a week, in which trainers brought from outside (on 
occasions, local trainers) have given lectures on the basic skills of the 
profession. Almost all of the major donors in the country have 
supported one or more programs of this kind at one time or another. 
The programs are given free to journalists working for the private or 
government media, nevertheless, how well attended they are depends 
on whether or not trainees are paid to attend the programs. The 
instructions are often given in English, but a majority of the trainees 
do not use English in their work, and have very limited understanding 
of the language. There are only a small number of English language 
newspapers published in the country. 
Many veteran journalists, some of whom have been involved in 
the training program as trainers or resource persons, are very 
dissatisfied with the program provided by donors. There is no 
coordination or continuity in the programs: each training program is 
new, involving new trainers and new trainees. The selection of 
trainees is random, and frequently the wrong person attends the 
programs. Moreover, trainers from abroad do not understand the 
reality facing local journalists, and thus the training is often not 
relevant to their needs23. Except for one or two courses in journalism 
offered at Addis Ababa University, and of late at Unity College, a 
private college in the capital, there is no school of journalism in the 
country to train journalists. The government's Mass Media Training 
Institute (MMTI), which was established at the end of 1996 is the only 
institution which provides professional training and offers a diploma 
in journalism. However, as a government body, its programs are open 
to journalists working in the government media and media operated by 
the ruling parties (Brook 2000). No keen interest has been shown on 
the part of the private media to take advantage of the opportunities 
offered by it. According to a senior official at the Institute, journalists 
from the private press are welcome to enroll as trainees but the 
response has not been encouraging24. For these reasons, not many 
donors have shown interest in supporting the Institute. 
c. Other Support to the Private Press. 
Selected newspapers have benefited from what for lack of a better 
term we have called financial 'subsidy' by donors and NGOs. Such 
'subsidy' takes the form of payment to one or more newspapers to 
publish articles on a specific subject to serve as a means of public 
education. Donors or NGOs with particular interest on a particular 
issue of public concern will pay a newspaper to publish articles on 
such subjects either prepared by themselves or by the newspaper 
itself. Some of the issues on which papers have run public education 
articles include HIV/AIDS, the environment, human rights, violence 
against women, pastoralism, as well as media professional ethics. 
23 Iinterview with Teferi Wossen, WAAG Communications. 
24 Interview with Ammanuel Abdissa of MMTI 
Sometimes, however, the choice of newspapers to support in this 
manner has been made on inadequate criteria and reflects a lack of 
hard-headedness or sound judgment. 
d. Assistance to Regulatory Reforms. 
As was noted above, the main alternative media in the country so far 
is the private press, and this media was up and running long before 
international assistance programs were on offer. One area which has 
raised keen interest among some donors is the deregulation of the 
electronic media. Ethiopia must be one of the few African countries 
which has not allowed private radio and television. The broadcast 
legislation of 1999 established the ground rides for the licensing of 
private radio and television and there was hope among many that the 
entry of the private sector into the electronic media would be allowed 
soon. However, this has been a big disappointment to the public, the 
private sector as well as donors because the government is dragging 
its feet and continuing to delay the implementation of the legislation. 
A number of business interests have drawn up plans and invested 
resources in preparation for the privatization of the airwaves but they 
have been frustrated by the delay. Donors such as Norway and foreign 
broadcast organizations such as the BBC have invested time and 
money to help local media interests prepare for the day of 
privatization. 
The government is apprehensive that private radio and television 
will undermine its monopoly on the airwaves as well as its political 
power. The Broadcast Agency, which is mandated to issue licenses, 
monitor and regulate radio and TV transmission, has been in business 
for over a year but so far no licenses have been issued. In an interview 
with the deputy manager of the Agency, we asked why the licensing 
process has been delayed for so long. The official's response was that 
the Agency has not yet been able to employ trained staff capable of 
carrying out the tasks entrusted to it by the legislation. At the moment, 
he said, the Agency has filled only 60 percent of its staff needs. He 
pointed out also that the Agency does not yet have enough technical 
capability to regulate private broadcasters. He went on to note that 
there are inconsistencies between the broadcast law and the newly 
drafted press legislation and these need to be ironed out before 
licenses are issued25. The Agency has not so far been a beneficiary of 
international assistance. Several donors, among which Norway, the 
23 Interview with Desta Tesfaye 
Netherlands and DFID may be cited, have shown keen interest in the 
deregulation of the broadcast media and have from time to time raised 
concerns to the government over the delay in issuing licenses. 
On the other hand, donor support to enabling media legislation 
has been limited. The government is in the process of finalizing a draft 
freedom of information legislation, the background work for which 
was prepared by international consultants paid for by donors. As noted 
above, the controversial press law that has finally been submitted to 
the Council of Ministers was the work of the government alone, and 
apart from paying for some conferences to discuss the draft legislation 
and to try to promote dialogue between the press and the government, 
donors have had no hand in its content. It should be noted that not 
many donors have shown concern about the draft law, at least not in 
public, and this is surprising considering the fact that both the private 
press and public opinion believe that should the draft be finally 
approved and become law, the government will have struck a savage 
blow against press freedom. 
e. Support to Media Organizations 
Unlike many African countries, media organizations in Ethiopia are 
few in number. According to a recent study of broadcasting in Eastern 
Africa, for instance, there were more than a dozen journalists' 
associations in Kenya in 2000 (Wanyeki 2000), whereas in Ethiopia 
there are only two associations serving journalists, of which one is 
very inactive. Obviously the reason for this poor record has been the 
underdevelopment of the media, and the fact that until some ten years 
ago the media was a government monopoly. Even after deregulation, 
the hostility of the government to the private press has impeded 
progress and professional development. 
The two associations that exist at present are the Ethiopian Free 
Press Journalists Association (EFJA) and the Ethiopian Media 
Women's Association (EMWA)26. The latter organization which was 
legally established in 1999, and whose aim is to promote the interest 
of women working in the media, is in the process of defining its role 
and has thus not been actively engaged. It has held a few workshops 
and published about two issues of its newsletter but so far it has not 
taken up any public programs or advocacy initiatives to pursue its 
objectives. It was established thanks mainly to the support it received 
26 There is an association for journalists working for the government media but the 
organization has been inactive for many years. 
initially from the Netherlands Embassy. EFJA27 was set up in 1992, 
following the deregulation of the media, however, according to the 
president of the Association, because of the hostility of the 
government, it has taken nearly ten years to get it registered under the 
law. Despite the pressure from government on the Association and the 
free press in general, the organization was kept running by a small 
number of dedicated members. In this country, it is extremely difficult 
to function as a civil society organization without registration. The 
organization cannot open a bank account and receive funds from 
donors if it is not legally registered. 
EFJA is a membership organization; membership is open to 
those who are engaged in the private media. Journalists working for 
the state owned media do not have their own association because they 
have been prohibited from establishing one by their employer. At 
present, EFJA has 166 members and membership is growing 
especially in the last two to three years due to some easing of 
government pressure on the press following the Ethio-Eritrean war. 
The Association is still in the process of building its own competence, 
and some of the duties of its office are carried out by voluntary work; 
each member is expected to contribute one day of work a week to the 
Association. The decision-making structure consists of the general 
assembly of members which appoints the Executive Committee which 
carries out the decisions and policies made by the assembly. The 
president is the head of the Executive. 
EFJA's major source of financial support has been the 
international free press movement. The Vienna based International 
Press Institute (IPI), and the International Freedom of Expression and 
Exchange (IFEX) have been its main source of funds so far. The 
organization is a member of IPI and has benefited a good deal because 
of that. Other international press organizations, including the London 
based PEN International, ARTICLE 19, and a number of Africa-based 
associations have offered moral support. Unfortunately, while they 
have shown a good deal of interest about the Association, donors 
based in the country have not offered any financial support to it. 
EFJA's main responsibility, broadly speaking, is to promote the 
growth of the free press in the country and to defend press freedom. 
While it has not had sufficient clout, it has attempted to support 
27 Based on EFJA 2003, unpublished documents, and interview with Kifle Mulate, 
president of EFJA. In November 2003, the organization was suspended by the 
government, allegedly for failing to renew its registration. The suspension has been 
contested by the organization; international press organizations have sent protests to 
oa 
members who have been harassed or put in detention on account of 
what they have written or published in their papers. The Association, 
through its international connections, campaigns on behalf of 
journalists persecuted by the government. The other dimension of its 
responsibility is to promote the quality of journalism in the country. In 
this endeavor it has drafted a code of professional ethics for members 
and has held public discussions on it. It is keen to improve the 
management, design and marketing of newspapers in the private 
sector. 
EFJA took a very active role in the recent campaign against the 
government's draft press law. As noted above, the new press law 
created a public outcry, and the feeble attempt to create dialogue by 
donors between the government and the press quickly flopped. The 
Association made a detailed criticism of the draft law, and drafted an 
alternative press law which it presented to the government for 
discussion. EFJA has frequently argued that the government's 
approach to the free press has been punitive and restrictive; the state 
has used the threat of punishment to control press activity. A better 
alternative, according to it, would have been constructive engagement 
which would have benefited the press and, at the same time, addressed 
the main concerns of the government. 
EFJA has also criticized the government for restricting 
investment in the private media and is unhappy with the long delay in 
the implementation of the 1999 broadcast law and in the licensing of 
private radio and television as promised by the legislation. A bone of 
contention in the draft law between the government on the other hand 
and the independent press on the other is whether the government has 
a mandate to establish a Press Council. The new draft states that the 
government shall establish such a Council, but the argument of EFJA 
and the private press in general is that it is people in the profession 
who should create a Press Council which will be accountable to them. 
The Association has drafted a proposal for the establishment of an 
independent Press Council which is now being discussed among its 
members28. 
4. Impact of International Assistance 
To begin with, the level of international financial and technical 
assistance to the media has been relatively small. Consequently, the 
28 Since these lines were written, the organization's leadership has been removed by 
the government and replaced by a new one. 
impact of donor assistance on the media, in particular in terms of the 
progress made by the independent press, has been by and large quite 
limited. The state of the media in the country today, including that of 
the free press, has been largely a product of its own making and the 
consequence of domestic political, social and economic processes. 
Individual initiative, public choice, competition and market forces, 
together with state action have been responsible for the achievements 
and failures of the media in general and the private press in particular. 
Donor assistance has mostly been concentrated on training 
programs for journalists; such programs have included visits arranged 
for journalist to foreign countries, and exchange of experiences among 
media people in the Horn of Africa. Assistance has also taken the 
form of financial support to selected newspapers to publish articles on 
the elections and other issues. And finally, international press 
organizations such as the International Press Institute, International 
Freedom of Expression and Exchange and others have provided 
financial assistance to EFJA as well as moral support to the cause of 
press freedom in Ethiopia. Both Amnesty International and Africa 
Human Rights Watch have reported on the arrest, detention and 
harassment of journalists on many occasions. 
Donor support has been provided without a clear understanding 
of the realities facing the media in the country. In the first place, as 
few donor staff speak or read Amharic or other local languages -the 
main languages of the media- their views of the state of the media 
have been shaped by the small number of English language papers 
that are published and the limited English programs broadcast on the 
electronic media. The English language media is a poor reflection of 
media in the country. There has been a tendency on the part of the 
donor community to offer support which is either not quite relevant or 
inadequate. Moreover, the type of assistance that has commonly been 
offered has largely been 'short-termist', that is, it is oriented towards 
short-term outcomes. Long-term investment in institution and capacity 
building has not been given serious consideration. Let us look closely 
at the some of the main support offered by donors. 
While accurate figures are not available, training of journalists 
has been the area where donors have invested considerably. There 
have been numerous training programs sponsored by donors but 
without coordination or follow up. The assumption behind these 
programs has been that if only media people were given some crash 
courses in the basics of their profession, the quality of journalism 
would markedly improve. But the problem is much more complicated 
than that. It is true that journalists need more training but this is not 
the main reason why the quality of reporting and news management is 
in such a poor state in the country. Journalists in the public sector 
cannot operate freely or in accordance with professional standards 
because their employer makes heavy demands on them. Journalists in 
the private sector are driven in part by stiff competition and in part 
because the papers they work on have definite political agendas. 
Equally significant has been the fact that the free press has been 
denied access to information by the government and is routinely 
excluded from all official press conferences. Moreover, the journalists 
that come to participate in the training programs are not the ones who 
make the important decisions: they do not have the power to initiate 
changes in standard, quality or style. 
More significantly, short-term training is not what is needed. The 
training given by each program is different with different instructors 
and different participants. We have also noted earlier that there is a 
language problem (the instructors do not speak the local language and 
the trainees have a poor grasp of English), that the instruction given is 
frequently not relevant to the needs of the trainees, and that on 
occasions the wrong people are selected. In brief, the investment in 
training programs is wasted investment. What is needed is long-term 
investment on an institution (or institutions) and on capacity building. 
The establishment of an independent school of journalism to train 
journalist for the public and private sector is one such sound 
investment. There are now plans to establish a school of journalism at 
Addis Ababa University supported by NORAD, the Norwegian aid 
agency. This is a positive step and should have been considered long 
ago. The Mass Media Training Institute, noted above, is a government 
institution and while there is no express discrimination against the 
private sector, journalists in the sector do not have confidence in it and 
have not shown any interest in enrolling in it. Another option is to 
invest in civil society institutions working with journalists, such as for 
example EFJA, to build up capacity so that they become responsible 
for promoting professional and responsible conduct among journalists. 
Donor support to election coverage may be faulted along similar 
lines. Until electioneering becomes relevant and interesting to the 
public and until the opposition candidates learn to make sound and 
creative use of the media, the press will find it difficult to devote 
space to elections, which in the past have been dull and uninspiring. 
Even with improvements in the campaign process, the main 
beneficiaries with be the electronic media and not the private press for 
obvious reasons. Moreover, it should be the candidates and political 
parties who should decide which media outlet and which newspaper 
will serve their purposes best. 
Regarding indirect subsidies to the press, several important 
issues need to be carefully considered. To begin with, the practice of 
paying newspapers to publish public education material is not a sound 
decision. This has helped some struggling newspapers to stay afloat 
when the public interest would have best been served if they were left 
to close down. Donors, in other words, have made interventions which 
has prevented the normal workings of the market place. Secondly, on 
occasions the choice of which newspaper to 'subsidize' has been made 
on poor criteria or without adequate knowledge and thus the "wrong" 
papers have been supported. There are far too many papers being 
published at present. Almost all the papers are based in the capital, 
and except for a few, do not have a market outside the city. The 
purchasing power of the city's residents cannot sustain more than a 
handful. Many of the major cities in Europe or North America do not 
maintain more than half a dozen or so papers, but the market here is 
literally over-flooded with newspapers and news magazines. One of 
the reasons for the poor quality of the press has to do with this fact. 
Thus, subsidizing papers serves no useful purpose, and instead one 
should adopt a hard-headed approach. 
In so far as enabling legislation is concerned, the record of 
international donors in this regard leaves a lot to be desired. The first 
order of business here is to make the government understand that 
donors are strongly committed to press freedom, and they should 
express strong concern when there are threats to press freedom on the 
part of the government. This has, by and large, been lacking among 
donors in this country. A good example is donor response to the 
restrictive press law drafted by the government recently. The donor's 
sub-committee on the press, which is a subcommittee of the Human 
Rights Subgroup, did discuss the matter at a few of its meetings but 
since it does not have the power to make decisions, it was only able to 
pass on information about the law to the donor embassies concerned. 
Some donors, such as for example the Netherlands and Norwegian 
Embassies, did express their concern to the government through their 
Ambassadors; however, they were not actively supported by many 
donors which have more leverage over the government. The media 
has not been given as much attention by donors as other elements of 
the democratization process. 
In so far as support to civil society organizations working with 
the media are concerned, it is disappointing to note that donors have 
not made serious efforts to support EFJA, the main professional 
the main reason why the quality of reporting and news management is 
in such a poor state in the country. Journalists in the public sector 
cannot operate freely or in accordance with professional standards 
because their employer makes heavy demands on them. Journalists in 
the private sector are driven in part by stiff competition and in part 
because the papers they work on have definite political agendas. 
Equally significant has been the fact that the free press has been 
denied access to information by the government and is routinely 
excluded from all official press conferences. Moreover, the journalists 
that come to participate in the training programs are not the ones who 
make the important decisions: they do not have the power to initiate 
changes in standard, quality or style. 
More significantly, short-term training is not what is needed. The 
training given by each program is different with different instructors 
and different participants. We have also noted earlier that there is a 
language problem (the instructors do not speak the local language and 
the trainees have a poor grasp of English), that the instruction given is 
frequently not relevant to the needs of the trainees, and that on 
occasions the wrong people are selected. In brief, the investment in 
training programs is wasted investment. What is needed is long-term 
investment on an institution (or institutions) and on capacity building. 
The establishment of an independent school of journalism to train 
journalist for the public and private sector is one such sound 
investment. There are now plans to establish a school of journalism at 
Addis Ababa University supported by NORAD, the Norwegian aid 
agency. This is a positive step and should have been considered long 
ago. The Mass Media Training Institute, noted above, is a government 
institution and while there is no express discrimination against the 
private sector, journalists in the sector do not have confidence in it and 
have not shown any interest in enrolling in it. Another option is to 
invest in civil society institutions working with journalists, such as for 
example EFJA, to build up capacity so that they become responsible 
for promoting professional and responsible conduct among journalists. 
Donor support to election coverage may be faulted along similar 
lines. Until electioneering becomes relevant and interesting to the 
public and until the opposition candidates learn to make sound and 
creative use of the media, the press will find it difficult to devote 
space to elections, which in the past have been dull and uninspiring. 
Even with improvements in the campaign process, the main 
beneficiaries with be the electronic media and not the private press for 
obvious reasons. Moreover, it should be the candidates and political 
parties who should decide which media outlet and which newspaper 
will serve their purposes best. 
Regarding indirect subsidies to the press, several important 
issues need to be carefully considered. To begin with, the practice of 
paying newspapers to publish public education material is not a sound 
decision. This has helped some struggling newspapers to stay afloat 
when the public interest would have best been served if they were left 
to close down. Donors, in other words, have made interventions which 
has prevented the normal workings of the market place. Secondly, on 
occasions the choice of which newspaper to 'subsidize' has been made 
on poor criteria or without adequate knowledge and thus the "wrong" 
papers have been supported. There are far too many papers being 
published at present. Almost all the papers are based in the capital, 
and except for a few, do not have a market outside the city. The 
purchasing power of the city's residents cannot sustain more than a 
handful. Many of the major cities in Europe or North America do not 
maintain more than half a dozen or so papers, but the market here is 
literally over-flooded with newspapers and news magazines. One of 
the reasons for the poor quality of the press has to do with this fact. 
Thus, subsidizing papers serves no useful purpose, and instead one 
should adopt a hard-headed approach. 
In so far as enabling legislation is concerned, the record of 
international donors in this regard leaves a lot to be desired. The first 
order of business here is to make the government understand that 
donors are strongly committed to press freedom, and they should 
express strong concern when there are threats to press freedom on the 
part of the government. This has, by and large, been lacking among 
donors in this country. A good example is donor response to the 
restrictive press law drafted by the government recently. The donor's 
sub-committee on the press, which is a subcommittee of the Human 
Rights Subgroup, did discuss the matter at a few of its meetings but 
since it does not have the power to make decisions, it was only able to 
pass on information about the law to the donor embassies concerned. 
Some donors, such as for example the Netherlands and Norwegian 
Embassies, did express their concern to the government through their 
Ambassadors; however, they were not actively supported by many 
donors which have more leverage over the government. The media 
has not been given as much attention by donors as other elements of 
the democratization process. 
In so far as support to civil society organizations working with 
the media are concerned, it is disappointing to note that donors have 
not made serious efforts to support EFJA, the main professional 
association for journalists in the country. The Association has 
survived thanks to the support it has received from a number of 
international press organizations and the support of its members29. 
29 These lines were written before the suspension of the Organization. 
V. C O N C L U S I O N S 
In this chapter, we shall try to present the main findings of our study 
and point to some of the major issues that have a bearing on the 
impact of democratic assistance. These issues may be taken as broad 
recommendations to donors and others, however, we hope they will be 
used as a starting point for further debate rather than as a blueprint for 
change. 
Limitations of Democratic Assistance 
As the discussion in the preceding chapters has shown, donor 
assistance to the democratization process in Ethiopia has been 
comparatively limited. In contrast, donors have invested heavily in the 
humanitarian and relief effort on the one hand, and in the socio-
economic development sectors on the other. Assistance to both sectors 
has been growing in the last ten years, and in particular assistance to 
the humanitarian sector has been increasing markedly in this period. 
Indeed, donor assistance in support of food security has been going on 
since the second half of the 1970s. By all standards, donor support to 
the electoral process has been fairly significant while support to the 
media has been relatively low. 
On the other hand, financial support to civil society, especially 
local human rights and advocacy organizations, has been instrumental 
in enabling the growth of the voluntary sector in the country. Without 
such support, civil society would have faced more difficult and trying 
circumstances, and its achievements, especially in the areas of human 
rights monitoring, training and advocacy would have been far more 
limited. However, to put the matter in perspective, we should note that 
the dependence of civil society organizations on donor funding is not 
unique to Ethiopia. Many of the global advocacy organizations, such 
as, for example, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam 
International, Greenpeace, etc. depend on donor funding for most of 
their program activities. 
An important finding of our study is that the impact of 
international assistance on the democratization process in this country 
has been very limited in terms of enduring results. The successes 
registered to date in the areas of elections, human rights and press 
freedom have primarily been a product of local initiative, local 
organizations, struggles by stakeholders, and an increasingly complex 
political reality to which the government has had to respond. 
International assistance has of course provided the resources that 
enabled civil society, the democratic stakeholders and the government 
to take important initiatives and to respond to emerging realities. 
On the other hand, the following are some of the major 
limitations of democratic assistance and the structural weaknesses of 
donor-government relations. The list is not meant to be exhaustive but 
reflects what we believe to be important ones that need to be debated 
and addressed. 
To begin with, donors rarely speak with one voice, and except 
for electoral support, assistance programs on democratization and 
governance are not offered in a well-coordinated manner among them. 
Donors speak with one voice when they wish to do so, and a few 
examples may illustrate this point. There was near unanimity among 
donors during the Ethio-Eritrean war: they supported Eritrea and 
criticized Ethiopia, and froze all development assistance to the country 
until the peace treaty was signed in December 2000. Most donors have 
insisted that Ethiopia should accept the IMF-World Bank's structural 
adjustment program to reform its economy. Finally, many donors have 
adopted what is known as direct budget support (DBS) switching from 
their previous project approach. Here, donors channel their aid 
directly to the state treasury for the government to use in accordance 
with its plans and priorities. The government is obliged to provide to 
donors progress reports based on a broad set of indicators. While this 
may make it easy for the government to plan and implement program 
activities, there is concern that DBS will strengthen the government 
bureaucracy and reinforce the dominance of the ruling party. It will in 
the long run undermine democratic change by making the government 
accountable to the donor community only and not to its own citizens. 
Moreover, decisions by donors with regard to human rights 
issues, issues of press freedom and responses to government failings 
in these areas are frequently inadequate and do not inspire confidence 
that the donor community is serious about promoting democratization 
and good governance in the country. The working consortia formed by 
different groups of donors, such as the Human Rights Subgroup, or ad 
hoc groupings set up to support the election process during elections 
are by and large forums for discussion and information exchange. 
Such consortia do not have a corporate body, i.e. they do not have the 
power to make decisions on behalf of their members but only to 
provide information. The European Union is the exception in this 
regard: it can make decisions and take measures once a common 
agreement is reached by all member countries. However, the EU's 
decision-making process is cumbersome and very time consuming, 
and the decisions that are finally arrived at will have been 
substantially revised (and watered down) from the original version in 
order to accommodate every member's wishes. 
Secondly, there are many foauns in which either donors by 
themselves or donors and government officials meet regularly to 
discuss economic, political and other issues. There are, on the other 
hand, no similar forums where citizens' voices and the voices of civil 
society are heard. The donors-only forums include the OECD 
Ambassadors Group, and the Development Assistance Group (DAG) 
which meets monthly; the DAG consists of all donors represented in 
the country. Then there is the Government-Donor Coordinating 
Meetings which are a forum for both. The only forum where a few 
NGOs have been allowed to participate (mainly because of their 
HIV/AIDS programs) is the Sector Development Group which brings 
together government, donors and NGOs (see UNDP 2001 for other 
coordination groups). This arrangement tends to foster dialogue 
between donor and government only, with the result that the 
government feels it is accountable to the donor community and not to 
its citizens. Such framework does not give importance to dialogue 
with and accountability to citizens' groups by either the government or 
donors. This does not foster responsible governance and democratic 
principles. It tends to not only marginalize non-state actors but also to 
send out the wrong signals to civil society and the public at large. This 
needs to be changed to allow tripartite dialogue involving government, 
donors and civil society. 
Thirdly, few donors have sufficient leverage over the 
government to hold it accountable if and when there are failings on its 
part or if government actions violate democratic principles. The donor 
group may be divided into three parts: a) the great major of donors 
which provide, individually, a small percentage of the total assistance 
fund to the country; b) donors which are part of the UN system, or 
include the Bretton Woods institutions; c) a small number of donors 
whose assistance makes up a substantial portion of total assistance to 
the country. The first have limited leverage over the government. For 
instance both the Netherlands Embassy and the Norwegian Embassy 
provide about 5 percent each of the total assistance; the U.K. provides 
much less. When acting individually, such countries do not have 
sufficient leverage to put pressure on the government on any 
substantive issue. Among the Bretton Woods institutions, the World 
Bank provides a substantial percentage of the assistance to the 
country; however, the Bank's support goes primarily to socio-
economic development, and as a consequence it tends to project a low 
profile in matters having to do with governance and democratization. 
Donors within the UN system do not make coordinated decisions nor 
do they harmonize their activities. Each donor in this group is a small 
actor in terms of its impact on the government or the country's needs. 
The exception to all this is the United States and the European 
Union. The US is by far the largest donor in all categories of 
assistance and thus the only country with potentially a preponderant 
power to influence the decisions of the Ethiopian government. The EU 
is also an important provider of assistance; if we add to this, the 
assistance provided individually by the member countries, the EU's 
influence can come to rival that of the US. Moreover, the EU is the 
largest provider of food aid to the country and food aid has come to be 
the Achilles heel of the Ethiopian government. What this means is that 
a majority of donors do not have sufficient power to influence the 
pace or conditions of democratization in the country. 
Fourthly, international assistance is not often free of politics. 
Each donor is driven by the national interest of its own government. 
Moreover, the dynamics of geopolitics, the desire to promote stability 
and peace in the Horn of Africa, and the war on international 
terrorism, have led big donors such as the United States to "befriend" 
the Ethiopian government, to refrain from raising issues of democratic 
performance and to decline to use their influence on matters of 
importance to the democratization process. 
Fifthly, the Ethiopian experience suggests that international 
electoral assistance, given in an environment characterized by chaos 
and poor organization of the electoral process, will not be effective in 
promoting democratic elections. Aid given under such an 
environment can be wasted or abused, and it is extremely difficult to 
provide full accounting on its use. The absence of effective 
monitoring and follow up has meant that a full assessment of the 
impact cannot be undertaken and best practices that can be replicated 
elsewhere are not documented. Moreover, donors have not given 
sufficient emphasis to the need to build up local capacity for 
monitoring elections. Sooner or later this country must rely on its own 
ability to monitor elections and to oversee the democratic process. 
International monitors, while important in providing international 
expertise and comparability, do not often have adequate knowledge of 
the complexity of the national political landscape. 
Sixthly, international assistance will be more effective if it is 
institutionalized and objectives and targets are clearly spelt out. 
International assistance for institutional and judicial reform to 
Ethiopia can be cited as a good example in this case. Reports were 
produced on time and distributed to all the parties to the project. 
Results were easily measurable and monitorable. Effective follow up 
of progress and lack of it were made easy. As * result, impact 
assessment was made less difficult and the strengths of the project 
could be identified to be experimented elsewhere under similar 
circumstances. 
Seventhly, democratization and the culture of good governance 
are long-term processes and cannot be achieved overnight. 
International assistance has frequently invested in projects or activities 
which show quick results when what is required is investing in the 
long term. Indeed, it will not be unfair to say that "short-termism" 
characterizes many aspects of donor assistance. The short-term 
approach may be seductive but will not have lasting value. Building 
institutions, in particular human rights, advocacy and other civil 
society institutions, and enhancing capacity in existing institutions 
have not received the importance they deserve by many donors. The 
disproportionate focus on elections rather than wider democratization 
issues has not advanced the democratic process. Moreover, related to 
this is the failure of donor assistance to make a strategic intervention, 
i.e. interventions with long-term and multiple benefits, in the areas of 
elections, human rights and the media. 
Lastly, in many instances, donors have made decisions without 
sufficient understanding of the country, its needs and the dynamics of 
democratization. As has been noted in the preceding chapters, donors 
have not had sufficient understanding of the dynamics having to do 
with the electoral process, human rights and the media in the country. 
Quite often, donors are interested in promoting programs that are 
currently in vogue and that have been designed without taking into 
account the specific realities of the country. Such programs come with 
pre-conceived assumptions. A point related to this is that on occasions 
dynamic and proactive donor personalities have had a significant 
impact on programs and relations between donors and the 
government. However, the frequent turnover of donor staff has had a 
damaging impact on continuity and sustainability. Many of the donor 
staff we interviewed for this study had been on their post from a few 
months to a year, and the experienced staff had been transferred to 
other countries. This involves a considerable loss of local knowledge 
and expertise in managing aid and monitoring progress. 
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